CHINA'S WAR WITH VIETNAM, 1979

ISSUES, DECISIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

KING C. CHEN



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Introduction

Unprecedented in scale and casualties, the brief Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979 was the bloodiest military conflict in the "fraternal" communist world. The war had many causes. The ups and downs of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship in the past, the border incidents, the Soviet factor, the Kampuchean problem, and the Overseas Chinese all contributed significantly to the escalation of the conflict. Nevertheless, China initiated the war. By launching a massive attack against Vietnam, Beijing attempted to achieve its foreign policy goals. As a result, the war not only affected Chinese-Vietnamese relations but brought about far-reaching international consequences as well.

The issue is so complex and interrelated that to consider some aspects of it, while ignoring others, is to misjudge the whole. In this context, a study of this sixteen-day war demands a thorough investigation that includes the framework of Chinese foreign policy, background issues, decisions, the war itself, and international implications.

The framework and background issues show the range and pattern of Chinese military-diplomatic operations in the past and the seriousness of various problems that had led the two "comradely" countries to war.

With regard to decisionmaking, the politics, model, and process require special attention. The politics became indispensable under the rehabilitated leadership of Deng Xiaoping, revealing the link between domestic politics and foreign policy in the form of the power struggle at the time, including ideological skirmishes and the re-establishment of factions. Such a struggle was manifested when Deng's power was further strengthened after 1979, as supported by the moderate flow of information from the mainland to the outside world. The model was constructed to illustrate how the decision to go to war was developed. The process was made possible by the domestic and international situation at the time and by the outspoken Deng Xiaoping. It was a rare situation.

On the topic of the war, a discussion is necessary on the overall military strength of both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in contrast to their armed forces engaged in the conflict. In view of the fact that the PRC never released official statistics about troops and casualties in any other war, it was unusual that Beijing announced the number of troops involved in the Vietnam war and in the 1979 border conflict. This should be attributed to the special situation of Vietnam and to Deng's personality.

The discussion of the international implications examines the depth and breadth of the impact on several international issues. The magnitude of consequences of this limited war can be measured by the current unfriendly Sino-Vietnamese relationship, the unresolved Sino-Soviet problems, the continuing Kampuchean tangle, and the growing Soviet presence in Asia. These issues present a challenge to the United States.

Students of communist affairs are often troubled by the scarcity of materials for analysis and interpretation. Even more difficult is access to information on policymakers and the decisionmaking process. This was the case in China's involvement in the Korean War and the Indian border conflicts. Since 1949, Beijing has been exercising strict control over all information, ostensibly to protect state secrets. Outsiders, including students of Chinese affairs, have had virtually no access to any information except that released by the government. They have to depend heavily on limited unofficial communications.

In the 1979 war, however, the case appeared moderately different. The sudden but short-lived campaign for "liberating" people's minds in 1977–1979, a campaign launched by Deng against Mao Zedong's political line and Hua Guofeng's leadership, encouraged the flow of oral communications. It also increased the leakage of a certain number of state secrets from the mainland to Hong Kong and other peripheral areas. Such leakages are highly important to outsiders, especially academic researchers.

In a strictly selective manner, I have included in this book a considerable portion of the materials from interviews and information collected in Hong Kong and other places. They were significantly useful. My confidence in these sources was strongly reinforced after I had read three important memoirs—*Keeping Faith* by Jimmy Carter, *Power and Principle* by Zbigniew Brzezinski, and *Hard Choices* by Cyrus Vance—about Deng Xiaoping's discussions with the Carter administration in early 1979 on the PRC's plans against Vietnam. My treatment of Deng's rationale of the war was almost complete in December 1980, whereas the three books were published in 1982 and 1983. The striking similarity between Deng Xiaoping's account and information from Hong Kong, with slight differences, not only vindicate the value of oral communications and the leaked information, but also prove Deng to be the top decisionmaker of the war. It is so revealing that the decision to go to war can be called Deng's decision, and the war, Deng's war.

Two other areas of analysis are worth a few words here: one is the pattern of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, the other is the level of the PRC's crisis management. In historical perspective, the 1979 war was an episode in the long history of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship and a revealing one in the pattern of their relations. This pattern was analyzed in this author's earlier study, *China and Vietnam, 1938–1954*: when China was strong, friendly, and magnanimous, Vietnam paid tribute to, cooperated with, and imitated China; when China was divided and chaotic, Vietnam enjoyed more independence and freedom; and when China was aggressive, Vietnam resisted. In their millenarian relationship with the Chinese, the Vietnamese have proved themselves to be an independent and heroic people. But the recent Soviet-Vietnamese alliance has complicated Vietnam's relations with China. It has also tarnished, to some extent, Vietnam's complete independent status that Ho Chi Minh had fought so hard to achieve. Whereas the pattern of their relationship has not altered, the factors that establish the pattern have begun to change. Such a development has illustrated that national and strategic interests have overshadowed the common binding force of communist ideology. If the strategic Soviet-Vietnamese alliance becomes as solid as the Warsaw Pact, which is unlikely at present, the pattern of Sino-Vietnamese relations will undergo a considerable change.

The crisis management of the PRC is a subject of increasing interest. Students in the field have discussed the subject, but have not yet developed a specific framework wherein the level and manner of Beijing's crisis management can be analyzed. In an attempt to meet the need, I present in this study a framework with six components of crisis and a rating system. Eight crises of the past (prior to the 1979 war) are used to formulate the criteria for determining the level and manner of Beijing's management. As it turns out, the framework proves to be applicable not only to the 1979 war and other Chinese crises, but also to the crises the United States has managed since World War II.

In the study of the level of the PRC's crisis involvement, the questions of "limited war" and "people's war" arose from time to time. Apparently, the PRC had conducted limited wars in all the crises between 1949 and 1978, except for the Korean conflict. And yet, the PRC was unable to engage in a people's war against Vietnam in 1979 as it planned to do and as it had done against Japan in 1937–1945. The main reason was that the conditions of a people's war, which requires among other criteria a strong sense of nationalism and massive people's participation, did not materialize in China. In contrast, Vietnam was able to fight a limited people's war against the PRC in 1979 not because of strategy, but conditions.

Finally, a point of observation should be registered here. In settling international disputes in the past, Beijing has employed peaceful and military means interchangeably. The regime is currently struggling for its modernization programs, which may require a period of three or four decades for achievement, and a peaceful domestic and international environment may be the prerequisite for such a gigantic task. If the Beijing policymakers are not fully aware of this most important precondition at this critical juncture and apply military means to domestic or international problems as they have done periodically since 1949, the chance of modernization may slip away.

A note on transliteration should be given here to avoid confusion. For materials from the PRC, I used the Pinyin; for materials from Taiwan (ROC), I used the Wade-Giles system.

1

The Framework of Beijing's Foreign Policy

Before discussing China's war with Vietnam in 1979, it is necessary to establish a framework for analysis. In view of the fact that Beijing took the initiative to launch the "self-defensive counterattack" on Vietnam, the issue should be explained by a China-centered approach. In this manner, Beijing's foreign policy can be better conceptualized to analyze this complicated issue.

Beijing's policy mentality has never been explicitly explained by the PRC government. It exists as we interpret Chinese international behavior. It has a theoretical background that guides the conduct of Chinese foreign policy. It is, therefore, the theory and practice that provide the foundation for our conceptualization. A succinct explanation is necessary.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In theory, Beijing's foreign policy mentality is drawn from traditional Chinese philosophy on foreign relations, communist ideology, and the concept of national and strategic interests. These elements appear highly significant when they are placed in the perspective of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship.

Traditionally, Chinese foreign relations were rooted in the concept of the "Mandate of Heaven." Justified by such a mandate, the authorities of the Middle Kingdom regarded China as the center of the world and its peripheral nations as barbarian neighbors. China established relations with them through the tributary system—the only institution for traditional foreign relations.[1] After a long period of practice, China built up its overlordship in Asia with political dominance and cultural superiority. Although military incursions took place occasionally, they were operated either at neighbors' requests or for the maintenance of the tributary system. This policy, therefore, was carried out in China's political, cultural, and strategic interests.

While excluding other strong powers from the region, China's political domination also brought about its political isolation. To maintain its leading position in Asia, China practiced a traditional rule: "to award those who are obedient and to chastise those who are defiant." This award-and-punishment policy was applied to the entire region of Asia, ranging from Korea to Annam (Vietnam) to Nepal, with mostly successful results.

After the Western powers appeared, the situation changed. Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and even Japan all demanded spheres of influence throughout China. China became weak and humiliated. Its tributary system ceased to function in the late nineteenth century although its interest in Asia remained unchanged.

Upon the establishment of its regime in Beijing in 1949, China reasserted its nationalism as well as its traditional position in Asia. Among Beijing's numerous statements, one of the most revealing was an editorial in a Chinese journal during the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954. It arrogantly stated that Zhou Enlai (chief Chinese delegate to the Geneva Conference) spoke not only for the "500 million Chinese people," but also for "the whole of the peace-loving people in Asia."[2] Northern Vietnam echoed this sentiment enthusiastically; it stated that "without China, the Asian problem cannot be solved; without China, there can be no solutions to questions of international relations."[3] The PRC's assertion of new leadership in Asia was unmistakably accepted by Vietnam. The leadership role, from traditional to modern, was then a factor for cooperation between the two nations. However, after the outbreak of the Vietnam War (1964–1975) and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1965–1976), China encountered Vietnam's more independent and growing role in Indochina. A new power, the Soviet Union, came into the arena to support Vietnam. The Sino-Vietnamese relationship turned sour, and the leadership element became a factor of conflict.

Nevertheless, owing to its long traditional and "brotherly" relations with Vietnam, China maintains but avoids over-extending its power in Indochina even though Vietnam is turning its back. In terms of communist ideology, the Beijing government stated in 1950 that the Chinese policy is formulated on the scientific principle of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin and on the scientific knowledge of the laws of social development. It interprets virtually every international issue in accordance with Mao's dialectical arguments, including his thoughts on contradiction, the "intermediate zone" concept, and the "three-world" theory.[4] When Beijing applies ideology to Sino-Vietnamese relations, it sees both their common objectives and their differences.

Their general common objectives run from their antireactionary and anti-imperialist struggle to the socialist transformation of their societies. In upholding their common goals, they employ ideology to strengthen their common bond. However, when their common objectives are overshadowed by their conflicting interests, they both twist the interpretation of Marxism-Leninism to their advantage. Therefore, Beijing theorizes the Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation as a hegemonic device encircling China and views Pol Pot's guerrilla fighting as a just war against the Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea.[5] Reciprocally, Vietnam accuses China of committing hegemonic crimes by suppressing and invading Vietnam. Consequently, the common ideology has also been utilized by both sides to escalate their dispute.

The general concept of national and strategic interests is well understood. Both nations have undoubtedly accepted it as a guiding principle to conduct their foreign policies. They both pursue national security, reunification, end of foreign intervention, economic development, national power, and influence. In some cases, their mutual assistance in promoting these interests has strengthened their cooperation and unity, such as China's military and economic aid to Vietnam and Vietnam's learning of China's experiences in land reforms, trade, and cultural exchanges.

In the course of promoting their interests, however, they have experienced different stages of development. Different stages require different policies that are often influenced by different times and physical environments, including the interference of outside powers. When different policies are formulated, they may run against each other's interests. China's attack on Vietnam in 1979 epitomizes their conflict of interests in the most serious form since 1949. As a result, the element of national and strategic interests has also become a factor of conflict.

But, for a variety of reasons, the conflicting interests have not guided either to extremes. China realizes that it is also in its interest to carry out its policy against Vietnam with restraint.

PRACTICE

To substantiate the foregoing theoretical interpretation of Beijing's foreign policy, we have to examine the PRC's international behavior. A brief survey of its involvement in eight crises prior to 1979 will show the level of its conduct of foreign policy and hence support the above interpretation.

During the Korean War (1950–1953), 320,000–400,000 Chinese "volunteers" fought fiercely with the United Nations forces and pushed them back to the south. However, they did not drive the U.N. forces down to Pusan. Instead, they stopped around the 38th parallel. The message was clear: they had "rescued" North Korea from being unified by the U.N. forces with the South and had safeguarded the security of Manchuria. A Chinese military takeover of South Korea was not in Beijing's interest, although its capability was not unlimited.

In the case of the two Indochinese wars (1950–1954 and 1964–1975), China endeavored to assist its Indochinese comrades. Chinese security was not directly in jeopardy. Neither the Chinese nor the Vietnamese saw the need for Chinese military intervention there.

The bombardments of Quemoy and Matsu (1954–1955 and 1958) were low-risk adventures since it was impossible to seize the islands at a low price. China was, however, able to inflict severe damage on the islands, especially in 1958 when the nearly blockaded island garrison was ordered not to return fire in order to preserve their limited ammunition against a possible communist surprise landing.

In the two dramatic border conflicts with India in 1959 and 1962, Beijing clearly demonstrated its restraint. After having given India a heavy lesson, China did not attempt a greater military victory over India in either case. The unilateral withdrawal of its forces after a one-month drive in October–November 1962 indicated unmistakably that the Chinese military behavior was well calculated and fully under control.

China's border fighting with the Soviet Union in March 1969 demonstrated further its surprise but limited policy. In facing a stronger and dangerous adversary, its inferior capability and realistic calculation restrained China from escalating the fighting into a great war.

THE FRAMEWORK

To understand Beijing's policy framework more specifically, I have constructed a rating system and a typology of crisis components to determine the level of behavior in the above eight crises.[6]

Range of Ratings

The ratings of low (L), medium (M), and high (H) as given below indicate the level of involvement in these crises. The numerical sequence is used to show Beijing's commitment as accurately as possible.

LOW	*MEDIUM*	*HIGH*
L_1 (low-low)	M_1 (medium-low)	H_1 (high-low)
L_2 (low-medium)	M_2 (medium-medium)	H_2 (high-medium)
L_3 (low-high)	M_3 (medium-high)	H_3 (high-high)

Typology of Crisis Components

To establish a typology of crisis components is to arrange the eight crises into a manageable pattern. Since this is an important attempt, the following six components are carefully selected in accordance with the general practice of the management of international crisis.[7] In fact, they are the most important components in Beijing's crisis involvement in the past. After the typology is established, we can use it to construct the criteria in standardizing the formation of crisis. The six components and their ratings are as follows:[8]

1. *MANPOWER IN FORCES*

    H: Above 150,000
        H_1: 150,000–200,000
        H_2: 200,000–300,000
        H_3: 300,000–up
    M: 30,000–150,000
        M_1: 30,000–60,000
        M_2: 60,000–100,000
        M_3: 100,000–150,000
    L: Below 30,000
        L_1: Below 10,000
        L_2: 10,000–20,000
        L_3: 20,000–30,000

2. *KINDS OF FORCES*

    H: Ground, air, and navy
        H_1: Medium quality, medium combat
        H_2: High quality, heavy combat
        H_3: High quality, heaviest combat
    M: Ground and air (or navy)
        M_1: Medium quality, limited combat
        M_2: High quality, medium combat
        M_3: High quality, heavy combat
    L: Ground
        L_1: Medium quality, limited or noncombat

2. *KINDS OF FORCES*, continued
   - L_2: High quality, limited or noncombat
   - L_3: High quality, active combat
3. *WEAPONRY*
   - H: Advanced conventional, strategic
     - H_1: Advanced conventional, medium quality
     - H_2: Advanced conventional, high quality
     - H_3: Advanced conventional, strategic
   - M: Conventional
     - M_1: Medium-low quality
     - M_2: Medium quality
     - M_3: Medium-high quality
   - L: Limited conventional
     - L_1: Low-limited quality
     - L_2: Medium-limited quality
     - L_3: High-limited quality
4. *DURATION*
   - H: Above 12 months
     - H_1: 12–24 months
     - H_2: 24–48 months
     - H_3: 48 months–up
   - M: 1–12 months
     - M_1: 1–4 months
     - M_2: 4–8 months
     - M_3: 8–12 months
   - L: Below 1 month
     - L_1: Below 10 days
     - L_2: 10–20 days
     - L_3: 20 days–1 month
5. *CASUALTIES*
   - H: Above 30,000
     - H_1: 30,000–50,000
     - H_2: 50,000–80,000
     - H_3: 80,000–up
   - M: 1,000–30,000
     - M_1: 1,000–10,000
     - M_2: 10,000–20,000
     - M_3: 20,000–30,000
   - L: Below 1,000

L_1: Below 300
L_2: 300–600
L_3: 600–1,000

6. *MOBILIZATION*

- H: National
  - H_1: Nationwide, low intensity
  - H_2: Nationwide, medium intensity
  - H_3: Nationwide, high intensity
- M: Regional
  - M_1: 1 province–1 military region
  - M_2: 1–2 military regions
  - M_3: 2–4 military regions
- L: Local
  - L_1: 1–5 counties
  - L_2: 5–10 counties
  - L_3: 10 counties–1 province

In applying the rating system and typology to the aforementioned eight crises, I have furnished detailed information on the PRC's involvement in these conflicts in Table 1.1.[9]

Several points of analysis can be drawn from this table. First, the PRC government during Mao's years never made known the size of forces involved and the casualties suffered in the crises. The two excellent studies on the Korean War cited in the table suggest a different but comparatively accurate account of the Chinese troops involved (320,000 and 400,000, respectively), yet no figure for casualties is given.[10] Similar situations are found in the Quemoy and Matsu crises,[11] the Indian border wars,[12] and the Sino-Soviet border conflicts.[13] The only different case is the Vietnam War. Although the Beijing government's announcement in 1979 of its troop involvement and casualties was mainly for the argument against Vietnam, it was done after Mao's death.[14]

Second, Chinese involvement in all these crises was in its peripheral areas, adjacent to Chinese territory. It offers a clear indication that the PRC, in the past at least, concerned itself mainly with its own security, unification, or territorial disputes with neighbors.[15] China has not ventured a military operation afar and is unlikely to do so in the near future. The reason is two-fold: restrained policy and limited capability.

Third, the Korean intervention was the only high-level crisis of the eight. It was 12.5 percent of the total eight involvements (100 ÷ 8 = 12.5). The combination of the other seven low- and medium-level crises was 87.5 percent. Such a percentage contrast suggests that low- and medium-level

TABLE 1.1

LEVEL OF THE PRC'S INVOLVEMENT IN EIGHT CRISES, 1950–1978

Crisis	*Manpower in Forces*		*Kinds of Forces*		*Weaponry*		*Duration*		*Casualties*		*Mobilization*		*Average Level*
1. Korean War 1950–1953	320,000–400,000	H_3	ground, air	M_3	advanced conventional	H_1	1950–1953	H_2	80,000–100,000*	H_3	national	H_3	H_2
2. Indochina War 1950–1954	6,000–9,000	L_1	ground (non-combat)	L_1	limited conventional	L_1	1950–1954	H_2	500–800*	L_2	regional-local	L_2	L_2
3. Quemoy and Matsu, 1954	5,000–6,000	L_1	ground (limited combat)	L_1	limited conventional	L_1	a few days	L_1	10–50*	L_1	local	L_1	L_1
4. Quemoy and Matsu, 1958	50,000–60,000	M_1	ground, air (limited combat)	M_1	limited conventional	L_2	two months	M_1	100–150*	L_1	local	L_2	L_3
5. Indian Border War, 1959	500–1,000*	L_1	ground (limited combat)	L_1	limited conventional	L_1	two days	L_1	5–20*	L_1	local	L_1	L_1
6. Indian Border War, 1962	50,000–80,000	M_2	ground	L_3	conventional	M_2	one month	M_1	1,500–2,000*	M_1	regional-local	M_1	M_1
7. Vietnam War 1964–1975	50,000–(320,000 in six years)	M_1	ground (non-combat)	L_2	limited conventional	L_2	1965–1971	H_3	3,000–4,000	M_1	national-regional-local	M_2	M_1
8. Soviet Border War, 1969	300–530; 3,000–4,000	L_3	ground	L_3	conventional	M_3	two days	L_1	850–1,000	L_3	national-regional-local	M_3	M_1

Sources: The extensive sources to this table are listed in Note 9, p. 00.

Note: *Estimated.

commitment is the PRC's choice in conducting its diplomatic-military policy. Even if compelled to make a high-level commitment, China de-escalates it as soon as conditions allow; its initiative in proposing the resumption of peace talks on the Korean War in late March 1953 is a case in point. The proposal was made immediately after the funeral of Stalin, who was regarded as being "uncommunicative" on Korea.[16] Such a level of commitment has become a principle of Beijing's international behavior. This is Beijing's foreign policy framework that has developed into a virtual law of its crisis management at the present time.

With the above framework in mind, we can place China's disputes with Vietnam in better perspective. We can also see more clearly Beijing's commitment to this sixteen-day war as well as the pattern of its management of the crisis.

2

Issues in Dispute: Chinese Assistance, the USSR, and Kampuchea

There were five major factors leading to the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict: Chinese assistance to Vietnam during the Indochina war (1946–1954) and the Vietnam War (1964–1975), Soviet involvement, the Kampuchean problem, the territorial issue, and overseas Chinese in Vietnam. Some of these issues had deep historical roots, some developed with international implications, but all of them emerged as serious problems only after the general Sino-Vietnamese relationship had deteriorated. For our background, these issues will be examined in Chapters 2 and 3.

CHINESE ASSISTANCE

To assist Vietnam's long struggle for independence and modernization, the PRC executed its socialist international duty. When China's assistance came with no conditions attached, Sino-Vietnamese friendship prospered. When their interests differed, their problems and conflicts arose. During the Indochina and Vietnam wars, such a cooperation-and-conflict relationship developed between the two nations. The following section will discuss succinctly first the highlights of Chinese assistance during the two wars and then Vietnam's disputes.

The Indochina War (1946–1954)

The French started the Indochina War in November 1946 by attacking the Vietnamese in Haiphong. Planning to regain the entire Indochinese peninsula and encouraged by the new international anti-communist environment in the early years of the cold war (1946–1947),[1] the French forces launched a powerful campaign against the Viet-Minh (Viet-Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh) in the fall of 1947.[2] The assault compelled Ho Chi Minh to abandon all the major cities in northern Vietnam. He retreated and spread his forces into the jungle of the Sino-Vietnamese border area. With the French in the front and the Chinese Nationalists in the back, his forces were isolated and inactive. At this stage, many French officers in Vietnam declared that there was no longer any military problem in Indochina. However, the resourcefulness of Ho and the resiliency of his men forestalled any Viet-Minh collapse.

The Chinese communist victory over the Nationalists in 1949 overjoyed the Viet-Minh. In July of that year, Pham Ngoc Thach, Minister of Public Health in the Viet-Minh regime, told a French writer, "The successes of the Chinese [People's Liberation] Army . . . herald the impending end of [the] dark days" of the Viet-Minh.[3] In November, Luu Duc Pho, chief delegate of the Viet-Minh to the Asian and Australasian Trade Union Conference in Beijing, echoed most enthusiastically Liu Shaoqi's revolutionary formula speech. Pho said that Liu's formula "must serve as the compass for all the workers of Southeast Asia."[4]

For the Viet-Minh, the big change, of course, did not come until the Chinese Communists offered massive aid in 1950. After Ho Chi Minh's secret visit to Beijing in early 1950, Beijing soon sent General Chen Geng to Vietnam to help organize and train the Vietnamese army and prepare them for future campaigns. Meanwhile, at the request of Ho, Beijing sent to Vietnam a military advisory mission headed by General Wei Guoqing. A political advisory group headed by Luo Guibo (Lo Kwei-po, former first Chinese ambassador to Vietnam) was also sent to Vietnam to pass on Chinese experience in financial and economic work, rectification of cadres' ideology, government work, and mobilization of the masses.[5]

Before September 1950, the Chinese in Yunnan and Guangxi had helped train and equip five Viet-Minh divisions (the 304th, 308th, 312th, 316th, and 320th), and gave them tens of thousands of military weapons. Prior to the fall 1950 offensive, the Viet-Minh army was reported to have 250,000 regular and guerrilla fighters with 30 artillery pieces, 140 mortars, 230 machine guns, and 100,000 rifles.[6] The war preparation was complete. Morale was high. The French authorities in Saigon predicted in mid-August that a well-trained Viet-Minh army would soon launch powerful attacks against the French. A week later, *Radio Beijing* made the same announcement.[7]

Less than one month after Beijing's announcement, the Viet-Minh launched a well-planned and powerful offensive against the French (September 16 to November 2). It "wiped out over 10,000" French troops, destroyed the entire French system from Cao-Bang to Lang-Son, and opened up major communication lines in the border areas.[8] As the offensive concluded, General Vo Nguyen Giap spoke to his officers: "From this battle, we better understand the greatness of the thought of Mao Zedong. I hope that all of you will double your efforts to study his thought, especially his military theory."[9]

After the fall offensive of 1950, the Chinese military mission continued to help the Viet-Minh organize the campaigns of Trung-Du (the middle reaches of the Red River, 1951), Dong-Bac (northeast, 1951), Ninh-Binh (1951), Tay-Bac (northwest, 1952), and Thuong Lao (Upper Laos, 1953). They scored more victories. As the Viet-Minh army grew and its liberation war gained momentum, so did Chinese advisors. They increased from about 4,000 to 8,000, plus 1,000 medical service men.[10] *Le Monde* reported that 3,000 to 4,000 Chinese officers were in the Viet-Minh army, including three or four generals.[11]

Between December 1953 and May 1954, the Chinese mission helped the Vietnamese army to organize and carry out the world-renowned Dien Bien Phu campaign. According to Beijing, "All the arms and ammunition, communication equipment, food and medicine used and expended in this campaign were supplied by China."[12] At the critical point of the battle, the French repeatedly requested U.S. military participation by air strikes. President Eisenhower declined the request but decided to keep southern Vietnam as a non-communist nation. As a result, the Viet-Minh captured Dien Bien Phu on May 7. The French garrison suffered an unprecedented defeat. It virtually ended French colonialism in Indochina. But, Hoang Van Hoan pointed out, "without the artillery sent by China it would not have been possible to destroy the French army corps' strongpoints, and without the personal participation of Comrade Wei Guoqing in the frontline command of the battle it would have been difficult to win [the] complete victory."[13] The French military authorities in Indochina generally agreed with this observation. Yet, today Hanoi gives no credit to China. Even regarding the massive aid China offered to the Viet-Minh throughout the period of 1950–1954, Hanoi merely mentions, "China was the main supplier of military hardware to Vietnam in the last years of the latter's resistance war against France."[14]

The Geneva Conference

The timing of the Viet-Minh's capture of Dien Bien Phu—one day before the opening of the Geneva Conference on Indochina (May 8, 1954)—was observed by General Henri-Eugene Navarre, then the French commander-in-chief in Indochina, as a device achieved at the "advice of the Chinese military mission."[15] Its purpose, naturally, was to strengthen the Viet-Minh's bargaining power in Geneva.

The participants of the Geneva Conference on Indochina included nine nations: France, Britain, the USSR, the PRC, the United States, North Vietnam (the Viet-Minh, DRV), South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (Kampuchea). Britain and the USSR served as the co-chairmen. There were many problems to be solved, but the central issues were how to reach a ceasefire agreement throughout Indochina and a political solution for Vietnam. All the major participants, except for the United States, contributed significantly to the success of the conference, including China and North Vietnam.

The process of the conference can be divided into three periods. The first was from May 8 to June 20, mainly for making proposals; the second was from June 21 to July 9, for home consultations; and the third was from July 10 to 21, for final negotiations.

During the first period, a prerequisite for a ceasefire was the Viet-Minh's agreement to the withdrawal of its revolutionary forces from Laos and Cambodia. Meanwhile, the problem of the participation in the conference by the revolutionary governments of the Pathet Lao and the Khmer was also raised by the Viet-Minh. Arguments and disputes broke out between the Viet-Minh on one side and Laos and Cambodia on the other. As the arguments dragged on, little progress was made. Many delegates became impatient. On June 10, Anthony Eden, British co-chairman, threatened to call off the conference if it could not reach an agreement in a short period of time on the issue of Viet-Minh troops in Laos and Cambodia and on the composition of the proposed International Commission (to be discussed later). After consultations among the Soviet, Chinese, and Viet-Minh delegations, Zhou Enlai (chief Chinese delegate) visited Eden on the morning of June 16—one day after the suspension of the discussion on Korea.[16] He told the British foreign secretary that he could persuade the Viet-Minh to withdraw its troops from Laos and Cambodia and that China would recognize the two royal governments provided that there would be no American bases in the two kingdoms. Eden had a "strong impression that Zhou wanted a settlement."[17] At a restricted session in the afternoon, Zhou made a formal proposal for the withdrawal of Viet-Minh troops from Laos and Cambodia. It was endorsed by the other conferees, including Pham Van Dong (chief Viet-Minh delegate). Western newspapers praised it as a step toward the path of agreement.[18] On June 19, the first ceasefire accord for Cambodia and Laos was reached—viewed as success for the first period.

During the second period, the chief delegates returned home for consultations, but there were several important events that developed outside the conference. On June 23, Pierre Mendès-France, the new French premier who had threatened resignation if peace in Indochina was not reached by July 20, met Zhou Enlai at Bern, Switzerland. The meeting was a "bombshell" to many observers but resulted in constructive agreement. It included a recommendation for an armistice throughout the three Indochinese states accompanied by a political settlement, a proposal for an eventually unified government in Vietnam through national elections, and a Chinese promise to recognize the royal governments of Laos and Cambodia.[19] Later, these three points of agreement were mostly embodied in the Geneva agreement.

Soon after, Zhou visited India on his way home. He proclaimed with Premier Nehru the well-known five principles of peaceful coexistence.[20] He then visited Burma, repeating the five principles with Premier U Nu. Finally Zhou, accompanied by Hoang Van Hoan (then spokesman for the Viet-Minh delegation in Geneva), met Ho Chi Minh in Liuzhou on July 3–5. They agreed on a demarcation line in Vietnam that had been discussed earlier in Geneva by the Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese delegations.

During the third period (July 10–21), delegates returned to Geneva for intensive negotiations. They conducted their numerous maneuvers, bargains, and compromises. The military demarcation line at the 17th parallel was agreed upon. It was done through Pham Van Dong's direct negotiations with Mendès-France on the condition of holding general elections in two years for the reunification of Vietnam. The date of the general elections was decided on—July 1956—two years after the conclusion of the conference. Another important issue was the composition of the International Supervision Commission. Proposals and counterproposals from communist and non-communist delegations were stubbornly rejected by each other. Frustrations developed. Finally, on July 18, Zhou Enlai proposed a three-member commission, one from each communist, Western, and neutral group. They were Poland, Canada, and India. It was unanimously accepted. "From that moment," as Eden recalled, "the tangled ends of the negotiations began to sort themselves out."[21] Beijing's mass media strongly urged the other participants to share this attitude of compromise with Zhou Enlai.[22]

In sum, the Geneva Conference achieved several agreements: a cease-fire throughout Indochina, a demarcation line for Vietnam at the 17th parallel, a ban on military alliance for the Indochinese states, the establishment of an International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICC), and the reunification of Vietnam through general elections in July 1956. Pham Van Dong's statement at the closing session of the conference (July 21), *Nhan Dan*'s editorial (July 25), and Ho Chi Minh's appeal to his compatriots (July 22), all hailed the achievements of the conference as a great victory for Vietnam and urged the people to struggle for the reunification of the country.[23]

In appreciation for Chinese aid during the first Indochina war, Pham Van Dong summed up on August 3, 1954, in this manner.

> During the eight years of the war of resistance, the Vietnamese people had the warm sympathy and support of the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Government of the Chinese People's Republic . . . We learned from China's experience in armed struggle, people's war, democratic and land reforms, and in financial and economic work during the war of resistance. By combining China's valuable experience with the practical conditions of the war of resistance in Vietnam, we have won tremendous military victories and achieved outstanding results in land reforms, financial and economic work and in other fields.[24]

The value of this statement lies not only in the mentioning of the military victory, but also in the acknowledgment of little-covered achievements in land reforms, financial, and economic affairs. As Hoang Van Hoan stated in his article, the Chinese political advisory mission headed by Luo Guibo helped Vietnam to run their financial and economic affairs, rectification of cadres' ideology, and other administrative works. Such efforts ensured the success of the war.[25]

However, the spirit behind the statements of cooperation and appreciation during the Indochina war has now changed. Vietnam bitterly disputes with China. Hanoi claims that after Dien Bien Phu the Vietnamese people were capable of liberating the entire country, but China prevented Vietnam from doing so. It also charges that China's position in Geneva was totally different from Vietnam's and that the Geneva solution was a result of the collusion between China French imperialism, which was then imposed on Vietnam. In summary, Hanoi charges that it was the first time Chinese leaders betrayed the revolution of Indochina.[26]

Beijing, of course, rejected these charges. And in 1979, Hoang Van Hoan defended China's position vigorously. Hoan, being the spokesman for the Viet-Minh at Geneva, rebutted Hanoi's accusations point by point, arguing that at Geneva, China maintained the same position as Vietnam and Russia, and obtained agreements from Ho Chi Minh on virtually every important issue. Hoan also ridiculed Le Duan's accusations against China as foolish, because if Le Duan's accusations were true, it would make the delegations of Vietnam and the USSR mere puppets of China.[27]

There are two points that merit discussion here. First, it is no longer a secret that a faction in the Viet-Minh, led by General Vo Nguyen Giap, argued for the complete military liberation of Vietnam immediately after the victory at Dien Bien Phu. Boosted by such an unprecedented victory, the advocators wanted to continue the war but had no way of measuring their capability to win; they also did not comprehend the trend of the international situation.

Second, in charging China with collusion with French imperialism, Hanoi obviously had either misread or distorted the peace trend of the world. In my study of the international peace situation of 1953–1954, my findings strongly suggest that it was the Soviet Union and the PRC who, for domestic and international necessities, steadily promoted a world peace campaign. It started almost immediately after Stalin's death (March 1953) and developed into an irresistible international force during the Geneva Conference.[28] If China should be blamed for collusion with France at Geneva, then the Soviet Union should be condemned for colluding with China in promoting the Indochinese peace settlement. Hanoi is silent on Moscow, however.

The real issue is the problem of either cooperation or conflict of interests between China and Vietnam. Prior to Dien Bien Phu when Vietnam's interest in anti-French colonialism was strongly backed up by China, they cooperated wholeheartedly. After Dien Bien Phu when China and the Soviet Union were actively promoting world peace for their national interests, the Viet-Minh were still strongly interested in the liberation of the entire country. As their interests differed, their disagreements arose.

The Vietnam War, 1964–1975

Among numerous causes for the escalation of the Vietnam War, Washington's containment policy and Hanoi's commitment to its sacred mission of liberating southern Vietnam had played a very fundamental role in predetermining the war as an inevitable conflict between the United States and Vietnam.[29] Both countries seemed unable and unwilling to reverse this inevitable trend, especially the United States. However, America was not formally involved in the war until the Gulf of Tonkin incident in early August of 1964 regardless of occasional conflicts with the Viet Cong by U.S. military personnel.

Immediately after the incident, the United States further escalated the war. China sent a squadron of MIG-15 and MIG-17 jets to Hanoi and began to construct new jet airfields in Yunnan and Guangxi for Hanoi's air sanctuary. At this juncture, Hanoi's interest in war with the United States and the Saigon government coincided with Beijing's. Mao was determined to keep Hanoi in the fight while Nikita Khrushchev ignored Ho Chi Minh.[30] The Sino-Vietnamese militant friendship was warm, and emotion against the United States ran high.

After Khrushchev was removed from power in October 1964, the Soviets made known their position on Indochina again. Moreover, the beginning of U. S. bombing of North Vietnam in February 1965, when Soviet Premier Kosygin was visiting Hanoi, led to a change in Soviet policy toward Vietnam. Although they still desired to maintain the precarious détente with the United States and hoped to end the escalating Vietnam

War at a negotiation table, Soviet leaders decided to render more assistance to Vietnam. Apparently, Moscow was under the Vietnamese and Chinese pressure to follow their militant line against the United States.

Immediately after Kosygin had returned to Russia, Moscow made a united action proposal to Beijing for Vietnam. It included: (1) transit rights for the Soviet military weapons through China; (2) Soviet use of one or two airfields in Yunnan and its right to station 500 men at these air bases; (3) a Soviet air corridor over China; (4) permission for 4,000 Soviet military personnel to pass through China on the way to Vietnam; and (5) trilateral talks among the USSR, China, and Vietnam to discuss the details of the proposal and future problems.[31] Pham Van Dong supported the proposal. Beijing, except for the transit rights of Soviet arms, formally rejected the rest of the proposal in November 1965.[32] The reasons were clear: Mao wanted to continue his anti-Soviet policy, and he did not want to see Chinese sovereignty encroached upon.

Beijing's rejection was, of course, directed against Moscow, not Hanoi; but it was Hanoi that suffered. After the rejection, however, the united action issue was not dead. Ho Chi Minh was reported to have personally appealed to Mao.[33] Moscow continued making similar proposals, and a Japanese communist delegation also tried to persuade Beijing to cooperate with Moscow.[34] Mao firmly refused. Beijing's intransigence led to the rise of Hanoi's resentment of China.

Under these circumstances, Beijing had to make a new policy for Vietnam. By the end of 1965, China's policy for the war was formulated. It contained the following major points: (1) An increase in military and economic aid and encouragement of people's war on a self-reliance basis. The aid included an average of $200 million a year and a large working force for air defense, engineering, railway and bridge building, and logistics. From 1965 to 1971, a total of 320,000 men were sent to Vietnam at an average of 50,000–60,000 a year. (2) No Sino-American war over Vietnam; China would not attack unless China was attacked. (3) Rejection of the Soviet united action proposal except for the transit rights for the shipment of Soviet war materials to Vietnam. (4) No peace talks with the United States, advising Hanoi to fight until final victory. (5) Conditions for intervention: if the United States brought the ground war to North Vietnam and presented a threat to Chinese security, China would respond to Hanoi's invitation to intervene.[35]

At the time when Beijing's policy was made, two important developments took place: the Chinese Cultural Revolution and an increase of Soviet involvement in Vietnam. Both had a significant bearing on the war.

The Chinese Cultural Revolution was launched in November 1965 and lasted for a decade. An important question has been asked: what is the relationship, if any, between the Cultural Revolution and the Vietnam War? The answer is that Mao had deliberated and prepared for almost ten years before launching such a campaign against the burgeoning capitalist and revisionist tendencies in China, and the Vietnam War broke out around that time. As a result, the former had had a significant impact on the latter.

To fulfill their international duty to Vietnam, Beijing leaders had formulated a policy on the war, as previously described, before they started the revolution. Mao was a realistic politician. Therefore, he firmly set a limit to China's aid to Vietnam and stubbornly upheld his anti-Soviet drive. He unequivocally sent a message to Vietnam in September 1965 through Lin Biao's article "Long Live the Victory of People's War" that "revolution or people's war in any country is the business of the masses in that country and should be carried out primarly by their own efforts; there is no other way." Meanwhile, he repeatedly rejected the Soviet united action proposal. Mao did so because he did not want to have a second Korean War with the United States, from which no one would really gain except the Soviet Union.

The Cultural Revolution, in a nutshell, was the greatest intraparty struggle of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since its establishment in 1921. It wasted an entire decade of nation-building. Because of the devastating infighting, Chinese leaders were extremely preoccupied with their domestic troubles. They gradually paid less attention to the Vietnam War. Moreover, the shipment of Soviet arms was reportedly interrupted in Guangxi several times, although the Vietnam News Agency was authorized on June 19, 1966, by its government to issue denials.[36] Nevertheless, this author found solid evidence showing that two rival factions of the Red Guards in Guangxi had stopped the Vietnam-bound train in Liuzhou for at least two months (June–July 1968) and robbed the military materials from the train. It prompted Zhou Enlai and other Beijing leaders to deliver urgent cables and telephone instructions for an immediate restoration of order.[37] When they were not obeyed, Zhou and other Cultural Revolution officials called in the Red Guard leaders of the rival factions from Guangxi to Beijing for severe reprimand.[38]

In summary, the Cultural Revolution constrained China to limit its assistance to Vietnam while the Soviet Union increased its aid significantly. It caused considerable damage to the general Sino-Vietnamese relationship. The increasing Soviet assistance to Vietnam not only doubled or even tripled the amount of China's aid but also included sophisticated weapons such as tanks and jet fighters.[39] More important, Moscow gradually stiffened its attitude toward the United States over Vietnam.

Beginning in 1967, Hanoi gradually moved toward a more independent policy from Beijing. It is also repeatedly tried to send out peace talk signals in 1967 and 1968. Therefore, when President Johnson made an offer of peace talks on March 31, 1968, after the Tet offensive, it was accepted on April 3. Beijing regarded it as an unusual move taken by Hanoi behind its back. China then carried a complete news blackout on the Paris talks for seven months. Whereas Beijing condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as an act of social-imperialism, Hanoi's spokesman in Paris endorsed it. As of 1969, it became clear that China had suffered a loss in Vietnam while the Soviet Union had scored a gain.

The Sino-Soviet border conflict in March 1969 and the beginning of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam in mid-1969 led Mao to believe that China's potential enemy had now shifted from China's south to China's north. Ho Chi Minh's death in September 1969 provided an opportunity for Beijing to warm up its cool relationship with Vietnam. Zhou Enlai flew to Hanoi and paid his final respects to Ho. Pham Van Dong, a moderate in Sino-Vietnamese relations, returned Zhou's visit in October of the same year. The Cambodian crisis of early 1970 offered China another opportunity to cooperate with Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The Saigon-American invasion of Laos in February–March 1971 seriously concerned Hanoi, which invited Zhou for a visit March 5–8. In their joint communiqué, Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong once again used strong language, which had been missing for eight years in Sino-Vietnamese public documents, warning the United States. It stated that if the United States expanded its war in Indochina, China was determined to take all necessary measures to support the Indochinese peoples, "not flinching even from the greatest national sacrifices."[40]

At the heels of the above developments, China's invitation to Nixon for a visit was, of course, a shock to Hanoi. Between Henry Kissinger's visit to China in July 1971 and Nixon's visit in February 1972, Zhou Enlai twice flew to Hanoi to offer an explanation. But his reasoning was not convincing to the Vietnamese leadership. Immediately after Nixon had returned to the United States from China in early March 1972, Hanoi declared the United States as the "enemy No. 1 of all nations in the world."[41] Even the Soviet invitation to Nixon for a state visit in May 1972 after U.S. bombing of Hanoi did not change Hanoi's attitude toward Moscow. Vietnam expressed much stronger bitterness toward China than toward Russia.

By the end of 1972, the U.S. ground force was reduced by progressive withdrawals from 543,400 in 1969 to 24,200. War casualties were also reduced from an average of 181 per week in 1969 to about 6 per week in 1972.[42] Although the South Vietnamese fighting responsibilities and death tolls increased, war tensions decreased. In January 1973, when Hanoi was forced by the U.S. Christmas bombing to sign the Paris peace agreement, China praised it. She stated that the treaty would have a "positive influence on the reduction of tension in Asia and the world."[43] Hanoi disliked it. On the other hand, Soviet military aid of sophisticated weapons, especially ground-to-air missiles that brought down at least fifteen B-52s during the Christmas bombing, was joyfully welcomed by Hanoi.

Unlike its efforts for the Geneva accord in 1954, China did not contribute much to the conclusion of the Paris peace agreement on Vietnam in 1973. After the agreement was signed, fighting declined. China's 50,000 military personnel also withdrew from Vietnam. Hanoi took this peace maneuvering period to strengthen its political and military positions throughout the South. Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Thi Binh, and other Vietnamese leaders came to China to see Mao and Zhou for consultations. The Chinese leaders, because of the Soviet threat, drastically changed their position to promote the burgeoning Sino-American rapprochement and advised their Vietnamese comrades to win time and get prepared for their final victory. For instance, Mao told Le Duan that the liberation of South Vietnam should be carried out in two steps. The first step was to force the withdrawal of the U.S. troops; the second was to "solve" the problem of Nguyen Van Thieu's troops "by war." Zhou Enlai passed on Chinese experience to the Vietnamese: in 1945–1947 the CCP negotiated with the Kuomintang; but in mid-1947 the Chinese Liberation Army began its counter offensive and eliminated the Kuomintang forces without a halt. "Vietnam, too," Zhou advised, "should win a spell of time to get prepared and, when it begins to fight, should eliminate the Nguyen Van Thieu administration without a halt."[44] Apparently, what the Chinese leaders suggested was to wait for an opportune time to strike. The Vietnamese wanted to win their final victory quickly. Their major difference now was not the goal of liberation, but the timing.

In the United States, several new developments, in addition to the national anti-war mood, worked unfavorably against South Vietnam. In November 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Act. It required the president to inform Congress within 48 hours of the deployment of U.S. military forces abroad and obligated him to withdraw them in 60 days in the absence of congressional endorsement. This was a direct limitation to presidential authority in Vietnam. In August 1974, Nixon was forced to resign because of the Watergate scandal. In September of the same year, Congress severely cut Vietnamese military aid from the suggested $1.5 billion to $700 million, including shipping costs. These developments were well disseminated all over the world by U.S. public media.

The Vietnamese leaders took these events into consideration. In mid-December 1974, they used a force of 8,000 to attack 2,000 South Vietnamese defenders in Phuoc Long and took the entire province in only three weeks. Then on March 10, 1975, the North Vietnamese army, led by General Van Tien Dung, fiercely attacked Ban Me Thuot, an important highland city.

They took it on the following day. One day later, President Nguyen Van Thieu and his generals made a drastic, surprising decision to pull back its defense forces from Pleiku, Kontum, and Darlac provinces (all in the central highlands) to the coastal Nha Trang area. The Hanoi leadership, realizing the serious weakness of Saigon's military capabilities, quickly made a new decision to launch an all-out drive to capture Saigon. They concluded, as Generals Giap and Dung wrote later, that even if the United States responded to their attacks with naval and air power, it could not "rescue the Saigon administration from its disastrous collapse."[45] On April 30, Saigon fell; Americans fled. The U.S. hands-off strategy was a surprise to Mao. Apparently, Hanoi's rapid and complete victory was unexpected by Beijing.

The foregoing discussion clearly indicates that during wartime some disagreements between China and Vietnam had developed while Chinese assistance continued. Hanoi now charged China with several serious wrongdoings against Vietnam. It accused China of forcing Vietnam to accept the policy of prolonged ambush in order to prevent Vietnam from stepping up armed struggle in the South, and of turning on the green light for the United States to invade Vietnam. It also charged China with undermining the Soviet united action proposal, opposing Vietnam's negotiations with the United States, and preventing Hanoi from completely liberating South Vietnam. It further accused China of negotiating with the United States behind Vietnam's back. This was, Hanoi concluded, the second time that the Chinese leaders had betrayed Vietnam.[46]

Beijing rebutted the Hanoi accusations. It stated that from 1950 to 1978 Chinese aid to Vietnam exceeded $20 billion and that during the Vietnam War China had sent over 300,000 military personnel to Vietnam on rotation duty (including 170,000 in a peak year), of whom 1,000 were killed. It also defended itself by stating that Beijing had supported the complete liberation of South Vietnam from the beginning to the end. Finally, it accused, in return, the Vietnamese leaders of being ungrateful and actually betraying Sino-Vietnamese friendship.[47]

A review of Chinese assistance to the Vietnamese revolution from 1950 to 1975 reveals that China had contributed much more to, than she had taken from, Vietnam in terms of military and economic aid as well as military personnel. However, in supporting the cause of Vietnam's complete liberation, Beijing's two-stage, pragmatic advice in 1973 apparently did not meet the urgent needs of the emotional and daring Vietnamese revolutionaries. The issue was overplayed as both sides bitterly accused each other. In fact, Hanoi's dispute with Beijing in 1978–1979 was almost diametrically different from Pham Van Dong's warm and appreciative attitude toward China in 1954.

In historical perspective, Vietnam's dispute with Chinese assistance is truly unprecedented. The violent manner of this dispute can only be compared to that of China's argument in the 1960s with Russia. Also, similar to the Sino-Soviet dispute, one thing is clear: conflicting interests between Vietnam and China heavily overshadow their common bond of ideology—Marxism-Leninism.

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT

Analysts of Soviet foreign policy generally hold a similar view that the Soviet Union traditionally has no vital interests in Southeast Asia when compared with its interests in Europe. Although Leonid Brezhnev stressed that the Soviet Union is not only a European but also an Asian power,[48] Moscow has always given first priority to its interests in Europe, especially Eastern Europe, and the second to Asia. Its interests in Indochina are probably placed in a flexible third or fourth position. However, this view has been altered to a considerable extent since the Vietnam War. There are at least two major reasons for such a change: Soviet competition with the United States and its rivalry with China. As one specialist put it, past Soviet international behavior is not always a reliable guide to its future actions.[49]

Soviet competition with the United States has led Moscow to pursue détente with Washington at one time and to engage in an actual arms race at another.[50] To compete against U.S. influence in Asia, the USSR reinforced its relations with several Asian countries by treaty commitments. They included treaties with India (1971), Iraq (1972), Afghanistan (1978), Vietnam (1978), South Yemen (1979), and Syria (1980). Vietnam's alignment with the Soviet Union fits well into its global strategy against the United States and China.

Soviet Interests in Indochina

The Sino-Soviet conflict has compelled Soviet leaders to plan for an encirclement of China. To this end, Moscow offered material aid and ideological ties to its Asian comrades and proposed a collective security system for communist and non-communist Asian countries. Immediately after the proposal was made by Leonid Brezhnev in June 1969, most Asian and Soviet analysts observed that its aims were to encircle China and weaken U.S. influence in Asia. The Soviet Union has made repeated statements and arguments that the system, which would eventually embrace all nations from the Middle East to Japan, is for the security, peace, friendship and well-being of the Asian peoples. The USSR also hoped that India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, beginning with economic cooperation, would form the nucleus of the system.[51] China responded to this proposed system with contempt. As its former Foreign Minister Chiao Guanhua remarked: "First, we are against it; second, we despise it."[52] In any event, the Soviet military action in Afghanistan has damaged immeasurably this already doubtful system directed against China and the United States.

It is clear, therefore, that the general goals of current Soviet policy in Asia are (1) to replace Chinese and U.S. presence and influence, (2) to support Communism wherever it is supportable, (3) to obtain the use of strategic ports to enhance its naval position running from Vladivostok to the Indian Ocean, and (4) to gain control over countries or areas as much as possible. Its specific objectives in Indochina can be summarized in a few items: (1) exclusion of Chinese (and U.S.) influence from the region; (2) usage of Cam Ranh Bay and other strategic ports; (3) support for, and influence of, the Indochinese communist parties and governments; and (4) creation of the dependency of the Indochinese states (particularly Vietnam) upon the USSR by extending generous assistance in their economic and military build-ups.[53]

Acting on these principles, the Soviet Union has scored considerable success in Indochina. Vietnam is the most outstanding case.

Rivalry with China

After Beijing's rejection of the Soviet united action proposal in late 1965, the USSR worked hard promoting Le Duan. It gradually and successfully established him as a new, strong, and pro-Soviet leader in Hanoi after Ho Chi Minh. The question of how Le Duan was won over by Moscow can be answered by a few major reasons: Moscow's massive aid to Hanoi; no major domestic disturbances, like China's Cultural Revolution, to interrupt Russia's support for Vietnam; China's drastic turn to the United States for a rapprochement; and Moscow's cultivation of Le Duan's leadership. As a result, Le Duan was honored by a standing ovation at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1966, something the CCP Congress had never offered him. In response, Duan stated that Russia was his second fatherland, a phrase that he had never given to the PRC. As the Vietnam War drew to an end, Le Duan had built up a firm, pro-Soviet leadership in Hanoi.

After the liberation of Saigon, Moscow continued its anti-Beijing campaign. In late May of 1975, Soviet tankers made their first call at a South Vietnamese port with badly needed fuel for Saigon, where gasoline was selling for $8 a gallon.[54] Meanwhile, the Soviets moved rapidly to increase their influence in Laos. Their advisors grew from 100 in June 1975 to approximately 500 in October of the same year.

With their annual economic program and a Five-Year Plan (1976–1980) in their package, the Vietnamese went to China and the USSR in September–November 1975 for aid. China, displeased with Vietnam's close relations with the USSR, granted Vietnam only the usual amount of assistance, approximately $200 million for 1976. No aid for the Five-Year Plan was given. In fact, Beijing, by formal notification to Hanoi in February 1977, has provided no new aid to Vietnam since 1977.[55] Nevertheless, two days before the 1975 aid agreements were signed in Beijing, Chinese Foreign Minister Chiao Guanhua spoke on September 27 at the United Nations. He accused the USSR of filling the vacuum in Indochina and warned the Asian countries that they should never "let the tiger in through the back door while repulsing the wolf through the front gate." After the agreements were concluded, Le Duan, who led the Vietnamese delegation to China, rushed to Moscow. He showed no need to stay two more days in Beijing for the celebration of the October 1 anniversary of the founding of the PRC.

In Moscow, Le Duan obtained an extremely impressive amount of aid in November 1975. Some details were not learned until three months later. Western analysts put its amount at $500 million for 1976 and as much as $3 billion for Vietnam's Five-Year Plan.[56] According to their agreement, the USSR would help Vietnam to finance 40 capital projects, including a hydroelectric power station, a caustic soda plant, a coal mine, food-processing plants, and others. Some analysts also observed that Moscow wanted to bring Vietnam into the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (better known as COMECON). Vietnam's payment for Soviet largess was, obviously, to take the Soviet political line against China.

In this connection, a close communist party relationship was probably the most important development between Moscow and Hanoi after 1975. At the 25th Congress of the CPSU in Moscow in late February 1976, Le Duan, head of the Vietnamese delegation, not only praised the Soviet Union as the "world's mightiest socialist state," but also said that the Vietnamese people, with the Soviet assistance, would smoothly build up a peaceful, independent, unified, and socialist Vietnam.[57] The CCP sent no delegation to honor the CPSU Congress.

The party-to-party relationship was further promoted by the holding of the Fourth Congress of the Vietnam Workers' Party in December 1976 in Hanoi—the first congress in the postwar years. The Soviet Union, demonstrating its influence and support for Vietnam, sent a strong delegation headed by Mikhail A. Suslov, a Politburo member of the CPSU. China sent no delegation to Hanoi. In his long political report to the Congress, Le Duan stressed Vietnam's efforts to do everything in its "power to contribute, together with the fraternal countries and the international communist and workers' movement, to restoring and consolidating [international] unity . . ."[58] Suslov, who led a parade of foreign communist delegates to the rostrum, relayed Brezhnev's promise that "in the task of rebuilding Vietnam, the Lao Dong Party can always rely on the assistance of the Soviet Union."

Despite all of these public statements, a really significant indication of the new Soviet gain was the component of the powerful new Political Bureau of the Vietnam Workers' Party (changed to be the Vietnam Communist Party after the congress). A new alignment of its political line is arranged in Table 2.1.

While all the Vietnamese leaders should be identified as pro-Vietnamese, the terms pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese in the table are used simply for the convenience of indicating their political inclination at that particular time. The table suggests the following analysis: (1) The overwhelming majority of the pro-Soviet leaders in the Politburo, led by Le

TABLE 2.1
POLITICAL LINE OF THE VIETNAM COMMUNIST PARTY POLITBURO, DECEMBER 1976

Name	*Pro-Soviet*	*Pro-Chinese*	*Moderate (neutral)*	*Unclear*
Le Duan	X			
Truong Chinh		X?		
Pham Van Dong			X	
Pham Hung			X	
Le Duc Tho	X			
Vo Nguyen Giap	X			
Nguyen Duy Trinh	X			
Le Thanh Nghi			X	
Tran Quoc Hoan	X			
Van Tien Dung	X			
Le Van Luong	X			
Nguyen Van Cuc (Nguyen Van Linh)	X			
Vo Toan (Vo Chi Cong)			X	
Chu Huy Man			X	
(The following are alternates:)				
To Huu	X			
Vo Van Kiet (Sau Dan)				X
Do Muoi	X			
Total	10	1?	5	1

Sources: This table is composed by numerous known and not so well known sources, including the following materials: *Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes* (Saigon, 1967–1972); *Vietnamese Communist Leadership* (Saigon, 1972); *Viet Nam Courier* (Hanoi, 1975–1978); Chart of "Democratic Republic of Vietnam—Party and Government Structure" (Washington, D.C., May 1974); Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Democratic Kampuchea, *Black Paper: Facts and Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam Against Kampuchea* (Kampuchea, September 1978); and *FEER*, June 9, 1978.

Duan, was a result of postwar developments. Several of the pro-Soviet members, such as Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and others, were originally moderate (neutral) in the Chinese-Soviet rivalry, if not pro-Chinese. (2) Hoang Van Hoan was dropped from the list. It is not clear whether the Soviets had exerted any pressure for his ouster, but he was a victim of Le Duan's pro-Soviet policy. Several leaders of the pro-Chinese group have shifted their line for survival; even Truong Chinh has become more moderate. This change reveals Le Duan's determination to meet any challenge from the disfavored Chinese apologists. (3) The Vietnamese party will remain pro-Soviet so long as Le Duan or his protégé stays in power.

Prior to the congress, Soviet position had already been strengthened while Chinese influence declined. A French priest and scholar who left Vietnam in the fall of 1976 filed this eyewitness report:

> The Russians have been and remain very powerful in the North, and already in Saigon the television is full of Soviet propaganda films . . . Sometimes such films appear every two or three days, preceded by a "journal" consisting essentially of a reading of the editorial of the official daily newspaper, the *Saigon Giai Phong* . . . International news about "our Soviet and Cuban older brothers" follows, but never about the Chinese; one would think they did not exist.[59]

After the congress, Soviet influence continued to grow. Their experts and advisers in Vietnam were estimated to have increased from 2,000–3,000 in mid-1977 to 5,000–8,000 in mid-1979.[60] When General Vo Nguyen Giap visited Beijing from Moscow in early June 1977, he even openly rebutted the Chinese by saying the Vietnamese had "routed U.S. imperialism without the need to oppose revisionism."[61] In response to Giap's argument, the Chinese mass media in Guangxi denounced Vietnam as a "running dog of Soviet revisionists."[62] In late August of the same year, however, the post-Mao Beijing staged an enthusiastic welcome for President Josip Tito, the one-time modern revisionist leader during Mao's years. On November 20, 1977, Le Duan led a party and government delegation to visit Beijing. He held talks with Hua Guofeng on the 21st and 22nd. Hua repeated the old anti-Soviet theme but found no echo from Duan. Then Duan rushed home. There was no official communiqué. Vietnam's mass media carried little publicity about it.[63] Although no detailed information was given, Kampuchea must have been the central issue on their meeting agenda. The talks must have failed, for only one month later (late December 1977), Kampuchea broke its relations with Vietnam. A large-scale war followed. As China supported Kampuchea, the USSR stood firmly behind Vietnam.

Cam Ranh Bay and the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty

Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated rapidly in 1978. In early May, overseas (ethnic) Chinese in Vietnam began to flee the country under pressure. In late May, a Chinese communist newspaper in Hong Kong charged that the Soviet Union had Haiphong and Cam Ranh Bay in hand and had built up a missile base near Huong Khe directed against China.[64] In early June, Deng Xiaoping, Chinese deputy premier, made it known that China had cut aid to Vietnam.[65] He accused Vietnam of expelling 110,000 ethnic Chinese and disclosed that Chinese aid to Vietnam from 1950 to 1978 had exceeded $20 billion. After Vietnam was admitted to the COMECON under Soviet arrangement, tensions between China and Vietnam increased.

Direct accusations between Beijing and Hanoi were brought into the open in July. In mid-July, Hanoi publicly denounced the Chinese leaders as reactionaries.[66] This was probably encouraged by Albania's criticism of China on July 7.[67] In the same month, Laos sided with Vietnam in its dispute with China. Meanwhile, Soviet advisers increased rapidly in that landlocked country. In August, the Sino-Vietnamese talks on refugees opened but broke off quickly after exchanges of bitter accusations. At this time, Pham Van Dong told a U.S. delegation to Hanoi that Vietnam wanted not only a reconciliation with the United States, but also normalization of relations between the two nations.[68] However, ten days later, Vietnam was reported to have let the Soviet Union build up a military base at Cam Ranh Bay.[69] Beijing viewed this development as a collaboration between Vietnam and the USSR for mutual ambitions: Vietnam needed Soviet support for its drive against China and for its realization of the so-called "Indochina Federation," the Soviet Union wanted Cam Ranh Bay. Beijing charged that the activities of Soviet social-imperialism in Southeast Asia were "a component part of the Soviet global strategy."[70]

The conclusion of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on November 3, 1978, truly escalated the tensions between Beijing and Hanoi. The focus of the treaty is Article 6. It reads:

> The two parties signatory to the treaty shall exchange views on all important international questions relating to the interests of the two countries.
>
> In case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the two parties signatory to the treaty shall immediately consult each other with a view to eliminating that threat, and shall take appropriate and effective measures to safeguard peace and security of the two countries.[71]

Naturally, the Vietnamese mass media praised the signing of the treaty as an act of great friendship that closely linked the destinies of Vietnam and the Soviet Union and as a reality of great "solidarity and cooperation among the [two] socialist countries."[72] The Chinese, however, railed unrelentingly at the treaty. Deng Xiaoping, visiting Thailand, called it a threat to the security and peace of Asia, the Pacific, and the world. The Chinese press, following Deng's denunciation, accused Vietnam of becoming the "Cuba of the East" and the small hegemonist who collaborated with the big hegemonist to form a "Holy Alliance" for Asian and world expansion.[73]

In strategic perspective, we can see clearly that the significance of the treaty lies in the inevitable development of Soviet military presence in Asia. Beginning with the use of Cam Ranh Bay, which was confirmed by Hanoi in late March 1979, expanding Soviet sea power would certainly weaken Chinese and U.S. naval positions in the area.[74] Soviet forces operating out of the base would be on the flank of China's weak South Sea Fleet, which is deployed from major bases at Whampoa (Huangpu), Zhanzhiang (Chankiang), and Yulin. Soviet naval units would also be a counterweight to the U.S. naval and air forces based at Subic Bay and Clark Field in the Philippines. The far-reaching impact on this region's balance of force and its future security and stability would be far greater than that Hanoi had ever contemplated.

In short, the Soviet factor had influenced substantially the nature of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Had there been no Soviet-Vietnamese alliance, the sixteen-day war between China and Vietnam might not have been fought. As previously discussed, the PRC had fulfilled its international duty to assist Vietnam continuously from 1950 to 1978, but it can be inferred that the Beijing leadership had never intended to offer aid to Vietnam for its occupation of Kampuchea and Laos, much less to support a Soviet-Vietnamese alliance against China.

THE STRUGGLE FOR KAMPUCHEA

The Sino-Vietnamese rivalry for Kampuchea did not crystallize until 1975, although there had been prior tensions. In this case, national-strategic interests and historical roots again transcended their common communist ideology and, as a result, formulated their discordant positions on Kampuchea.

Background

In spite of the fact that China had historically spread some influence to Kampuchea, the Chinese government did not express serious concern about and keen interest in Kampuchea until 1954.[75] At the 1954 Geneva Conference, as previously discussed, Zhou Enlai persuaded Pham Van Dong to announce the withdrawal of the Viet-Minh forces from Kampuchea, promised to recognize its royal government, but demanded no military bases in that country. In April 1955, Zhou assured Prince Norodom Sihanouk at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia that China would always support Kampuchea's independence and neutrality.[76] In 1956, Sihanouk visited Beijing and obtained Chinese economic aid of $22,500,000. In 1958, Kampuchea established diplomatic relations with the PRC. This was followed by a friendship and nonaggression pact, a Canton–Phnom Penh air route, more aid (1960, 1965), more trade and cultural exchanges, and more mutual visits by Zhou Enlai, Sihanouk, and Liu Shaoqi.[77] In November 1963, Sihanouk, mainly because of the reported U.S. involvement in the death of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, asked the U.S. mission of military and economic aid to leave Kampuchea. The Chinese government immediately issued a stern statement expressing its full support of Kampuchea against any possible armed incursions by the United States.[78] Sihanouk welcomed it and said that without U.S. aid his country would be poorer but freer. He also added that if Kampuchea "must one day be submerged by communism," he "would wish that it be China and not another socialist country" [North Vietnam] that would control Kampuchea, because China would maintain Kampuchea's territorial integrity.[79]

The March 1970 coup in Kampuchea by Lon Nol prompted the Indo-Chinese to hold a Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples in late April in Guangzhou, China. Temporarily, Sihanouk allied with the leaders of the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam, and the Pathet Lao for their common cause in opposition to the United States and the Lon Nol regime. China supported them. Sihanouk stayed in Beijing from 1970 to 1975, serving as the figurehead of the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea and his government in exile. During those six years, he visited North Vietnam a dozen times en route to and from the guerrilla area of the Khmer Rouge. In addition, China offered free weapons and transportation to the Khmer Rouge against the Lon Nol regime. Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge continuously provided sanctuary to the Vietnamese Communists against the United States during the Vietnam War.[80] However, the Khmers never truly trusted the Vietnamese.

China, in view of national-strategic interests and geographical distance, apparently envisioned that an independent and neutral Kampuchea would maintain a friendly relationship with Beijing. It could also serve as a forestalling factor against Vietnam's complete control of Indochina.

Naturally, the Vietnamese stand differed from the Chinese viewpoint. To Vietnam, Kampuchea had long been held as specially close for several important reasons: historical background, national-strategic interests, and geographical propinquity.

The Vietnamese (Annamese) annexation in 1471 of the Kingdom of Champa, which was much akin to neighboring Cambodia in ethnicity and culture, foreshadowed later attempts at control over the Mekong delta area.[81] In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Kampuchea was under the strong influence of Vietnam on the east, and Siam (Thailand) on the west. It became a tributary state to Vietnam at one time and to Siam at another. Its dual tributary relationship led to occasional conflicts between the two aggressive neighbors until the French came.[82] After the French colonialists concluded a protectorate treaty with King Norodom in 1863, however, Kampuchea continued to lose territory to Vietnam. In fact, the French arbitrarily incorporated large pieces of land, which were inhabited mostly by Khmer people, into today's Vietnam.[83]

Against this background, the nascent Vietnamese Communist Party of 1930 was quickly enlarged and renamed the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). In February 1951 in northern Vietnam, when the ICP was reorganized into the Vietnam Lao Dong (Workers') Party, the Vietnamese pledged to establish a great union of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. As Ho Chi Minh's radio promised: "The Vietnam Lao Dong Party will bind the Vietnamese people closely to the Laotian and Cambodian peoples, and is determined to liberate Indochina."[84]

Soon after Indochina's independence from France in 1954, Sihanouk argued for the continuing right to sovereignty over the lost Mekong delta area. Talks and exchanges of views took place from time to time but yielded no results. During the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese Communists, with or without Sihanouk's knowledge, made the Kampuchean-Vietnamese border area a sanctuary that was of vital interest to the Vietnamese. In 1967, Sihanouk requested the Vietnamese to make a statement of respect for Kampuchea's existing borders. Although the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam and the Hanoi government responded to such a request, respectively, they later interpreted the statements as wartime measures.[85] Small Kampuchean-Vietnamese conflicts began in 1970 under the Lon Nol regime, and frequent clashes occurred thereafter.[86] From 1970 to 1975, the Vietnamese also executed their international duty to help train the Khmer Rouge military personnel for the liberation of Phnom Penh.

Thus, Vietnam historically was an aggressive power against the Khmer Empire, making it a vassal of Annam. Due to geographical closeness and its own interests, Vietnam has long since planned to establish a great union of Indochina under its leadership.

The Struggle of Kampuchea

The Kampucheans' suspicion of Vietnamese ambition to take eventual control of the Khmer state was learned by the Vietnamese even during the best years of their cooperation (1970–1975). In anger, General Giap said to Sihanouk emotionally: "We North Vietnamese are genuine Communists, men of our word. We promised you solemnly and in writing that we would always respect your sovereignty, your national independence, your territory as it now stands, including the coastal islands. We will never break our promises."[87]

Apparently, both the Khmers and Vietnamese had foreseen the shadow of their future conflict after their final victory over the United States and the Lon Nol regime.

When the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh in April 1975, the Chinese became the most trusted and powerful friends to them, whereas the Russians were treated like hated adversaries. As a reporter wrote at that time:

> There was also the unexpected arrival . . . of the seven Russians who had been holding out at the Soviet Embassy. They had been desperately trying to make friendly contact with the new Cambodian leaders to counterbalance Chinese influence.
>
> But it was the Chinese and not the Russians who had been supplying the Khmer Rouge with arms. The Cambodian Communists rebuffed the Soviet overtures, fired a rocket through the second floor of their embassy, looted the building and ordered the Russians to the French compound.[88]

Prince Sihanouk later confirmed this report and added that the Russian diplomats were forced to go to the French embassy compound with their hands tied with rough country-style rope.[89] The Russians would never forgive the Khmer Rouge for this humiliation.

Undoubtedly, China had won the first round of the struggle for Kampuchea, but not for another Indochinese country—Laos. Being an offspring of Vietnam for some time, the Pathet Lao's military decisions were either made by the Vietnamese or approved by Vietnam's advisers attached to Pathet Lao units.[90] Soon after South Vietnam was liberated, the Pathet Lao gently took over the entire country of Laos. Its communist regime was established in December 1975. Then Vietnamese and Soviet influence grew whereas China's declined.

During its first post-victory visit to Beijing in August 1975, an official delegation of Democratic Kampuchea (the Khmer Rouge's Kampuchea), led by then Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan, concluded an agreement with China for free economic aid and technical assistance. Meanwhile, the two governments pledged to unite still more closely in their common struggle against hegemonism.[91] Arranged by Zhou Enlai, Sihanouk was invited back to Kampuchea in early September where he was offered a triumphant welcome. He also received a strong statement from Khieu Samphan, Son Sen (then defense minister), and other Khmer Rouge leaders that they were determined to take "Draconian measures aimed at eliminating North Vietnamese and Vietcong presence in Cambodia once and for all."[92]

Before long, however, Sihanouk helplessly watched Kampuchea change from a backward but peaceful land to a murdering, starving, and disastrous nation.[93] According to Sihanouk , Zhou Enlai had emphatically advised Khieu Samphan in 1975 of the need to move "step by step" toward socialism. This would take several years of patient work, but this was Chinese experience. Then and only then should they advance toward a communist society, Zhou concluded. Ieng Sary confirmed that Zhou Enlai did speak about the Chinese revolutionary experience to the Kampuchean leaders, including himself; but Zhou did not make his talks clear enough to the Kampucheans; otherwise, they would have thought it over carefully.[94] In any event, Khieu Samphan and others decided to transform Kampuchea into the first nation to create a completely communist society without wasting time on intermediate steps. This was an indirect reply to Zhou Enlai.[95] After problems arose, however, they did ask China for help—to perform a super-Herculean task of modernizing and developing the troubled Kampuchea. China sent a delegation, led by Fang Yi (a technocrat), to Phnom Penh in December 1976. What the Chinese found was an exhausted population, a nation with no technicians or scientists, and an army with no officers with a basic grasp of mathematics or technology. The Chinese also found it difficult to recruit and train Kampucheans to run factories, to take charge of the artillery, armored divisions, and especially aviation. As Sihanouk wrote frankly, "All during the Kampucheo-Vietnamese war, and even in 1978, not one Chinese MIG fighter plane was operational."[96] Everywhere there was chaos. Everywhere there was a kingdom, running its own affairs. It was a national catastrophe. Such a grave blunder under Pol Pot was finally admitted by his Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary in 1980. As he told the author: "We moved too quickly. We made political errors. We did not have the chance to think enough about organizing the state and we had too little experience."[97] To outsiders, his account seems only an excuse for the Khmer Rouge's murder of Kampucheans.

During 1975–1978, the Khmer Rouge regime repeatedly asked Vietnamese troops to leave Kampuchea. Reluctantly, the Vietnamese withdrew their troops only to the Kampuchean-Vietnamese border. The withdrawal request was made because the Khmers had never stopped regarding Vietnam as their "Enemy Number One" even during the anti-American war.[98] In fact, the Hanoi leadership had considered military intervention in Kampuchea in 1970–1972.[99]

Fully realizing the Kampuchean nationalistic and independent mind but resentful of the Khmer Rouge's withdrawal request, the Vietnamese felt that they had to even the score with the Khmers. First of all, the Vietnamese asserted that Kampuchea had been liberated with their help. They should, therefore, be treated like "Big Brothers." Instead, they were requested repeatedly to leave the country. Second, Vietnam was extremely unhappy about the Khmer Rouge's purge of more than 4,000 Vietnamese-trained forces in 1976. According to Huang Hua and Geng Biao, the components of the Kampuchean Liberation Army were extremely complicated—some were the original royal troops, some were trained by the Chinese, some were organized by the Khmer Rouge, still others were trained by the Vietnamese. After liberation, the Kampuchean leaders disbanded some units, arrested and executed some elements, ousted some undesirables, and reorganized the rest, thereby purifying their ranks and strengthening their fighting ability. The Vietnamese-trained forces were mostly executed or jailed.[100] Third, Vietnam was upset by the Khmer Rouge's treatment of Soviet diplomats in Phnom Penh in 1975 as previously discussed. Fourth, Vietnam could not make any progress in negotiations with Pol Pot's Kampuchea, as compared to Laos, on a great union of Indochina (a euphemism for "Indochinese Federation"). Fifth, China's strong support for the Khmer Rouge and its gains in Kampuchea annoyed Vietnam. Worst of all, border skirmishes broke out from time to time, increasing tensions between the two countries. To settle the problem, Le Duan and his associates finally formulated a new policy for Cambodia.

Vietnam's Formula: Special Relations

At the Fourth Congress of the Vietnam Workers' Party in December 1976, the Vietnamese Communists made several important decisions. They decided to carry out their Second Five-Year Plan, changed the party's name to the Vietnam Communist Party, and developed a formula of special relations for Laos and Kampuchea. As Le Duan stated in his political report:

> To endeavor to defend and develop the special relations between the Vietnamese people and the peoples of Laos and Kampuchea, enhance the militant solidarity, mutual trust and long-term co-operation and mutual assistance in all fields between our country and fraternal Laos and Kampuchea on the principle of complete equality, respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and respect for each other's legitimate interests so that the three countries may be for ever bound together in the common cause of national construction and defense.[101]

This formula was to be carried out by peaceful negotiations, if possible, or by military coercion, if necessary. In the case of Laos, the special relationship was soon established. A treaty of friendship and cooperation for 25 years was signed on July 17, 1977, together with an aid pact, a border agreement, and a joint declaration.[102] The Vietnamese delegation, led by Le Duan, was also generous in promising Laos to open a former seaport at Da Nang, 370 miles from Saigon, for foreign trade. In September of the same year, Laotian Defense Minister Khamtai Siphandon led a delegation to Hanoi. He paid a tribute to Vietnamese troops who fought in Laos during the Vietnam War and said that the armies of Laos and Vietnam were strengthening the alliance of combat, cooperation, and mutual help in all fields.[103] Their military ties were reinforced, but the Laotians denied that Vietnam's influence had relegated Laos to a status of semi-protectorate.

Negotiations with Kampuchea began in June 1975—long before the special relations formula was adopted. According to Pol Pot's Foreign Ministry, the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea proposed to discuss the border problem and to conclude a friendship and nonaggression treaty with Vietnam. The negotiations, however, produced no results.[104] Nor did their later contacts. Instead, border conflicts and mutual accusations virtually dominated the postwar years. In June 1977, a Vietnam-directed coup in Phnom Penh reportedly failed. One month later, Hanoi concluded the treaty with Laos in hopes that Kampuchea would follow suit, but Kampuchea wanted a treaty of friendship and nonaggression, not friendship and cooperation. Vietnam refused it, because a nonaggression treaty would place Kampuchea in a position as equal and independent as Vietnam's, while a cooperation treaty would not. Such a friendship and cooperation treaty was, and still is, the Soviet model for several Third World countries. Vietnam wanted to copy it for Kampuchea. Cambodia's refusal angered Le Duan into exerting new military pressure on the Khmer Rouge.

Pol Pot's visit to Beijing in September–October 1977 was to solicit more aid and reportedly also military protection from China. Although he obtained no protection commitment from Beijing, he was warmly welcomed and was promised more material assistance, causing Hanoi's concern. In late November 1977, Le Duan led a party-and-government delegation to China as mentioned above. The main purpose of his visit was to discuss Kampuchea. He tried to probe China's real position on the issue. Without positive results, Duan's delegation quietly left Beijing two days later. In early December, Beijing sent Chen Yonggui (Chen Yung-kuei, Politburo member) to Phnom Penh to relate to Pol Pot information about Le Duan's visit and the Tachai experience. As Vietnam's large-scale attacks began in late December, Kampuchea broke diplomatic relations with Vietnam on December 31, accusing Hanoi of ferocious and barbarous aggression. This so-called proxy war, as it was called by the West, seesawed in January 1978. Both sides claimed victory over the other, accompanied by mutual exchanges of bitter accusations.[105] China quickly made its position clear. On January 12, 1978, the Chinese government issued a statement urging an immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, and a peaceful settlement. Meanwhile, China pledged its continuing support and aid to Kampuchea. On January 18, Beijing dispatched Deng Yingchao (Zhou Enlai's wife) to Phnom Penh on a fact-finding mission.

At this point, Hanoi reached a new decision on Kampuchea. It decided at a special Central Committee in February 1978 to oust the Pol Pot regime by December.[106] Its strategy appeared to contain the following steps: (1) to describe the Pol Pot government as a regime of terror; (2) to attack China for its all-out aid to Kampuchea; (3) to propagandize the uprising of the Kampuchean people against the Pol Pot regime; and (4) to play the Soviet card. Meanwhile, Hanoi further increased its troops on the border up to twelve divisions. An explanation for these strategic steps is necessary here.

Vietnam began to describe Pol Pot's Kampuchea as a place of terror in early 1978 and intensified the drive after the spring of the same year. It called Pol Pot's regime butchers, a Fascist clique, murderers, and enemies of the people. Kampuchea was depicted as a hell on earth!

Meanwhile, Hanoi started accusing China in February 1978 of arming Kampucheans against Vietnam. After July, Hanoi showered direct and violent attacks on China. It accused China of becoming the main culprit in genocide in Kampuchea and in Kampuchea's war with Vietnam. It also denounced China as an international reactionary, expansionist, and hegemonist. Moreover, it railed at the criminal act of the Peking–Phnom Penh Axis. An article in *Tap Chi Cong San* epitomizes these attacks:

> Why do the Chinese authorities support the fascist, genocidal clique in Kampuchea? Why do they fully support this barbarous regime, and why have they turned a deaf ear to the tragic call for help from millions of victims in Kampuchea? Why have they spent billions of dollars to supply huge quantities of weapons to the Kampuchean clique of executioners and sent thousands of military advisers to help maintain at all costs this evil social system which has been cursed by all mankind? The only possible answer is: The reactionary Pol Pot–Ieng Sary clique is a blood-thirsty lackey clique badly needed by Chinese authorities to carry out their expansionist policy in Indochina and in all Southeast Asia. The Chinese authorities are using the barbarous social system in Kampuchea as a tool to oppose Vietnam. . .[107]

Vietnam's propaganda for the Kampuchean uprising was designed to create the appropriate climate of public opinion for its imminent blitzkrieg against Phnom Penh. The plan to overthrow the Pol Pot regime was decided upon in early 1978 after Heng Samrin had been established as a leader by Vietnam. Heng Samrin, little known to the outside world before 1979, began his revolutionary activities as a messenger between the Khmer Rouge and the Viet-Cong. He became familiar with the Vietnamese people and their affairs. Of humble origins, he was later trained by the Vietnamese when the Viet-Cong organized a parallel Kampuchean army fighting together with Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge against the U.S.–Lon Nol forces. He rose to be a division commander in the Fourth War Zone near Vietnam. In 1976, when Pol Pot began to purge the Vietnamese-trained Kampuchean personnel, he fled to Vietnam. The Vietnamese made him commander of a reorganized group (division-size) of Kampuchean refugees in South Vietnam in 1978.[108] Then Hanoi started the uprising campaign for Kampuchea in early October and intensified it in early December when the Vietnam-directed Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS) was formed. *Nhan Dan* then announced that a "great opportunity for Kampuchean revolution" had come.[109] Soon after, a Vietnamese blitzkrieg followed that ousted the Pol Pot regime on January 7, 1979.

The Soviet Card and Vietnam's Victory

Judging from their decisionmaking as revealed in Hoang Van Hoan's article, the Vietnamese leaders must have consulted the Soviet leaders before they decided in early 1978 to take Phnom Penh by force. After the decision was made, the timing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty and Vietnamese attacks on Phnom Penh was well set. The Soviet card had an immeasurably important impact on Vietnam's offensive against Cambodia.[110] Hanoi played it well.

A few months before the treaty was signed, the Soviet Union had begun special air shipments of MIG-23s and other weapons to Vietnam via India.[111] When the treaty was concluded, Wang Dongxing (Wang Tung-hsing, Vice-Chairman of the CCP), rushed to Phnom Penh on November 5, 1978. It was a mission of morale and material support. On November 11, *Nhan Dan* launched an attack on Wang, stating, "The trip by Wang Tung-hsing . . . was aimed at seeking ways to prolong Kampuchea's horrible disaster in order to carry out Peking's hegemonist scheme—fighting Vietnam to the last Kampuchean citizen." Meanwhile, Hanoi gave warnings to both Kampuchea and China. It said that the Kampuchean revolutionaries would soon overthrow the Pol Pot regime. Even if China gave massive aid to Phnom Penh, it could not "rescue the Pol Pot regime from its complete collapse."[112] The phraseology and style of this statement are strikingly similar to that written by General Van Tien Dung in early spring 1975 against the Saigon government. At the same time, the Soviet Union stepped up the arms flow, providing Hanoi with more MIG-23s and two 2,000-ton escort vessels.

According to Pol Pot's radio, Soviet advisers were with every unit of the Vietnamese forces.[113] This may not be true, but the increasing visibility of the Soviets in Vietnam was evident after the Vietnam reunification in 1975.

In fact, Hanoi was very concerned about the possibility of Chinese military intervention in Kampuchea, and the Pol Pot government had made such a request. As revealed in a speech given by Vice-Premier Geng Biao on January 16, 1979, the Kampuchean regime's request was made when Wang Dongxing visited Phnom Penh in November 1978.[114] The Beijing leadership turned it down. The main consideration was that if China intervened, it might be drawn into the Indochinese quagmire as the United States had been. The Chinese leaders decided instead to send material aid to Kampuchea and to support the Pol Pot regime to the end (more in Chapter 4).

China, naturally, repeatedly condemned the KNUFNS and Hanoi's aggression. As Vietnam used 100,000 troops in a two-week offensive, Phnom Penh quickly fell. On the eve of the fall of the capital (January 6, 1979), Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping ruled out an immediate military intervention in the Kampuchea-Vietnamese conflict but added that China must one day be obliged to take measures contrary to its wishes for peace. He called the Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea part of Soviet expansionism and a Soviet-Vietnamese threat to China.[115]

However, it is important to note, as revealed in the previously cited source of Geng Biao, that about 1,500 Chinese were left behind in Kampuchea during the emergency evacuation in January 1979. They did not make the evacuation and later voluntarily chose to stay in the Khmer states. They are now working and fighting as Kampucheans for the Khmer rebels against Vietnam.

On January 8, 1979, one day after Phnom Penh was captured, a Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council was formed, headed by Heng Samrin. As expected, Hanoi and Moscow sent their warm congratulations to Heng Samrin and recognized his regime, while Beijing angrily condemned that "such a lawless aggression must be stopped." A few days later, Hanoi's military newspaper gave a stern warning apparently to China and Thailand that "no one can intervene in Kampuchea's internal affairs!"[116] Truly concerned about their own security, the Thais calmly observed that all eyes in the world were looking at Thailand to see how it would deal with the new situation. They urged the United States, Japan, and China to help them "build a strong Thailand."[117]

Virtually under house arrest in Phnom Penh for three years and three months, Sihanouk flew to Beijing on January 7, 1979, and then to New York to speak to the United Nations Security Council on January 10. His address provoked some criticism of Vietnam by Singapore, Zambia, Gabon, Portugal, Malaysia, and New Zealand.[118] His appeals to the United Nations and the United States for help to get Vietnam out of Kampuchea received only moral support.

As Vietnam consolidated its control in most of Kampuchea, Pol Pot's forces were reduced to small guerrilla units in the western jungle of the country. At the end of January 1979, Pham Van Dong told Asian ambassadors that the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) under Heng Samrin would accept the occupation of Vietnamese troops. On February 18, one day after China had invaded Vietnam, Pham Van Dong and Heng Samrin concluded in Phnom Penh the Vietnamese-Kampuchean Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, valid for 25 years. It provides for mutual assistance in national defense and economic reconstruction. Article 2 of the pact states:

> On the principle that national defense and construction are the cause of each people, the two sides undertake to wholeheartedly support and assist each other in all domains and in all necessary forms in order to strengthen the capacity to defend the independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and peaceful labour of the people in each country against all schemes and acts of sabotage by the imperialist and international reactionary forces. The two sides will take *effective measures* to implement this commitment whenever one of them requires.[119]

Thus, the treaty legitimized the Vietnamese military occupation and operation in Kampuchea. The dream of a special relationship between Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos, a euphemism for the Indochinese Federation headed by Vietnam, has come true. It was achieved by force, however, and is being maintained by force.

3

Issues in Dispute: Territorial Conflicts and the Overseas Chinese

Unlike its relations with the Soviet Union, China traditionally has not had many territorial disputes with Vietnam. It is true that China has invaded Vietnam several times in the past; the invasions, nevertheless, were launched to gain power or domination, not territory. This past pattern has now changed. Territory has also become an issue between the two countries. However, it must be stressed that the disputes occurred only after the general Sino-Vietnamese relationship had turned sour. In other words, many factors have contributed to the territorial conflicts. Among them, the most explosive and emotional issue is Vietnam's expulsion of Chinese residents from both the south and north of the country.

THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE

The Sino-Vietnamese territorial issue centers around three geographical areas: the 797-mile-long borderline, the Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu Gulf, Bac Bo Gulf), and the Paracel and Spratly islands.

The Three Geographical Areas

Historically, the border area, the first problem area, was never clearly delimited by either side until 1887. At that time, the Chinese Qing (Ch'ing) government and the French colonial authorities in Annam (Vietnam) concluded the Sino-French Convention on the Delimitation of the Frontier, and in 1895 they signed the Supplement to the Convention. More than 300 boundary markers were erected along the border by both sides in accordance with these documents.[1] After that, the border area was quite peaceful for almost 90 years. Both nations and peoples mutually utilized and cooperated in trade, cultural, and even revolutionary activities. Small and insignificant incidents occurred from time to time, but they never disturbed the ties between the two countries. "Brotherhood and comradeship," in Ho Chi Minh's words, prevailed during those days. When border conflicts broke out in the late 1970s, however, the border issue became an explosive factor in the 1979 war.

The second area at issue—the division of the Gulf of Tonkin—is unclear and unsettled. The delineation in the 1887 convention made only a vague reference to the problem, lacking specification and detail. To clarify ownership of the offshore islands, the French and Chinese negotiators in 1887 drew a straight red line from Mon-Cay (a border town in northeastern Vietnam) southward into the gulf, passing through the hill at the east tip of Tra-Co (Wanzhu in Chinese) to the south of Mon-Cay. All islands east of the line belong to China, and the islands (Co To Island and others) west of it belong to Annam.[2] While the Chinese text of the 1887 convention does not provide the exact location of the red line, the French text describes it as Greenwich longitude, 108 degrees, 3 minutes, 13 seconds east. Since the convention does not specify the line as a "sea boundary line," it therefore cannot be concluded that the sea boundary of the gulf had been settled at that time. This observation is supported by both China and Vietnam, because China had made it clear that the line was not a sea boundary, and Vietnam had asked for a division of the gulf at the border conference of October 1977 in Beijing. In March 1979, Vietnam began to argue that the gulf had been divided at the 1887 and 1895 conventions.[3] This part of the territorial issue, nevertheless, is the least urgent among the three.

The third area, the Paracels (Xisha in Chinese, Hoang Sa in Vietnamese) and the Spratlies (Nansha in Chinese, Troung Sa in Vietnamese) is the most disputed. Since the problem has been brought into the open, Hanoi has tried hard to assert its ownership of the archipelagoes. For this complicated and controversial situation, an in-depth discussion is necessary.

The Paracel Islands are roughly 160 miles southeast of the Chinese Hainan Island and 225 miles east of Da Nang. The Spratlies are about 540 miles south of the Paracels and 400 miles east of Saigon. These two archipelagoes comprise more than 135 named, tiny, uninhabited coral atolls, reefs, banks, sand cays, and rocks. Apart from China and Vietnam, the Philippines, to a less extent, has also laid its claims to several islets of the Spratlies near Palawan. While China and Vietnam have escalated their claims against each other for the archipelagoes, the Philippines has not joined in the argument but keeps its claims.

To China and Vietnam, the importance of the Paracels and Spratlies is viewed from three perspectives: sovereignty, energy, and strategy. In terms of sovereignty, the ownership of the archipelagoes is a matter of nationalism, a right to possess one's own territory. Both China and Vietnam cherish highly their respective nationalist rights after a century's subjugation under Western imperialism and colonialism. Although a compromised settlement may eventually be worked out like the Tiao-yu T'ai (Senkaku Islands) dispute between China and Japan, it is premature, as of 1986, to expect either side to drop its claims.[4] Nationalism is still a strong force in these two communist countries.

In terms of energy, the archipelagoes have an added value. After oceanographers made known their findings of studies in the East Asian Sea from a series of United Nations survey missions and other research beginning in the late 1960s, some analogized the East Asian offshore areas as "another Persian Gulf," others criticized the view as too optimistic.[5] Most, however, agree with the overall estimate that the region is one of the most substantial oil and gas reservoirs in the world. The most promising areas of the whole Chinese offshore region are the deep water sections of the East China Sea and part of the Taiwan Strait where the average hydrocarbon potential is 50,000–79,000 barrels per square kilometer. In the South China Sea, the Paracels and Spratlies are believed to contain significant petroleum deposits. The Paracels, for instance, "are among a number of volcanoes and calcareous reefs found the northwestern edge of the China Basin, and represent ideal locations for centers of offshore activities surrounded by the thickest sediments in the area."[6] Although the deep water section of the South China Sea is beyond the reach of the present Chinese or Vietnamese technology for production, its potential is promising.[7] In early 1981, China discovered another promising oil field near the Leizhou peninsula and Hainan Island. It is part of the 110,000 square-mile oil area extending from Hainan to Taiwan.[8]

In Vietnam, the former Nguyen Van Thieu government signed contracts with Western oil companies in 1973 for oil development. Drilling began in 1974. In October of the same year, U.S. Shell Company made the first discovery 200 miles off the coast, and Mobil made the second in February 1975.[9] These discoveries significantly boosted Saigon's economic hopes and morale. Hanoi immediately became restive. Such a development may have played an important role in Hanoi's accelerating its decision to launch an offensive against Saigon's regime in the spring of 1975. Against this background, the value of the potentially oil-rich Paracels and Spratlies to both Vietnam and China was significantly enhanced.

In terms of strategic value, the location of the two archipelagoes is of the concern of the major powers in the Asian-Pacific region—China, Japan, the United States, and the USSR. Together with the Chinese Tungsha (the Pratas Reef) and Chungsha (the Macclesfield Bank) islands, the Paracels and Spratlies constitute, as Beijing observes, "an important junction for navigation between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and an important maritime gateway from China's mainland and nearby islands."[10] For China, and to a less extent for Japan, it is an extremely important sea lane for its commercial and naval activities. For the United States, it has only a short distance to its naval and air bases in the Philippines. For the Soviet Union, it is an area through which the growing Soviet Pacific Fleet must travel freely from its home port, Vladivostok, to the Indian Ocean.

Since the Soviet acquisition of the use of naval and air facilities at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay, which are roughly 225 and 540 miles west of the Paracels and Spratlies, respectively, the strategic value of the two archipelagoes has greatly increased. In fact, during World War II Japan built a small submarine base in the Spratlies. During the Vietnam War, the United States monitored shipping and submarine activities in the Pratas Reef area. The Macclesfield Bank has also, in the past, served as a midsea anchorage area for many nations' ships, including those of the USSR.[11] In Chinese and Vietnamese eyes, the military significance of the two archipelagoes is bound to increase as the superpowers escalate their naval competition in the Pacific and Indian oceans.

Dispute over the Paracels and Spratlies

Prior to 1975, Beijing and Hanoi engaged in no arguments about territory, including the Paracels and Spratlies. In fact, Hanoi formally supported Beijing's territorial claims in the late 1950s and issued no official statement to challenge the Chinese position on the two archipelagoes. After 1974, however, the situation gradually developed into a dispute.[12] It has historical roots and a legal background.

Historically speaking, the earliest reliable Chinese source on the Paracels is an important book entitled *Chu-fan-chi* [A Description of Barbarous Peoples], written by Chau Ju-kua (Zhao Ergua) in the thirteenth century. In it is the following description: "To the east (of Hai-nan) are the 'Chien-li Ch'ang-sha' (Thousand li Banks) and the 'Wan-li Shih-ch'uang' (Ten-thousand li Rocks), and [beyond them] is the boundless ocean . . . "[13] Friedrick Hirth and W. W. Rockhill, the two sinologists who translated and annotated the book, rightly identified these two island groups as the Paracels and Macclesfield Banks.[14]

The generally accepted proof for Chinese claims to the ownership of the Paracels is *Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo* [The chronicles of the Sung Dynasty]. It records that the second-to-last emperor of the Southern dynasty escaped in 1277, under the repeated pursuance of the Mongol generals, from Guangdong Province to Ch'i-li Yang (the Sea of Seven Miles or the Paracels) en route to Champa (Kingdom of Cham). A Sung general had escaped to Champa one month earlier, but the emperor failed to reach it.[15]

The Yuan (Mongol) dynasty dispatched an expedition to Java in 1292 headed by General Shih Pi (Shi Pi). He sailed through Ch'i-chou Yang [The Sea of the Seven Islands] and Wan-li Shih-t'ang [Ten-thousand li Rocks], passing Kiau-chi (northern Vietnam) and Champa.[16] But there is no evidence to indicate any claim or use of the archipelagoes by the expedition.

Convincing evidence has been found in the history of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). During 1405–1433, navigator Cheng Ho made seven well-known expeditions to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean through the archipelagoes. His mission, composed of more than 27,000 men with 62 ships at one time, may have visited the Paracels and the Spratlies. Several islets in the Paracels were named the Yung-lo Ch'un-tao (after Ming Emperor Yung-lo, also called Crescent Group), and several in the Spratlies were named the Cheng-ho Ch'un-tao. Cheng Ho (or fishermen after him) also left Ming coins, "Yung-lo t'ung-pao," on the Paracels.[17] In about 1430 his staff drew a map that indicated the sea routes of their travels between the Paracels and Spratlies.[18]

During the Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty, more references were made in books to the Paracels. They located the islands 700 Chinese *li* (one li = 0.33 mile) southeast of Hainan Island as "Ch'i-chou Yang," "Ch'i-li Yang," "Ch'i-chou-yang Shan," or "Ch'ang-sa Shih-t'ang." "Ch'i-chou Yang" means the "Sea of the Seven Islands."[19] These seven islands are now Tree Island, West Sand, Middle Island, North Island, South Island, Rocky Island, and Woody Island. In 1884, Annam became a protectorate of France. Three years later, French colonialist authorities negotiated with China on the boundary issue between China and Annam as previously discussed.

On the Vietnamese side, the earliest evidence for the Paracels is *Phu Biên Tap Lue* [Miscellaneous records on the pacification of the frontiers] of the late eighteenth century. It states that "formerly the Nguyen formed a Hoang Sa detachment of 70 men" in five small fishing boats and sailed for three days and nights to the islands. There is no indication as to the time to define "formerly." The men were sent to "collect things as they like." They found "swords, silver coins, brass valuables, ivory items, china," among other things.[20]

In 1816, according to *Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien* [Official chronicles of Dai Nam], King Gia Long ordered "naval units and the Hoang Sa detachment to travel in boats to Hoang Sa to survey sea-routes."[21] Hanoi today argues that the event represented the occupation of Hoang Sa. One year later, the Vietnamese King sent his navy commander Pham Huu Nhat to plant ten wooden markers on the islands.[22] These measures, Hanoi contends, were actions of installing sovereignty on the islands. Up to this point, Vietnamese historical records deal with only the Paracel Islands; no mention was made about the Spratly Islands.

A map of Vietnam drawn in 1838 has been recently presented by Hanoi as evidence proving the Paracel and Spratly islands as part of Vietnamese territory. No other information is given. One may well question whether the locations of the islands in the map are those of the Paracels and Spratlies today.

Historical records before the mid-nineteenth century prove one point: while both China and Vietnam had claimed ownership of the archipelagoes, neither was aware of the other's claim. They, therefore, never saw the need to protest the issue. In terms of evidence, China has more solid documentation than Vietnam to prove its first discovery and claims to the ownership of the islands. Although neither nation has ever exercised permanent occupation or effective control, China, not Vietnam, had at least stopped a German attempt to survey the Spratlies in 1883.[23] In addition, the 1887 convention, concluded only four years after the 1883 incident, could well be interpreted by China as an agreement on the land boundary, not on the "indisputable" Chinese territory of the Paracels and the Spratlies.[24]

In 1907–1908, Japanese merchants' occupation of the Pratas Islands (Tungsha Ch'un-tao) prompted the Chinese Guangdong Provincial Government to take direct and assertive action in regard to the ownership of the Paracels.[25] It dispatched three warships in 1909 led by naval commander Li Zhun to inspect the islands. Upon completion, the mission submitted to the Chinese government an eight-item development proposal for the Paracels.[26] Nothing, however, was immediately done. In 1928, the Guangdong Provincial Government organized a team to survey and investigate the islands. Sun Yat-sen (Chung-shan) University in Canton led the team, and a warship was sent there. After the investigation, a report was published, and China reasserted its sovereignty over the archipelagoes.[27] No nation, including France (or Annam), challenged it.

In December 1931, however, France challenged the Chinese sovereignty over the Paracels for its protectorate Vietnam. The French Quai d'Orsay notified China, claiming Vietnam's sovereignty over the Paracels based on Vietnamese historical records that King Gia Long in 1816 and King Minh Menh in 1835 had exercised their sovereignty there.[28] Meanwhile, the French government also laid claim to the Spratlies for Vietnam. During diplomatic negotiations between China and France, France in 1933 suddenly announced its occupation of nine islets of the Paracels and Spratlies and placed them under its sovereignty. France made it known that when the occupation took place, the only people on the islands were Chinese.[29] The Chinese government filed strong protests against the French occupation.

Arguments dragged on; no settlement was made. In July 1938, when China was engaged in its resistance war against Japan, France occupied the rest of the Paracels.

The situation began to change in 1939. In February of that year Japan occupied Hainan, the Paracels, and the Spratly Islands until August 1945 when it surrendered. In November 1946, the Taiwan government (ROC) took over the two archipelagoes, and renamed all the islets, reefs, banks, and sands. The ROC garrison forces stationed on the Paracels and Spratlies until 1950 when PRC troops landed on Hainan Island. From 1939 to 1950, neither France nor Vietnam had ever protested against the Japanese or Chinese takeover of the two archipelagoes.

When the Peace Treaty with Japan was being signed at the San Francisco Conference, both China and Vietnam asserted their rights to the islands. The PRC Foreign Minister, Zhou Enlai, issued a statement on August 15, 1951, in Beijing (neither the PRC nor the ROC was invited to the conference) to the effect that the Paracel and Spratly islands "have always been China's territory," and that China's sovereignty over them "will not be in any way affected."[30] On September 7, 1951, at the San Francisco Conference, Tran Van Huu, Premier of the Bao Dai government, also reaffirmed Vietnamese sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel islands. He stated that the two archipelagoes "always belonged to Vietnam."[31] Later the Philippine government also laid claim to some islands of the archipelagoes, and the Peace Treaty did not specify to which country they belonged.

In June 1956, two years after Ho Chi Minh's government (DRV) was re-established in Hanoi, Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Ung Van Khien said to Li Zhimin, Chargé d'Affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Vietnam, that "according to Vietnamese data, the Xisha and Nansha islands are historically part of Chinese territory."[32] In late 1956, the ROC sent garrison forces to occupy T'aip'ing Island (Itu Aba) of the Spratlies and they have been stationed there ever since.

More convincing evidence of Vietnam's recognition of the Paracel and Spratly islands as Chinese territory was Premier Pham Van Dong's endorsement of a Chinese government's statement in 1958. On September 4 of that year, the Chinese government proclaimed the breadth of its territorial sea to be twelve nautical miles which applied to all territories of the PRC, "including . . . the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Nansha Islands . . . " Ten days later, Pham Van Dong stated in his note to Zhou Enlai that "the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam recognizes and supports the declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China on China's territorial sea made on September 4, 1958."[33]

In 1977 Pham Van Dong changed his mind. He said that he had had to make such an endorsement because it was wartime.[34] However, 1958 was not a war year. Had not the Sino-Vietnamese relationship been deteriorating, Dong's endorsement would still have been justified today.

To rally the people's nationalistic support, the Saigon government in 1959 landed troops on one of the islets in the Paracels and harassed Chinese fishermen but did not occupy it. In 1961, Saigon announced the incorporation of the Paracels into Vietnam's Quang Nam Province. China protested strongly; Hanoi kept silent. In 1973, Saigon occupied one island of the Paracels and began to draw contracts, as discussed earlier, for oil exploration with foreign companies. Moreover, Saigon announced the incorporation of eleven islands of the Spratlies into Vietnam's Phuoe Tuy Province. These developments prompted the PRC to occupy the Paracels militarily in January 1974 after a brief conflict with Saigon forces there.[35]

The impact of the Chinese occupation of the Paracels was significant. Two weeks later, Saigon swiftly occupied six islands of the Spratly Archipelago, but left the Taiwan garrison forces on T'aip'ing Island untouched. Beijing called Saigon's occupation an "invasion" and reiterated China's sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlies.[36] The ROC also issued a statement to reassert its sovereignty over the four archipelagoes in the South China Sea; it sent protests to the Saigon and Manila governments denying their claims to the archipelagoes.[37] To complicate this diplomatic scramble, the Philippines protested against both Chinese and Vietnamese military actions over the islands and reasserted its claims. Finally Hanoi, for the first time after a long silence, issued a terse statement urging peaceful discussions on the Paracels and other issues.[38] The Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (the Viet-Cong's regime) endorsed it. This was the first time that Hanoi changed its supportive position of Beijing on the archipelagoes to a neutral one.

The incidents concerning the Paracels and the Spratlies in 1974 between Saigon and Beijing coupled with the oil discovery off the coast of Vietnam in the same year contributed significantly to the hardening of Hanoi's position on these two archipelagoes. As the North Vietnamese army marched toward Saigon in April 1975, Hanoi lost no time in dispatching forces to take over the six islands in the Spratlies from the Saigon garrisons.[39] After the occupation was complete and secured, Hanoi's *Guan Doi Nhan Dan* [People's Army], on May 15, 1975, carried a Vietnamese map, marking the Spratly Archipelago as part of Vietnam. In late 1975, a new map of unified Vietnam included both the Paracels and the Spratlies as Vietnamese territory.[40] Vietnam appeared to have adopted a strategy of taking offense for defense. This was the second time that Hanoi changed its position on the archipelagoes.

Prior to 1976, Vietnam had never used the names "Hoang Sa" and "Truong Sa" for Paracel and Spratly islands. Since 1976, however, it has consistently used them mainly to reassert its historical rights. In May 1977, Vietnam extended its sea economic zone to 200 miles, which would include the Chinese-occupied Paracels.[41] Aggressive as it appeared to be, Vietnamese leadership, up to the end of 1978, seemed to still maintain some degree of restraint. For instance, in its rejection of the Chinese statement on Chinese sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, Hanoi repeated its counterclaims to the archipelagoes but expressed its wish for a peaceful settlement.[42] Beijing, however, was intransigent. Its position was clear and determined, especially in Li Xiannian's conversations with Pham Van Dong in June 1977 and in Huang Hua's speech in July 1977.[43] Thus, when the border talks were held in October 1977, no progress was made. In April 1978, Vietnamese Vice-Foreign Minister Phan Hien reportedly expressed in Beijing his country's disagreement on the sovereignty of the two archipelagoes.[44] After China attacked Vietnam in 1979, Vietnam was determined to insist on its ownership of the archipelagoes and called China's occupation of the Paracels "a flagrant act of aggression" of Vietnamese territory which was "designed to put Viet Nam under Chinese control from the sea."[45] This was the third time that Hanoi changed its position from opposition to China's sovereignty over the two archipelagoes to condemnation of China's aggression on Vietnam territory.

This dispute, to conclude, arose only after the general Sino-Vietnamese relationship had deteriorated. In historical perspective, China, as discussed previously, has more solid evidence than Vietnam to prove its first discovery and ownership of the archipelagoes. Moreover, Chinese fishermen from time to time have resided and transacted business there although they neither exercised sovereignty continuously nor took control until the early 1900s. French occupation of the two archipelagoes in 1933–1938 was not extended into the post-war years after the Japanese takeover in 1939–1945. Rather, it was China who occupied them in 1946–1950. Moreover, the ROC, as discussed earlier, has occupied the T'aip'ing Island of the Spratlies since 1956. Although South Vietnam harassed Chinese fishermen on the Paracels in 1959 and announced the incorporation of the Paracels into the Quang Nam Province in 1961 without actual occupation, China has repeatedly protested. In 1973, South Vietnamese forces landed on one of the Paracel Islands but were expelled by the Chinese in 1974. Finally, Vietnam's occupation of the six islands of the Spratlies since 1974 is a new exercise of its sovereignty over the islands, not a continuation of control. In this context, French occupation in 1933–1938 can hardly be considered as a "final and decisive sovereign act" as required by international law.[46] China appears to have a stronger claim to the archipelagoes than Vietnam.

This long dispute can hardly be settled by argument. At present, however, it is not an urgent issue. The border conflict by early 1979 had become a much more serious problem contributing significantly to the outbreak of the 1979 war.

The Gulf of Tonkin and Border Conflicts

Unlike the disputes concerning Paracel and Spratly islands, those over the Gulf of Tonkin and the border area do not have deep historical roots. China and Vietnam have argued with occasional reference to the 1887 convention.

Two conferences at the vice-foreign minister level on the boundary issue were held. The first was held in August–November 1974 in Hanoi on the division of the Gulf of Tonkin.[47] The meetings only served to increase the acrimonious arguments.

On the issue of the Gulf of Tonkin, Hanoi's position gradually hardened in the 1970s. In December 1973 after Hanoi had made a proposal to Beijing on the Tonkin Gulf, a Vietnamese vice-foreign minister stated that the Tonkin Gulf sea area "has not been divided . . . because Viet Nam has been at war all the time."[48] He may have implied Vietnam's determination to negotiate with China on the division of the gulf in the forthcoming conference in 1974, but he could not deny that the gulf had not been divided as of 1973. Yet, at the first conference in August 1974, the Vietnamese changed their position by asserting that the boundary line of the gulf had been "delimited long ago" by a provision of the 1887 convention: that is, longitude 108 degrees, 3 minutes, 13 seconds, east. Hanoi's assertion would make Vietnam possessor of two-thirds of the Tonkin Gulf.

China disagreed. Chinese negotiators argued that the 1887 Sino-French Convention on the Delimitation of the Frontier provided the red line only as an indication of the ownership of the offshore islands, not as the "sea boundary line" in the gulf. Moreover, according to China the term "Gulf of Tonkin" did not appear in the convention, nor did the map attached to the convention include the entirety of the gulf. China called Vietnam's assertion a "fantastic interpretation of the convention."[49]

After the first conference, China made several proposals for a second meeting. Vietnam finally agreed, and a second conference was held in October 1977. But five months prior to the meeting, Vietnam defined its territorial waters and 200-mile sea economic zone that included the greater portion of the Gulf of Tonkin and the surrounding areas of the Paracels and Spratlies. In June of the same year, Chinese Deputy Premier Li Xiannian told Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong that the sea area of the Tonkin Gulf had never been officially divided and that China did not accept Vietnam's proposal whereby Vietnam would occupy two-thirds of the sea area of the Tonkin Gulf.[50] With so many pre-conference differences, the October

1977 conference was doomed to failure. Afterward, further proposals for negotiations were made. The Vietnamese hardened their position in the summer of 1978 saying that they were "too busy to negotiate" with China.

The land border dispute created an even more tense situation than the Tonkin Gulf issue. The first disagreement appeared in 1974 on the joint points of the Sino-Vietnamese railway. Vietnam argued, gently at first, that the joint points of the railway track had been mistakenly placed in 1954 over 300 meters inside Vietnamese territory. Hanoi asked for an adjustment; Beijing rejected it. Thereafter, similar disagreements increased on the location of the junction of an oil pipeline, on the markers for the borderline, and even on the boundary rivers. Claims and counterclaims were made. Violent incidents between local authorities and residents on both sides increased. Then came the first bloody incident on May 4, 1977, at the Youyiguan [Friendship Pass] where more than 50 Chinese workers in the railway section were injured by 500 Vietnamese soldiers. One week later, Vietnam toughened its stand by announcing its 200-mile economic zone in the sea from its coast, as discussed earlier.

The impasse of the October 1977 negotiations in Beijing registered rather accurately the increasing tensions in the border area. At the negotiations, however, the Chinese suggested that the two sides recheck the alignment of the entire boundary line based on the Sino-French boundary accords and settle all boundary and territorial disputes. After that, China and Vietnam should conclude a new Sino-Vietnamese boundary treaty to replace the Sino-French boundary accords.[51] The Vietnamese turned it down. As Hanoi reasoned later, "they [the Chinese] have demanded, as a pre-condition, that Viet Nam give up its line of independence and sovereignty and its sovereignty over Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Archipelagoes."[52]

Another measure taken by Hanoi to harden its position in the border dispute was the campaign for the "purification of the border area," beginning in mid-1977. Under this campaign all the Chinese and non-Vietnamese minority residents in the border area had to leave for China. It was felt that after the area was cleared, there would be no border dispute. But, before the border area became cleared ("purified"), more violent incidents broke out. General Vo Nguyen Giap was reported to have visited the border area in January 1978 to inspect defense facilities in the company of Soviet military advisers.[53] After the beginning of the expulsion of the Chinese residents in Vietnam took place in 1978, border incidents rocketed to new heights as shown in Table 3.1.

Although there is a discrepancy in the reports of incidents according to Chinese and Vietnamese accounts, the increasing intensity, especially in October and early November 1978, signaled the development of a crisis.

TABLE 3.1
SINO-VIETNAMESE BORDER INCIDENTS

Year	*Chinese Accounts*	*Vietnamese Accounts*
1974	121	179
1975	439	294
1976	986	812
1977	752	873
1978	1108	2175
1979	129 *(up to February 16, 1979)*	

Sources: Renmin Ribao, May 14, 1979, and "SRV Memorandum," March 16, 1979, p. K19.

The conclusion of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty on November 3, 1978, confirmed such a signal. On November 10, China gave a stern warning to Vietnam on the growing border conflicts.

> It is absolutely by no means accidental that the Vietnamese authorities stirred up disturbances along the Sino-Vietnamese border on the eve of their intensified aggression against Kampuchea and their conclusion of a military alliance with the Soviet Union . . . We have to question the Vietnamese authorities: What are you up to? How far will you go? . . . The Chinese people are determined to safeguard their sovereignty and territorial integrity . . . We sternly warn the Vietnamese authorities: Draw back your criminal band . . . and stop the provocations and intrusions along the Chinese-Vietnamese border.[54]

Warnings and protests came and went. As border clashes continued to increase, the Sino-Vietnamese tensions were further aggravated by the emotional issue of the expulsion of the Chinese from Vietnam.

THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN VIETNAM

The Overseas Chinese in Vietnam, like the ethnic Chinese in other Southeast Asian countries, have come mainly from the provinces of Guangdong (Kuangtung) and Fujian (Fukien).[55] During the Sung Dynasty (960–1279), the Chinese developed significant coastal and naval affairs in South China, encouraging trade with Southeast Asia. According to convincing evidence, Chinese traders were visible in the markets and ports of the Gulf of Siam in the thirteenth century; in the last decade of that century, Chinese also constantly came to Cambodia, which covered a large part of what is southern Vietnam today.[56] During the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), the

Chinese came to Vietnam for trade and settlement; more came during the Qing (Ch'ing) period (1644–1911). After the Opium War (1840–1842), the turmoil in China and peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia encouraged a significant flow of ethnic Chinese to Southeast Asia, including Vietnam. The primary motivation for the migration was economic.

Organizations

Over the past centuries, the Chinese community in Vietnam and in other Southeast Asian countries has developed several characteristics. First, their economically oriented minds and hard-working abilities earned them economic positions in Vietnam. Most of them made a periodical or systematic remittance of money back to China. Second, they carried on their cultural heritage by opening up Chinese schools and by publishing Chinese newspapers. Some wealthy and/or education-oriented parents also sent their children back to China for school before the youngsters went abroad for higher Western learning. Third, they generally maintained their ethnic ties in marriage. Intermarriage was a secondary choice; some did it for economic reasons or immigration status. Fourth, they possessed no political power, partly because they were not political men and partly because they were a minority. They also produced no military leaders. The traditional Chinese concept of *hao-tzu pu tang-ping* [good son (boy) will not be a soldier] still prevailed in the Chinese community. When they were obliged to join the military service as Vietnamese citizens, they would either seek exemption through corrupt Vietnamese officials or join the Saigon garrison forces rather than fight on the front.[57]

Politically speaking, Chinese support for the South Vietnamese government experienced a significant change in 1965. Prior to 1965, only about half of the 1,300,000 ethnic Chinese supported the Saigon (anti-communist) regime. After 1965, and especially after the 1968 Tet Offensive, anti-communist Chinese increased to 75–80 percent.[58] The reason is simple: ethnic Chinese as well as the general Vietnamese had had a better chance in 1965–1968 to observe and experience what real communist policy would be like. Nevertheless, a small portion of Chinese, mostly the younger generation, still joined the Viet-Cong. They engaged in threats, assassinations, and guerrilla warfare. Naturally, anti-communist figures were their targets. Although there were well-organized socioeconomic associations in the Chinese community, these organizations exercised persuasion, rather than control, over Chinese political behavior. In most cases, such practice was not effective. Prior to 1975, there were only five parliamentary members of Chinese origin in the Saigon government. None of them ever gained any meaningful power.

Owing to the above characteristics, the ethnic Chinese maintained a complex position in Vietnam. On the one hand, they had made substantial contributions to the country; on the other hand, they were not fully integrated into Vietnamese society. They kept their fundamental identity and were economically better off than most Vietnamese. It was also because of these characteristics that the ethnic Chinese had become a problem to Vietnam (as well as to other Southeast Asian countries). This situation was compounded by the drastic changes in the government and society after North Vietnam's liberation of the South.

Prior to April 1975, several nongovernmental, socioeconomic associations were well-established in the Chinese community. On the basis of language-geographical differences, they were divided into five groups (bangs or bongs); namely, Cantonese Bang (Cantonese and Chao-ch'ing group), Hokkien (Fukienese) Bang, Teuchiu (Ch'ao-chou) Bang, Hakka Bang, and Hainan Bang.[59] Each bang organized its own association in both Saigon and Cholon, and elected its president (bang director). In other words, there were altogether ten bang associations in the Saigon-Cholon area. The membership of each bang was composed of people from all walks of life. Each bang had its own Chinese schools, hospital, and sports club. They published eleven Chinese newspapers for a population of 1,200,000–1,400,000 in South Vietnam, but their publications were not sponsored or supported by each bang. Above the bang was the Chinese Regional Grouping Administration [Groupment Administration Chinoise Regional]. In fact, it could have been called the General Council of the Ten Bangs in Saigon and Cholon. It was a wealthy and effective organization. In addition, the Chinese formed the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in South Vietnam for the Chinese community and business throughout the South—similar to the Chamber of Commerce in the United States. The former (Bang Council) was based on language-geographical groupings, the latter (Chamber of Commerce) was based on business. They coexisted separately on equal footing under the South Vietnamese government.[60] For clarity, see Chart 3.1.

Three important points should be emphasized here. First, these bang associations socially organized the ethnic Chinese into units, leaving virtually no one unorganized outside the Chinese community. It was traditional for a newcomer to report to his bang and to join his association. Although there had been no definite practice of population registration, each bang kept track of its population. In addition to their function as a social organization, the bangs also maintained Chinese social rites and customs. Second, business was mostly run on an individual basis, not controlled by the bang organization. Mutual assistance and cooperation in business took place more often within each bang rather than among the bangs. Cooperation and

CHART 3.1

ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM, PRE-1975


The South Vietnamese Government
Chinese Regional Grouping Administration (General Council of the Ten Bangs in Saigon and Cholon)
Chinese Chamber of Commerce
Cantonese Bang Associations (Saigon and Cholon)
Hokkien Bang Associations (Saigon and Cholon)
Teuchiu Bang Associations (Saigon and Cholon)
Hakka Bang Associations (Saigon and Cholon)
Hainan Bang Associations (Saigon and Cholon)
General Chung-cheng Hospital, 300 beds
Other bangs in South Vietnam outside Saigon and Cholon
Commercial organizations in South Vietnam
Schools
Hospital (912 beds)
Sport club
Schools
Hospital (610 beds)
Sport club
Schools
Hospital (603 beds)
Sport club
Schools
Hospital (355 beds)
Sport club
Schools
Hospital (40 beds)
Sport club

Source: See Note 60 of this chapter.
Note: There were also 11 newspapers and more than 166 schools in South Vietnam. The General Hospital was supported by the entire Chinese community.

competition promoted the business development. Most of them were successful and therefore held a dominant economic position in South Vietnam. Third, there were eleven Chinese newspapers in Saigon-Cholon and more than thirty-four elementary and high schools in the same area. Their main purpose was to encourage Chinese cultural heritage. Although some of the young Chinese-Vietnamese also attended the Vietnamese military academy, none of them became a military commander. Thus, the Chinese community was able to raise and maintain some men of culture but no military-political leaders.[61] As a result, it had almost no power to stand against Vietnamese domestic political storms, let alone drastic revolutionary change by the Vietnamese Communists.

In northern Vietnam, hundreds of thousands Overseas Chinese moved to the South after the country was divided in July 1954. In 1955, Beijing and Hanoi agreed that Chinese residents in northern Vietnam should gradually obtain Vietnamese citizenship. They would be treated as Vietnamese. As of 1978, there were about 300,000 ethnic Chinese living in the North.

In the South, the Vietnamese political storms against the ethnic Chinese were generated by two major motivations: economics and nationalism. In August 1956, after Ngo Dinh Diem, then president of South Vietnam, consolidated his power in the South, he promulgated a decree requiring the Chinese residents to renounce their Chinese nationality and to adopt Vietnamese citizenship if they wanted to continue their business there. In April 1957, the Diem regime further declared invalid the alien identity cards of all Chinese residents. The Chinese had no power to resist. Reluctantly, they accepted the measures. Many of them employed a noncooperation policy by closing down their businesses for a period of time. Undoubtedly, they suffered great losses, but the government also lost a significant amount of taxes.

The ethnic Chinese enjoyed a period of economic growth between 1963 and 1975.[62] After the Communists took over South Vietnam, however, their gains became a target of Vietnamese attacks. As Hanoi's theoretical monthly *Tap Chi Cong San* [Communism] charged:

> At the end of 1974 they controlled more than 80 percent of the installations of the food, textile, chemical, metallurgy, engineering and electrical industries and nearly achieved a trading monopoly—wholesale trade 100 percent, retail trade more than 50 percent, and export-import trade 90 percent. They absolutely controlled the purchase of rice and paddy and obtained up to 80 percent of the bank loans in the entire south. They owned 42 of the 60 corporations having a large annual turnover of more than 1 million *dong* of the old regime and their investments always accounted for up to two-thirds of the total annual investment in the south.[63]

Despite the exaggeration of the above charge, the ethnic Chinese did hold a significant portion of the South Vietnamese economy before 1975 as mentioned previously. Such a situation would become intolerable to a new communist regime whose economic policy would not allow the existence of private capital and whose sense of nationalism and indignation toward China was particularly strong at that time. The liquidation of Chinese wealth and the transformation of their status was inevitable. Pessimistic about the outlook of the Vietnamese situation, many wealthy Chinese quietly left Saigon prior to the fall of that city in late April 1975.

New Measures and the Overseas Chinese, 1975–1978

In retrospect, we can see clearly that in 1975–1978 the unified Vietnamese government carried out a series of measures for socioeconomic transformation in southern Vietnam that vitally struck the Chinese community. They were, in chronological order, the anti-comprador bourgeoisie movement (1975), currency reforms (1975, 1978), and the socialist transformation of private capitalist industry and commerce (1978). These measures were for all southern Vietnamese (the currency reform was also for the North), not specifically for the Overseas Chinese. Most of the Chinese, however, were wealthy businessmen or comprador bourgeoisie, so they became the main targets for the burning sentiment of Vietnamese nationalism. Later, the expulsion of Overseas Chinese became the most effective measure that virtually wiped out the Chinese community from the entire country.

THE ANTI-COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE MOVEMENT, 1975. After Saigon was taken in April 1975, Vietnamese authorities planned for some time to liquidate the wealth of the business community. In July and August 1975, they recruited several hundred young people, including college students of Chinese origin, for a short period of ideological training. It concentrated on learning the Marxist theory of class struggle and aimed at the liquidation of the exploiting, rich, reactionary, and comprador bourgeoisie. The wealthy Chinese were all identified as belonging to this group which was required to register with the government. When the training and preparation were done, a powerful campaign began on September 5 in Saigon-Cholon as well as in many other cities in the South. Well-organized mass demonstrations and mass meetings were held every day. Mass media incessantly denounced the crimes of the comprador bourgeoisie, charging them with monopolizing the market, manipulating prices, hoarding goods, and illegally trading gold and U.S. dollars. The drive was both fearful and impressive: fearful to wealthy people, especially the ethnic Chinese, impressive to the youngsters who had an illusion about a better society under Communism.[64]

The mass campaign lasted for five days. Then the stormy actions began. Beginning at 10:00 p.m., September 9, groups of armed police, security personnel, and the trained youth occupied numerous companies, shops, factories, and residences of Vietnamese and Chinese businessmen in Saigon and Cholon. The enlisted Chinese youth assisted them with translation and identification. They either arrested the businessmen or placed them in temporary (one or two days) custody. Meanwhile they searched and made complete records of the hoardings and properties, which included U.S. dollars, gold pieces, diamonds, commodities, automobiles, refrigerators, television sets, furniture, and even electric fans. They searched meticulously from the living room to the small incense burner, lest they should miss "a needle or a thread."

It was not until next morning that the government issued a fourteen-point statement about the action. It made accusations that the comprador bourgeoisie "undermined the economy, monopolized the market and amassed riches . . . at the expense of our compatriots' bones and blood." It also stated that the people demanded that the state deal severely with them.[65] In its fourth and fifth points, the statement revealed the possibility of confiscation of the capital and business establishments:

> 4. The state will do its utmost to encourage and help the bourgeoisie who contribute their capital, technical knowledge and talents to participating in building new economic zones.
>
> 5. There are special cases in which many bourgeoisie want to sell their production and business establishments to the state . . . The state may examine and consider each particular case.

On the same day, the spokesman for the Ho Chi Minh City Military Management Committee made known that the government had ordered the arrest of a number of "guilty" comprador bourgeoisie; it had also ordered a freeze of all their properties.[66] Also on the same day, Saigon's *Giai Phong* [Liberation] daily carried an editorial, stating that the comprador bourgeoisie had colluded with the U.S. aggressors and the puppet administrations. The more "our compatriots' blood was shed, the richer" they became. They had become "kings," such as the rice king, the barbed wire king, the fabric king, the coffee king, and the iron-steel king. Their crimes were "extremely grave and totally unforgivable," the daily charged angrily. They must be "resolutely eliminated."[67] On September 12, more kings were arrested. Arrests were made in other cities too. As *Giai Phong* continued its attacks on the comprador bourgeoisie, the ethnic Chinese were reported by Hanoi Radio to have welcomed the movement.[68]

Such a campaign went on until early October—almost a month. In theory, both the Vietnamese and Chinese bourgeoisie were the targets. In reality, the Chinese suffered most. Yet, how many Chinese companies or shops were searched and "frozen," and how many members of the Chinese bourgeoisie were arrested? The PRC never published the exact figures. There is no way to know for sure. As learned later, however, at least 100 Chinese firms were thoroughly searched in only one evening, September 9, and more than 250 wealthy Chinese were arrested during the campaign. Several committed suicide. Absentees' properties, including houses, were confiscated immediately. Those arrested included presidents and/or owners of companies involved in monosodium glutamate, metalworks, wheat flour, movie theaters, imports-exports, textile, paper, restaurants, and ironworks.[69] Most of them were released prior to 1979 after they had contributed their capital and business establishments. As to the reactionary political and educational-cultural leaders, they were among the first groups to become prisoners or unemployed.

As mentioned earlier, beginning in April 1975 some leaders of the Chinese community left Vietnam for foreign lands. After May 1975, more leaders of the bang associations left. The original leadership was virtually nonexistent. Then, the revolutionary authorities occupied the office buildings of the General Association and General Council, then the bangs clubs, and closed down the eleven Chinese newspapers. They also took over the Chinese General Chung-cheng Hospital in early 1976 and the other five bangs hospitals in January 1978.

CURRENCY REFORMS, 1975 AND 1978. From the liberation of Saigon in 1975 to the Sino-Vietnamese border war in 1979, the Vietnamese government carried out two currency reforms. One was in September 1975 for southern Vietnam; the other was in May 1978 for the entire country. The 1975 reform was for the conversion of the Saigon capitalist currency into the socialist one and for the policy of establishing an egalitarian society by significantly reducing the wealth of the people in the South. The 1978 reform was made under the policy of promoting national unification and eliminating the postwar profiteers, be they wealthy businessmen or sidewalk retailers. Both Chinese residents and Vietnamese, however, suffered severely from the reforms.

At 4 p.m., September 21, 1975, Ho Chi Minh City authorities informed all residents by radio broadcast that they had to return home by 11 p.m. (curfew time: 11 p.m.–5 a.m.) to wait for an important announcement of the government. Meanwhile, groups of wives of northern Vietnamese cadres rushed to markets to purchase clothes, food, foreign wines, and other groceries. Rumors flew high. Shortly after 11 p.m., the radio announced that the curfew would be extended for six more hours on September 22, that is, until 11 a.m.[70] Three hours later (2 a.m., September 22), the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) announced a currency exchange. Later the Military Management Committee of Ho Chi Minh City explained that the extended hours were set so the residents could prepare for the exchange.[71]

On the morning of September 22, the Bank of Vietnam in Ho Chi Minh City issued a communiqué for currency exchange. It can be thus summarized:

> 1. The rate of exchange between the new and old currencies (*dong*) was one for 500 piasters.
> 2. Each household could exchange 100,000 piasters in old currency (equal to 200 new piasters) for daily life requirements.
> 3. Families involved in small business could each apply for an additional exchange of 100,000 piasters in old piasters, pending approval.
> 4. Big business organizations could each apply for an exchange of 100,000–500,000 piasters in old currency. If truly needed, big business firms could each exchange a maximum of 500,000 additional piasters in old currency.
> 5. The rest of the old currencies (from 100,000 to 100 millions and more) must be exchanged for new currency and deposited in the bank.
> 6. All the exchanges had to be completed by 11 p.m., September 22.
> 7. Violators of these regulations were liable to criminal charges.[72]

Numerous old dong holders, especially overseas Chinese, faced a great dilemma. Many of them had just sold their goods or business equipment at unbelievably low prices to the North Vietnamese cadres under the strong pressure of the anti-comprador bourgeoisie movement beginning on September 10. If they exchanged additional 100,000–500,000 old dongs (equal to 200–1,000 new dongs) and deposited them in the bank, they were afraid of being identified as comprador bourgeoisie; but if they kept their extra old currency which was valueless, they would be punished when discovered. Amidst great confusion, some of them deposited a portion of their extra dongs, some asked their relatives or friends to exchange for additional new dongs, some sold the old dongs to communist cadres at a rate of 5,000 to 1, some gave away money, and others simply burned their excess currencies.[73] Consequently, countless relatively and considerably rich Chinese businessmen, who had not previously exchanged dongs for gold or foreign currencies in significant amounts, suffered great losses overnight.

What about the excess money deposited in the bank? It took the authorities almost six months to announce the permission to depositors to withdraw 30 new dongs per month. Beginning in December 1976, however, the government ordered a stop to such withdrawals completely.

Shortly after the first currency exchange, the government issued a decree ordering all foreigners and Vietnamese to report and deposit their foreign currencies in the bank. Those who refused would run the risk of punishment in addition to confiscation. As a result, the value of foreign currencies soared; the prices rose beyond control (official rate: U.S. $1 = 1.50 new dong).

Two other important policies that also hurt the Vietnamese and Chinese were adopted in 1976–1977 before the second currency reform was made in 1978. One was heavy taxation, the other was called new economic zones.

In August 1976, a new decree stipulated that all business concerns, including sidewalk cigarette stands, which made a profit of over 10 percent since May 1975 would be subject to a tax rate of 80 percent retroactively. The actual tax was increased to 100 percent, however, because of inflation starting in July 1976, also retroactively. In other words, almost all the profit made by businessmen since May 1975 had to go to the government. This decision was "aimed at all small businessmen in general, but more particularly at the million Chinese" businessmen in Cholon and Saigon.[74] In addition, the communist authorities in Saigon ordered the businessmen to pre-pay taxes for four months—from September to December 1976. Taxes were divided into three rankings with three steps in each ranking. According to these rankings, the highest single tax amounted to 13,750,000 old dong (equal to 27,500 new dong).[75] The profits of Chinese businessmen were virtually wiped out.

The development of new economic zones was based on the imaginary planning of the Vietnamese leaders. It was part of their five-year plan (1976–1980). Its purpose was twofold: the redistribution of the labor force from overcrowded cities to uninhabited countryside and the creation of food-producing economic areas.

At the Fourth Congress of the Vietnam Communist (Workers') Party in mid-December 1976, Vietnamese leaders officially unveiled their plan. As Nguyen Van Linh, Politburo member and Party Secretary of Ho Chi Minh City, told the delegates of the Congress on December 15, 1976: "In the near future a target of more than one million people from Ho Chi Minh City will be completely resettled in new economic zones . . . The outskirts of Ho Chi Minh City will be developed as a vast farm around the city to supply sufficient foodstuffs and vegetables to the city."[76] Premier Pham Van Dong also announced on December 16 that the distribution of the work force, which might reach the four million mark, would be started in 1977.[77] Pham Hung, Politburo member and Party Secretary for the South, further stated that the Mekong Delta zone "will produce rice and other foodstuffs."[78]

After the redistribution of population began, problems arose. People criticized the policy as a "re-population of the South by the North." In his interview with a *Le Monde* correspondent on April 16, 1977, Pham Van Dong defended the measure:

> We now face complex problems, which require an urgent solution, of how to make southern cities less crowded and to reclaim "white zones" in the countryside . . . For Viet Nam . . . the question now is to formulate and work out this plan in the most rational way possible . . . This is also the most effective and most practical measure to ensure a balanced and proportionate development of industry and agriculture and of the cities and the countryside, to avoid pollution and ecological disturbance . . .[79]

Yet, what kind of people were resettled in the new economic zones? From where did they come and in what fashion? What were the preparations made for them in the new areas? What were the achievements? And how did it all affect the Overseas Chinese? Several eyewitness accounts provide adequate answers to these questions.[80]

In 1976–1977, the life in Ho Chi Minh City worsened every day. Heavy unemployment, inflation, and food shortages were widely reported in letters trickling out of Vietnam to foreign lands, including the United States.[81] Even if people had money, they still could not buy food and medicine. Hundreds of thousands of people were having an extremely difficult time eking out a living. Under such circumstances, the new economic zones were made available to them. Thus, the new settlers in the zones were formerly civil servants, urban employees, shopkeepers and the unemployed after the anti-comprador bourgeoisie movement. They were largely from Ho Chi Minh City. Some were volunteers because they could no longer subsist in the city; they had "nothing more to sell, no choice." Others were sent forcibly because they were "nonproducers." The new zones were assigned to unused, remote, and undeveloped mountainous areas where often little or no preparations had been made to receive the settlers. The new arrivals were sometimes killed by the mines remaining from the Vietnam War. They had insufficient shelters, food, water, and medicine. They suffered severely. As a French-Canadian Catholic priest, who lived in Vietnam for 28 years, described:

> What happened is that a month before the settlers arrive, students are sent out to prepare the terrain; for each house they set up four bamboo stakes which they roof over with lantana and banana leaves . . . No walls, floors of packed earth, the rain comes in.
>
> A more serious problem is finding water . . . Life is very hard in the zones . . . Malaria is again reappearing, and food is insufficient. Officially the government promised a three-month supply of rice to the settlers while awaiting the next harvest, but I don't know a single case where these promises were kept.[82]

The same priest also reported that in the early morning he saw lines of military trucks crossing Saigon filled with civilians leaving for the barren zones. "Above 3,000 leave each day," he wrote. By February 1977, 600,000 people had left Saigon. The number increased to one million by mid-April of the same year, according to government figures.[83] In April of 1977, the official Vietnamese News Agency stated, "Several hundred thousand shopkeepers, coffee house and restaurant owners, and hawkers still spend their time trading, trafficking, speculating, making prices waltz and pocketing substantial incomes. Worse still, many young people shy away from work, preferring to traffic for a living." Since more than 80 percent of the Saigon population provided no useful work for the state, the statement continued, they must be moved to the countryside. In estimate, six more million people in the South had to leave the cities, most of them to new economic zones, the agency reported. But these zones were called by some people as "concentration camps without fences."[84]

By May 1978, approximately 300,000–350,000 ethnic Chinese had gone to the zones from Saigon-Cholon.[85] All suffered and complained. Some of them slipped back to the city staying with their relatives or friends since their houses in the city had been taken over by the government when they left. Assistance was sought unceasingly in and outside Vietnam through friends, relatives, schoolmates, clanship, and relations of the same bang. They tried hard to survive in the city. Some tried to escape before the government began to permit them to leave in January 1978. They were often caught and jailed.

The second currency reform was scheduled for May 3, 1978. As mentioned previously, it was ostensibly for the promotion of national unification and the removal of capitalist profiteers. Hanoi hoped that this reform would promote its socialist transformation.

According to governmental decree, each urban household was allowed to exchange old monies for 100 to 500 new bank notes, and each rural household for 50 to 300, depending on the size of the family. Public officers, military units, and other economic and social organizations were allowed each to exchange an amount not exceeding 1,000.[86] The rate of exchange was one old northern dong (piaster) for one new dong and 0.8 old southern dong for one new dong. All of the excess money supported by evidence as legitimate income had to be exchanged and deposited at the bank. The deposited accounts could be withdrawn when the depositors needed unexpected monetary requirements arising from sickness, birth, accidents, or funerals. Withdrawals had to be approved.[87] Excessive, undeposited old currencies would become valueless after 24 hours. Although the exchange rate was different from that of 1975, it was almost a replay.

With the experience of the 1975 exchange, in 24 hours people rushed to purchase limited gold, U.S. dollars, and Hong Kong currencies on the black market no matter what the price was. Once again, countless old currencies were exchanged on the black market at low prices, hidden in the house, given away, or even burned. Some people bought highly priced foods (for instance, 200 new dong for a fish, 100 new dong for a chicken), enjoying their meals for a day![88] A few days later, policemen raided houses and carried away cartons and bags of the old money. On more than one occasion, policemen found more than 10,000 piasters in old currency in one dwelling because the owners could not prove they had earned it legally.[89] Refrigerators, motorbikes, high-fidelity radio sets, television sets, and other luxury items were also taken by the policemen. The Vietnamese and Chinese suffered great losses overnight for the second time.

Beijing was probably very concerned about the treatment the Chinese had received under the currency reform. It was in no position, however, to interfere in Vietnam's internal affairs.

By that time, the Vietnamese government, without realizing the consequences, had also taken another step toward eliminating well-to-do businessmen.

SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF PRIVATE CAPITALIST INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE, 1978. Like the anti-comprador bourgeoisie movement in 1975, the socialist transformation campaign in March 1978 had been prepared at least one month before action was taken. The only difference in the preparation between the two movements was that the latter depended heavily on mass media and less on mass meetings and demonstrations than the former.

The initial signal for the transformation campaign appeared in an editorial of *Nhan Dan* on February 24. It stated that such a transformation in the South was "one of the urgent economic tasks to be carried out" in 1978 and was thus "being stepped up."[90] Its purposes, the editorial went on, were to eliminate the private ownership of industry and commerce, to build and expand the socialist market, to stabilize prices, currency, production, and people's livelihoods, and to strengthen political security. The party-government newspaper also emphasized that such a transformation could be successful only with the participation of the masses.[91] Then the campaign was intensified by the mass media in Ho Chi Minh City.

On March 23, 1978, the People's Committee of Ho Chi Minh City issued a communiqué. It stated:

> Effective immediately the state unifies market management and charges all socialist trade organizations with unifying business operations and organizing the distribution of all goods and commodities essential to production and the people's livelihood . . .
>
> All trade business operations of bourgeois tradesmen are to be abolished. These tradesmen will be guided and assisted by the state in using their capital to produce material assets for society . . . If they have technical and professional skills, they may be employed in the state-run trade sector to serve the revolution.[92]

As for the goods and business facilities of the capitalist traders, they would be requisitioned or purchased by the state, the authorities announced.[93]

That day, the action began. Under the name of "general inspection," armed police and security personnel arrived at all business firms and houses. Their searches were even more meticulous than those of the anti-comprador bourgeoisie movement in 1975. All gold, jewelry, and foreign currencies were confiscated. Goods in stock and business facilities were removed by military trucks virtually without compensation. Refrigerators and television sets again became targets. After the goods and facilities were confiscated, factories and firms were closed down. Then the government sent the former capitalist families to the new economic zones. The sweeping transformation campaign continued for more than a month. Numerous Vietnamese and Overseas Chinese lost all they had and then were ordered to move to the new economic zones.[94]

Coupled with the second currency reform of May 3, the transformation movement seemed to have achieved its goal of abolishing the last traces of private capitalism. There were no more wealthy Chinese of Vietnamese businessmen in southern Vietnam. Some of them still kept some gold or foreign currencies in secret places, but the majority had to depend on foreign connections for their survival or escape.

Exodus of the Overseas Chinese

It seems clear that the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese in 1978–1980 was not Hanoi's premeditated plan immediately before or after the liberation of South Vietnam in 1975. Rather, it was a disastrous development of Hanoi's policies in the South and a calamitous consequence of its mishandling of the Overseas Chinese problem under deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese relations. Although the previously discussed issues can be regarded as the early roots of the expulsion, its immediate cause can be traced to Hanoi's policy of clearing or purifying the border areas in early 1977.

Again, the motivation of clearing the border areas in the provinces adjacent to China was to eliminate border disputes. In fact, it created more disputes and conflicts. According to Chinese sources, Vietnam began in early 1977 to send back to China groups of border inhabitants who had moved from China to settle there long ago. On May 4, 1977, as mentioned previously, the first bloody incident broke out at Youyiguan with 51 Chinese workers being injured by 500 Vietnamese soldiers. In October of the same year when the second Sino-Vietnamese border conference was in session in Beijing, Vietnam began to expel Chinese residents from northeast Vietnam.[95] In the South, the ethnic Chinese, under increasing pressure, continued to escape by boat. Many of them failed and were imprisoned.[96] In January 1978, the government of Ho Chi Minh City declared that it would allow people to apply for exit visas if they had the entry permits to France, Hong Kong, or Taiwan. Many of them waited for weeks or months to obtain such exit permits.

The exodus of the Overseas Chinese was caused by the March 1978 transformation campaign and the second currency reform in May 1978. These two measures resulted in the confiscation of at least 50,000 Chinese firms and sent 320,000 Overseas Chinese to the new economic zones.[97] On April 30, Liao Chengzhi, director of the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs, stated in Beijing that Vietnam was forcing the Chinese residents to return to China. On May 4, one day after the currency exchange deadline, Xuan Thuy, former Vietnamese foreign minister and a member of the party Central Committee, declared in Hanoi that "if anyone wants to return to China, he only has to make an open request." Later he added that assistance would be offered to repatriate the Chinese through predetermined cross-points on the border.[98] Sensing the possibility of a forthcoming political storm, the Overseas Chinese in northern Vietnam nervously flocked to the Chinese Embassy to request exit visas. They returned by land to Yunnan or Guangxi, abandoning industries, cooperatives, and even schools where they were working. In only 13 days (May 9–21), more than 57,000 Chinese were forced to return to China from northern Vietnam.[99] Among them were many specialists.[100]

Facing such an urgent problem, the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs in Beijing openly condemned Hanoi on May 24. It urged Vietnam to stop the erroneous policy of "ostracizing, persecuting and expelling" Chinese residents; otherwise, Beijing warned, "the Vietnamese Government should bear full responsibility for all the consequences arising from these unwarranted measures."[101] Three days later, Beijing decided to evacuate the Chinese from Vietnam. It announced its plan to send two ships to Haiphong and Saigon for the evacuation. Whereas Beijing continued to criticize Vietnam's ill treatment of the refugees who firmly backed up Beijing's charges, Hanoi accused China of distorting the issue.[102] Meanwhile, the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi issued a directive for the Chinese residents, containing the following major items: (1) all the Overseas Chinese in Vietnam should unite together to cope with the distressing situation; (2) they should listen to the radio broadcast from the "mother country" for relevant instructions; and (3) they should wait for the arrival of diplomats for the arrangements of evacuation by ship.[103]

Events in June and July developed rapidly. On June 7, Chinese deputy premier Deng Xiaoping, in front of a group of visiting Thai journalists in Beijing, accused Vietnam of maltreating not only the Chinese residents in Vietnam but also China itself. In disclosing the amount of China's "too-much" aid to Vietnam, which exceeded $18 billion, Deng declared: "Vietnam has taken its tenth move against China. And it is taking the eleventh step while China has just taken its first step, that is to reduce aid to Vietnam and to tell the world what is really happening. We are waiting for Vietnam to make further moves."[104]

On June 13, Sino-Vietnamese negotiations on the evacuation of Chinese reached a deadlock after nineteen sessions on the exit procedures and docking time of the two Chinese ships. Vietnam wanted to limit the docking time to three days; China wanted a flexible schedule dependent on evacuation work. On June 16, Vietnam refused to let China open a consulate-general in Ho Chi Minh City. China retaliated immediately by ordering Vietnam to close down its three consulates-general in Guangzhou, Kunming, and Nanning.[105] Meanwhile, China called back its Hanoi ambassador because of poor health. On June 29, Vietnam joined the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (COMECON) in Romania. In response, China ended all aid to Vietnam and evacuated its 880 aid specialists on July 3. By early July, more than 150,000 Chinese residents in northern Vietnam had been forced to cross the border. Not a single ethnic Chinese was spared, not even a Vietnam war hero.[106] In the South, 1,200 Overseas Chinese had been flown to Taiwan for resettlement through an arrangement with the International Red Cross, apart from 5,000 other ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos since April 1975. Meanwhile, Taiwan sped up the evacuation of an additional 1,500 Chinese from Vietnam.[107]

Disturbed and distressed, Chinese local governments of Guangxi and

Yunnan issued a joint public notice, requiring Chinese residents in Vietnam to produce Chinese repatriation certifications and Vietnamese exit visas (or passes) for crossing the border to China at appointed points.[108] Since negotiations on Chinese evacuation made absolutely no progress in June and July, China proposed on July 28 the suspension of such negotiations and ordered its two evacuation ships to go home. Tensions ran so high during these two months that a Sino-Vietnamese war was considered possible. It had become "a very dangerous situation—a spark could set it off."[109] This observation was reinforced by a report that General Vo Nguyen Giap had, in January 1978, inspected the defense facilities on the Vietnamese-Chinese border in the company of Soviet military advisers and that the Vietnamese forces along the border area had been increased by 30 to 100 percent.[110] In fact, border forces on both sides had been significantly strengthened.

Beginning in August 1978, Vietnam's position on the ethnic Chinese issue toughened for probably three major reasons. First, China's aid had already been terminated, and a compromise attitude would not quickly reverse the decision. Second, Vietnam argued that Beijing was unfair about Vietnam's position on Chinese refugees. Beijing bitterly accused Vietnam of expelling the Overseas Chinese from Vietnam while saying nothing about the massacre and expulsion of Overseas Chinese by Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea since May 1975. Vietnam complained that thousands of Chinese had fled to southern Vietnam where they were "being cared for" by the Vietnamese people, but this fact was completely ignored by the Chinese side.[111] Third, Hanoi had probably decided to promote a stronger Vietnamese-Soviet relationship bound by treaty commitment to counterbalance any unexpected pressure from China. With forthcoming Soviet support, Vietnam firmed up its attitude toward China.

As part of its new tough position, Hanoi accused the Beijing authorities for the first time of enticing about 170,000 Hoa (Chinese) people to go back to China from early 1978 to August 1978.[112] Also for the first time, it squarely called the Overseas Chinese "Hoa comprador bourgeoisie" and accused them of being used by Western imperialists as foreign "yellow-race" capitalists to exploit the Vietnamese people. Moreover, Hanoi publicly denounced the Hoa comprador bourgeoisie as "kings" of various business concerns to agitate Vietnamese nationalistic passions against the Chinese, such as rice-paddy kings, wheat flour kings, scrap-iron kings, gold kings, paper kings, and monosodium glutamate kings.[113] These kings were all arrested during the anti-comprador bourgeoisie movement in 1975 as discussed earlier. Finally, Hanoi argued in ideological terms that the struggle against the Hoa comprador bourgeoisie was in the nature of "a *class struggle* and a struggle for *national liberation*" (emphasis added).[114] What task could be more sacred than the struggle for national liberation in Vietnam!

On the Chinese side, Beijing consistently argued that the Chinese resident issue was instigated by the Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping regarded it as "part of the Soviet encirclement strategy" against China.[115] *Renmin Ribao* repeatedly accused the Soviets of creating hegemonism in Southeast Asia and of advising Vietnam to turn the Overseas Chinese against China.[116] Significantly, the Chinese refugees in China later confirmed this point. They said that their Vietnamese friends had told them, before they left Vietnam, that the Vietnamese were heeding Soviet advice to expel the fifth column of all the Chinese residents.[117] Hanoi retaliated by criticizing Beijing of seeking ways to help the Hoa bourgeoisie cause difficulties and obstacles to Vietnam's socialist transformation and socialist construction. It was part of Beijing's scheme of carrying out "big-nation hegemonism and big-nation expansionism to oppose Vietnam's sovereignty and independence," Hanoi argued.[118] As mutual accusations continued, they turned more and more emotional and acrimonious. As a proverb says, "the mind of the onlooker is clear." *Le Monde* correspondent Roland-Pierre Paringaux rightly reported in October 1978 that Hanoi's leaders had "picked up the measure adopted by Ngo Dinh Diem" against Chinese residents. That measure had been previously rejected and condemned by Hanoi.[119]

According to an eyewitness account by a reporter who experienced the ordeal of the Boat People, the Saigon Communist regime in October 1978 made arrangements with travel agencies in Hong Kong, Macao, and Singapore allowing Overseas Chinese and Vietnamese to leave southern Vietnam by taking the returning empty freighters from Saigon. The freighters usually flew a Panama flag. The fare was 10 to 12 ounces of gold for each adult, half price for each child, 70 percent of which went to communist officials. This freighter arrangement was cancelled after a few runs under strong international accusations. At the same time, permission was given to private, small boats in Vietnam. No foreign connection was made, and the fare was the same. The communist officials continued to arrange the exodus. Sometimes the Vietnamese naval vessel escorted the boat to international waters,[120] where the boats would run the risk of being destroyed by storms or captured by pirates. After permission was given, the exodus of the Boat People increased dramatically.[121] Tragedy after tragedy occurred, but no one is certain about the number of Boat People that disappeared in the stormy seas.

A careful reading of Hanoi's public documents leads us to determine that beginning in September 1978, Hanoi started to re-educate its people for the preparation of war with China. For instance, in a long article in *Tap Chi Cong San*, it first stressed the traditional values of Vietnamese patriotism and independence that had coped with the "big-nation expansionism and hegemonism of the Han (Chinese) feudalists." Then it sent a warning to "the imperialists and international reactionaries" (alluding to Chinese) that their invasion would be totally defeated.[122] The editorial of the same issue of the journal urged the people to defend their socialist fatherland. After China protested strongly against Vietnam on new border clashes in mid-December 1978, *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* ran an editorial on December 21, urging the Vietnamese army to carry out its sacred mission of defending the fatherland. Meanwhile, Hanoi strongly emphasized reinforcing the strength of its militia.

On the Chinese side, the Beijing leadership debated again and again the issue of war against Vietnam. The massive exodus of the Chinese residents was a very emotional issue that helped China make its decision.

4

Decisionmaking: Politics, Model, and Process

Students of international affairs admit rightly that a great deal is not known about foreign policy decisionmaking in non-Western capitals, especially in communist countries.[1] In the case of the PRC's decision to attack Vietnam, we will probably never know the exact details. The reason is simple: Beijing has always maintained the policy of keeping its decisions from the public and regards all unannounced political decisions or information as top state secrets. It allows no one to reveal them.[2] However, the great convulsion of the Cultural Revolution brought about enough confusion and disturbance to result in leaks of state secrets to the outside world for more than one decade. Before Beijing again tightened its security control over state secrets in April 1980, public documents and unofficial information provided a considerable amount of materials for study on the subject.[3]

In examining Chinese intervention in the Korean War, Michael Lindsay has concluded that "it seems quite likely that the Chinese involvement in Korea was mainly the result of confusion and not of considered policy on either side."[4] Alexander L. George has also observed that the Chinese-American war in Korea was fought because of "misperception, miscalculation, and inept actions." He concluded that it was a war which "neither side wanted and both tried to avoid."[5] I agree with this conclusion, but China's war with Vietnam in 1979 was neither a result of confusion nor a product of miscalculation. Rather, it was a fairly sophisticated decision arrived at after long consideration and repeated debate. Beijing also wanted definitely to teach Vietnam a lesson by military means. Nevertheless, Beijing's decision to go to war with Vietnam was made possible immediately after a power struggle among the leaders. A study of Beijing's decision consequently requires an examination of the politics prior to the decision, the decisionmaking model, and its process.[6]

THE POLITICS PRIOR TO THE DECISION, 1977–1978

In the PRC, as in the USSR, the decisionmakers at the highest level are a few top leaders in the party's Politburo.[7] Over the years, they have utilized the Politburo and its enlarged Central Work Conference to deliberate important issues. Although the general view of "teaching Vietnam a lesson" had been floating around the leadership circle in Beijing for some time, the crucial decision time was in November–December 1978.

From mid-November to mid-December 1978, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held an extremely important Central Work Conference that was followed by its Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress on December 18–22. It came out with the resolutions on the war against Vietnam and on domestic affairs.[8] The decision on Vietnam, however, was reached only after Deng Xiaoping had won his power struggle against Hua Guofeng and had secured firm control over the party leadership. It was the general belief that if it were not for Deng's newly won leadership and his daring personality, the decision might not have been made. To avoid an oversimplified understanding of the background, it is necessary to discuss it in some detail.

The Triumvirate

The domestic politics in 1976–1979 (from the death of Mao to China's decision to go to war with Vietnam) centered around three major issues: the campaign to criticize the Gang of Four, the drive for Four Modernizations, and the change in the power structure of the leadership. Although these issues were interrelated, the change in the power structure was most relevant to the decision on war. We will have only a few words on the first and second issues before examining the third—the power structure.

The campaign against the Gang of Four began after their arrest in October 1976. It developed a new dimension in 1978 when the campaign was linked together with the seven-year old movement of criticizing Lin Biao. Such a link was strongly suggested by Deng Xiaoping in June 1978 at the All-Army Political Work Conference in Beijing.[9]

It should be pointed out that after 1971 a political formula was developed in the PRC: if one wants to destroy an enemy, one links him to the notorious Lin Biao.[10] For instance, when the Gang of Four was in power in the early 1970s and attempted to destroy Zhou Enlai, it linked Confucius and Lord Zhou (implying Zhou Enlai) with Lin Biao. Likewise, when Deng Xiaoping and other Zhou Enlai followers wanted to defeat the Gang of Four, they linked the gang with Lin Biao. After the anti-Jiang (Qing) Lin (Biao) campaign finally brought the "ten evils" of the gang to trial in

November 1980 by a Special Court in Beijing, it concluded the struggle on January 26, 1981 by sentencing the ten to long imprisonment.[11]

The drive for Four Modernizations was originally set forth by Zhou Enlai in 1974, including the fields of industry, agriculture, defense, and science and technology. In February 1978, Hua Guofeng belatedly promulgated the Ten-Year Plan (1976–1985). It called for ten major iron and steel complexes, nine nonferrous metals facilities, eight large-scale coal combines, ten new oil and natural gas fields, thirty major hydropower stations, six new trunk railways, and five key harbors. The original plan was extremely ambitious. It projected, for instance, to increase food production from 285 million tons in 1977 to 400 million tons in 1985 (a 40 percent increase), and steel production from 21 million tons to 60 million tons (a 185 percent increase).[12] For a time, slogans like "Everything is for the Four Modernizations" were widely publicized. But one year after Hua's promulgation, the projected 1985 targets were substantially readjusted and reduced.

The change in the power structure of the leadership is much more complicated than the first two issues. After Deng Xiaoping was fully rehabilitated at the Third Plenum of the party's Tenth Congress in July 1977, he regained all of his positions: vice-chairman of the party, vice-chairman of the Military Commission, deputy premier, and general-chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). One month after the Third Plenum, the party held its Eleventh Congress. Apparently, this unprecedentedly hurried move was made for the rebuilding of the party leadership after the demise of Mao and the arrest of the Gang of Four. To be specific, Hua Guofeng wanted the congress to endorse his party chairmanship, and Deng Xiaoping wanted to fill the power vacuum in the leadership. As a result, the congress endorsed Hua's chairmanship and elected Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Wang Dongxing as vice-chairmen. More important, Deng rehabilitated almost one-third of the members in both the Politburo and the Central Committee. It constituted a triumvirate of Hua, Ye, and Deng in the Politburo—a shift from Mao's era.[13]

Hua's strength in the Politburo was composed of those members who either benefited from the Cultural Revolution or were engaged in the secret service system (public security). He did not establish deep roots in the party or in the PLA. His supporters were limited. They included Chen Xilian, Wang Dongxing, Ji Dengkui, Wu De, Chen Yonggui, and Seypidin. However, his chairmanship enabled him to hold a certain amount of power.

Ye Jianying was a contemporary of Mao and Zhou Enlai. As a professional soldier, he had a long career with the PLA in which his strength lies. Using his seniority, he enthusiastically called for the party's full support for Hua's chairmanship at the Eleventh Congress in August 1977. He also advocated that Hua should lead the PRC to the twenty-first century.[14] His old age has restricted him from playing an active role in the Politburo. He is highly respected by many, but his real supporters probably only include Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, and some senior military men. Nevertheless, he has served as an almost indispensable balancing force between Hua and Deng.

Through some efforts, Deng Xiaoping succeeded in naming ten new Politburo members at the Eleventh Congress. Most of them were victims of the Cultural Revolution and Deng's followers. Their professional backgrounds were broader than those of Hua's or Ye's men because Deng had served a long while in the PLA, the party, and the executive branch of the government. They included military men, party officials, and technocrats. As a result, he had the majority in the Politburo.

Power Struggle Between Hua and Deng

The development of domestic politics from August 1977 (the Eleventh Congress) to December 1978 (the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress) can be divided into two periods: August 1977 to February 1978 and March to December 1978.

During the first period, the triumvirate situation gradually moved toward a new direction, namely, the emerging factional politics between Hua and Deng. Whereas Hua tried hard, in a mediocre way, to enhance his power and prestige by glorifying Mao unceasingly, Deng quietly but dynamically worked for military and party support. Meanwhile, wall posters in Beijing began in December 1977 to criticize Hua's men: Chen Xilian, Wang Dongxing, and Wu De.[15]

Soon after he had pushed the publication of the fifth volume of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* in April 1977, Hua speedily had Mao's elegant mausoleum opened in September of the same year. He also repeatedly used Mao's controversial words, "With you in charge, I'm at ease," as Mao's will to select him as his successor. His supreme concern was the legitimacy of his chairmanship.

Deng's strategy was different. Apart from consolidating the support from the military veterans in the Politburo, Deng named Wei Guoqing in September 1977, one month after the Eleventh Congress, to succeed Zhang Chunqiao as the director of the General Political Department of the PLA.[16] Wei, a Politburo member, had been a supporter of Deng ever since the December 1929 Bai-se Uprising in Guangxi which was led by Deng.[17] In late November 1977, Deng appointed Yang Yong, another Bai-se Uprising cadre member, deputy chief of staff of the PLA, and Luo Ruiqing, former chief of staff and a friend of Deng, a standing committee member of the

Military Commission of the party. At the end of the same year, Zhao Cangbi was appointed minister of Public Security. With these four appointments, Deng had built up a new secret service network, significantly reducing the secret service power under Hua Guofeng, Wang Dongxing, and Ji Dengkui. In addition, Deng Xiaoping also rebuilt his power in the party. Before the year 1977 was over, he appointed other supporters to head several key posts: Geng Biao, External Liaison; Hu Yaobang, Organization; Ulanhu, United Front; Zhang Huaping, Propaganda; and Huang Zhen, Culture. As a result, the operational units were under Deng's control, while Hua retained his lofty but isolated chairmanship.

During the second period (March–December 1978), factional politics became further fractions, including the conflict in ideology.

The Fifth National People's Congress was held in Beijing from February 26 to March 5, 1978. It elected Ye Jianying as its chairman, with the function of chief of state without the title. The post of defense minister vacated by Ye was assigned to Xu Xiangqian, Deng's associate. Meanwhile, Deng retained his post as the general-chief of staff of the PLA. It appeared indisputable now that Deng was in firm control of the military. The congress also adopted a new constitution which provided, among other items, four freedoms, namely, to "speak out freely, air . . . views fully, hold great debates, and write big-character posters." Such a provision encouraged the Democracy Movement of 1978–1979, which enhanced Deng's prestige significantly.[18]

More important, however, was the ideological debate between the two groups headed by Hua and Deng. In retrospect, we can see clearly that the ideological skirmish was one of several aspects of the political-line dispute. It began in 1977 and became apparent in late March 1978. At the National Science Conference on March 18–31, 1978, Deng Xiaoping delivered a speech at its opening session. He stressed that "science and technology are part of the productive forces" and defended that scientists and technicians "who have flaws . . . in their ideology or their style of work" should not be called "white" if they "are not against the party and socialism."[19] In other words, such scientists and technicians should be regarded "expert and red." In contrast, Hua Guofeng, in his speech after Deng's at the same conference, stressed the supremacy of ideology that "politics is the commander, the soul in everything." He stated clearly that in natural science, "neither theory nor experiment can be cut off from materialism and dialectics. We should urge all research workers in natural science to make conscious use of the Marxist world outlook to guide their work . . ." In meeting head-on with Deng, Hua attacked the "counterrevolutionary revisionist line" of Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and the Gang of Four for interfering and sabotaging the development of Chinese science and technology.[20] In view of the fact that

Liu and Deng were constantly under attack during the Cultural Revolution, and that Liu was posthumously rehabilitated by Deng in 1980, Hua's attack on Liu foreboded his own defeat in the power struggle.

In his speech at the National Educational Work Conference on April 22, 1978, Deng carefully twisted Mao's May 7 directive. He stated that "the main task of students is to study, to learn book knowledge, i.e., science and culture." He also said that "firm and correct political orientation does not exclude the study of science and culture."[21] Hua Guofeng did not reply. Western China watchers in Hong Kong observed that Deng was challenging Mao's ideology, thereby challenging Hua.[22] Significantly, *Renmin Ribao* endorsed Deng's view.[23]

The debate reached a peak in May–June of the same year after *Guangming Daily* published on May 11 an article, "Practice Is the Sole Criterion of Testing Truth." It urged that tested new ideas and conclusions be adopted, and the old ones abandoned. This was an implicit attack on the Whatever Faction, which held the view that whatever Mao said was correct and should be followed. On May 29, Hua, using the occasion of the All-Army Political Work Conference, repeated his early statements glorifying Mao and attacking revisionism. He insisted, "We must persist in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and place revolutionization in command of modernization."[24] Deng Xiaoping disagreed. In his reply on June 2 at the same conference, Deng sharply criticized those comrades who "often forget, abandon or even oppose" Mao's method of "seeking truth from facts" and those who regard "Marxist theory as lifeless dogma" and "odd quotations from Marxist-Leninist works as a ready-made panacea." He insisted that only through practice can the correctness of one's ideas be proved, and "there is no other way of testing truth." "We must," he continued, "set things to rights and shatter spiritual fetters to effect a great emancipation of our minds."[25] It became clear now that Hua's group stuck to dogma to transmit Mao's thought, whereas Deng's group advocated a pragmatic, flexible interpretation.[26]

As the debate continued, all the important official newspapers directly or indirectly supported Deng's views.[27] In addition, both the Theory Division of the Academy of Science and the Institute of Philosophy Studies of the Academy of Social Sciences held conferences on the issue of "Theory and Practice." They disapproved of Marxism as a standard of testing truth and approved of social practice as the only criterion.[28] Facing such an upsurging wave of disapproval, Hua sensed that it was all too much for him. He managed to make a retreat. In his toast at National Day's reception on September 30, Hua stated, "we must further emancipate our minds, be bolder, devise more measures, and quicken our step." He asked for unity.[29]

The parallel use of his phrase "emancipate our minds" with Deng's "emancipation of our minds" is unmistakable.

An editorial in *Hongqi* hailed Hua's retreat statement as "a great strategic decision." It also interpreted "more emancipation of the mind" as meaning the integration of the general truths of Marxism with the concrete practice of studying new situations and problems.[30] Ostensibly praising Hua's great determination in making such a timely call, the article's real purpose was to register and disseminate Deng's new political line. This development was reinforced by the communiqué of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee that officially endorsed the concept of practice as "the sole criterion for testing truth."[31]

Deng's victory in this ideological debate was crucial to his new political power. Ever since 1949, it has become a Chinese political custom for a political debate to be won before a new policy can be established. For instance, in 1955–1957, Mao won the debate on economic policy before the radical Great Leap Forward was launched. In 1964–1965, Mao insisted on winning the debate on the Vietnam War before China's policy for the war was executed. Now, Deng had won the debate. Its significance was twofold. First, Deng had cleared his ideological road. He now had a better chance to introduce a new series of sweeping policies and modernization programs. He also had a better opportunity to get rid of some potential competitors as well as deadwood from the Chinese government lacking the administrative or technical skills necessary for economic development. He was in a better position to set China on the threshold of a new era. His power would grow accordingly. Second, Deng's iconoclastic daring had considerably demythologized Mao and interpreted his ideology in a more flexible way.[32] Deng had virtually silenced Wang Dongxing and others who belonged to the Whatever Faction and wanted to keep Mao's thoughts enshrined as a magic talisman.[33] Some analysts observed Deng's victory in the debate over Hua as a victory over the dead chairman.[34]

Wall posters, another symbol of the power struggle, continued to appear. Apart from the Democracy Movement, the attacks were aimed mostly at Hua's men, such as Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Chen Xilian, and Ji Dengkui, for their association with the Gang of Four and the 1976 Tien An Men incident. They also questioned the way Hua was appointed as prime minister immediately following the incident and asked for the rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi and Peng Dehuai.[35] In mid-August, Peng Zhen, former mayor of Beijing, reappeared on Beijing's political scene. In the fall of 1978, the campaign to oust Mayor Wu De (Mayor of Beijing) gained momentum. After a critical meeting of the Politburo reportedly held in early October, Wu was removed from his mayorship but retained his Politburo membership.[36] More than a month later, Ji Dengkui was replaced on November 22 by Chin Jiwei, another victim of the Cultural Revolution and Deng Xiaoping's associate, as the first Political Commissar of the Beijing Military Region. Speculation began to circulate in Beijing that Chen Xilian, Commander of the Beijing Military Region, might be the next target for removal.

China watchers described the above development as a power struggle between Deng and Hua, but Deng suddenly denied any differences from Hua.[37] Such a puzzling denial was made probably for two major reasons. First, a series of secret sessions of the enlarged Politburo meeting (Central Work Conference) was held from mid-November to mid-December 1978. The Vietnam problem was one of several important issues discussed at the conference. Deng needed Hua's support for his policies, including his war policy against Vietnam. Second, it represented a tactical retreat on Deng's part before extracting further gains and concessions from Hua.

The establishment of Washington-Beijing diplomatic relations was announced on December 15. It was an exciting boost to the PRC and to Deng. The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee began three days after the announcement. It was an extremely important conference for both internal and external affairs. Internally, it elected four more victimized party officials to the Politburo (Chen Yun, Deng Yingchao, Hu Yaobang, and Wang Zhen) and nine to the Central Committee.[38] It also reversed the Politburo decision of April 1976 purging Deng Xiaoping. Moreover, it rehabilitated Peng Dehuai, Tao Chu, Bo Yibo and Yang Shangkun, restored the party secretariat, and decided to establish a Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline headed by Chen Yun. Furthermore, it called for concerted efforts for modernization and a peaceful reunification of Taiwan.[39] Externally, the conference endorsed the decision to go to war against Vietnam.

In sum, by the time the decision on Vietnam was being made, Deng Xiaoping had won an important ideological debate, cut thin Hua Guofeng's power group, rehabilitated more of his victimized associates, and consolidated his power. In the decisionmaking Politburo, he was in control of a solid majority. This Hua-Deng-Ye factional lineup in the Politburo in 1977–1978 is illustrated in Table 4.1.

This table shows us first that Deng's supporters numbered 17.5, Hua's 8.5, and Ye's 4. Generally, the Ye group remained neutral in the Hua-Deng struggle. Although Chen Yun stood between Ye and Deng, it made no difference in the lineup. Thus, as of December 1978, Deng's majority was indisputably assured. His power, prestige, and revisionist viewpoints were clearly ascendant. Second, Deng's majority had promoted him to command the Politburo as well as the Central Committee. On the one hand, his majority had apparently facilitated the Politburo's decision on the 1979 war against Vietnam. On the other hand, Deng might have used the decision as a measure to test the loyalty of Politburo and Central Committee members to his newly established leadership and authority. Third, Deng's success in gaining a majority was undoubtedly due to the expectations and needs of the party and his close association with Zhou Enlai, who enjoyed an incomparable posthumous popularity. These three reasons explained why Deng was the ultimate authority for making policy decisions in China. Equally important were his personality, use of psychology, and political style.[40]

A short biographical sketch of Deng is necessary.

Biographical Sketch of Deng Xiaoping[41]

Born in 1904 in Sichuan, Deng went to France after World War I with a work-study group. Reputed for his organization ability, he soon got acquainted with Zhou Enlai. In 1924, he joined the CCP in Paris. Before long, he went to Moscow and attended Sun Yat-sen University.

After returning to China in 1926, he engaged in revolutionary activities in Guangxi where he led the Bai-se Uprising in December 1929. From 1937 to 1949, he served as a political commissar at various levels of the PLA, cooperating mostly with Commander Liu Bocheng. He became the secretary-general of the CCP and a deputy premier in 1954. The following year, he was a Politburo member.

The Cultural Revolution began in November 1965. At the critical Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee in August 1966, Deng switched at the last moment from support of Liu Shaoqi to Mao. It did not, however, save him from being removed in December of the same year. During his six-year (1967–1973) disappearance, he was criticized by Mao as a deaf man who sat far away from Mao at meetings and one who seldom reported party affairs to the chairman. Red Guards also denounced his bourgeois habit of loving a game of bridge.

Arranged by the skillful but ailing Zhou Enlai, Deng's quiet reappearance on the Beijing political scene occurred in April 1973. Zhou's adroit handling of Deng's rehabilitation as the Number Two Man was accepted by most bureaucrats except the Gang of Four. Unlike Zhou, Deng is short and lacks grace. Yet, he is sharp, daring, tough, and pragmatic. In his three-year deputy premiership under Zhou, he made many important decisions and many enemies as well. For instance, he decided in late December 1975 to suddenly release a Soviet helicopter and its three crewmen who were held in Xinjiang for twenty months; he criticized the rapidly promoted leftists during the Cultural Revolution as officials who "had risen up by helicopter"; and he disagreed with the way leftists carried out policies by saying, "it does

TABLE 4.1

HUA-DENG-YE FACTIONAL LINEUP IN THE POLITBURO

(July 1977–December 1978)

Name	*July 1977, Third Plenum, Tenth Congress*	*August 1977, Eleventh Congress*	*December 1978, Third Plenum, Eleventh Congress*	*Faction*
Hua Guofeng	Chairman	Chairman	Chairman	H
Ye Jianying	Vice-chairman	Vice-chairman	Vice-chairman	Y
Deng Xiaoping	Vice-chairman (rehabilitated)	Vice-chairman	Vice-chairman	D
Li Xiannian		Vice-chairman	Vice-chairman	Y
Chen Yun			Vice-chairman (new)	YD
Wang Dongxing		Vice-chairman	Vice-chairman	H
Wang Zhen			(new)	D
Wei Guoqing				D
Ulanhu		(new)		D
Fang Yi		(new)		D
Deng Yingchao			(new)	D
Liu Bocheng				D
Xu Shiyou				Y

Ji Dengkui				H
Su Zhenhua	(alternate)	(regular)		D
Li Desheng				H
Wu De				H
Yu Qiuli		(new)		D
Zhang Tingfa		(new)		D
Chen Yonggui				H
Chen Xilian				H
Hu Yaobang			(new)	D
Geng Biao		(new)		D
Nie Rongzhen		(new)		D
Ni Zhifu	(alternate)	(regular)		HD
Xu Xiangqian		(new)		YD
Peng Chong		(new)		D
Chen Muhua		(new, alternate)	(alternate)	D
Zhao Ziyang		(new, alternate)	(alternate)	D
Seypidin	(alternate)	(alternate)	(alternate)	H
			Total	H8.5 + D17.5 + Y4 = 30

Notes: H = Hua Guofeng and his supporters; D = Deng Xiaoping and his supporters; Y = Ye Jianying and his supporters.
Most Hua Guofeng's supporters were also identified as the Whatever Faction. Li Xiannian, Yu Qiuli, Kang Shien, and Chen Muhua were called the Petroleum Faction. There was also the Wind Faction, Slippery Faction, and Quakers' Faction. They were active for a time in politics but not in the Politburo (*Renmin Ribao*, January 6, 10, and 15, 1978).

not matter whether it is a white cat or a black cat—if it catches mice, it is a good cat." The Gang of Four later attacked him severely as a "capitalist roader."

Zhou Enlai died in January 1976. Deng was purged for the second time in April 1976 for the Tien An Men incident by the Gang of Four in the name of Mao. One month after Mao passed away in September, however, Deng, in cooperation with Ye Jianying, Xu Shiyou, and others, led the revolt against the Gang and their followers. The entire nation was overjoyed at the Gang's arrest.

The long-expected second rehabilitation of Deng finally materialized in July 1977. He carried the spirit of the popular Zhou Enlai, made bold rehabilitation of numerous victims of the Cultural Revolution, and began seriously to re-evaluate Mao and his ideology. His background, hardships, and ups-and-downs in power struggles had trained him to be pragmatic, resourceful, confident, risk-taking, and iconoclastic. Deng had almost seen the end of his career and his life before September 1976. His dramatic comeback made him more determined than almost anyone else in Beijing to push forward his policies. He became popular.

Thus, we can see that Deng's experience, personality, use of psychology, and political style have all contributed significantly to his success in gaining an absolute majority in the Politburo. Likewise, this factor has helped him become the most powerful leader in the post-Mao era. Such a strong leadership was indispensable to Beijing's decision to go to war with Vietnam.

A Chronology and a Model

As of late 1978, the escalation of the Sino-Vietnamese tensions, as discussed in previous chapters, had developed into a crisis. Scholars have defined and theorized about crisis in several different ways.[42] One of them, which is more applicable to the Sino-Vietnamese case, defines it as a situation "which results from unusual extensive and intensive inputs to the international system—inputs accelerating paces, increasing tensions, unbalancing stabilities, and increasing the danger of war."[43] Such a situation unmistakably "confronts decisionmakers" with an opportunity for response—either action or inaction.[44]

To the decisionmakers in Beijing, the Vietnam case in 1978–1979 was a crisis, and they had to react decisively. Two major reasons guided their decision to respond. One, China's interests were at stake, and, two, they could not tolerate the rampage of the small and ungrateful brother in the south.[45]

The process of Beijing's decisionmaking was not a hasty reaction. It was a well thought out and orderly executed response to the growing crisis. Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann have suggested a five-stage process in arriving at a stable decision. They are: (1) appraising the challenge, (2) surveying alternatives, (3) weighing alternatives, (4) deliberating about commitment,and (5) adhering to the decision despite negative feedback.[46] In their decisionmaking process, the Beijing leaders had actually gone beyond these five stages. Their sixth stage was giving open and repeated warnings. In terms of a general military decision, Beijing's sixth stage is unusual. In terms of a punitive action from a big to a small brother, it is not. In this context, one can see a different process behind China's action in Vietnam and the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia or Hungary.[47]

To clarify the Chinese decisionmaking process, I have drawn from public data a selected chronology to highlight the intensity of the development.

1978

April 30: Liao Chengzhi claims that Vietnam forces Overseas Chinese to return to China.

May 9: An exodus of Chinese residents from northern Vietnam to southern China begins.

June 7: China reduces its aid to Vietnam.

June 29: Vietnam joins the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (COMECON).

July 3: China ends all aid to Vietnam. More than 150,000 Chinese residents have stampeded from Vietnam into China.

August 8: Sino-Vietnamese refugee talks in Hanoi get nowhere.

August 16: A Soviet military base is reportedly built in Cam Ranh Bay.

August 25–26: New border clashes take place.

October 15: Vietnam increases pressure on Cambodia.

November 3: The Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation is signed in Moscow.

November 8: Deng Xiaoping says in Bangkok that the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty is used to encircle China.

November 15–December 15: A series of the Politburo meetings and the Central Work Conference is held in Beijing.

December 3: Hanoi Radio announces the formation of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation in Cambodia.

December 6: Vietnam launches a large offensive in Cambodia.

December 12: China sends Vietnam a strong protest regarding new border clashes.

December 15: The United States recognizes the PRC.

December 18–22: The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP meets in Beijing.

December 25: Renmin Ribao warns Vietnam of new border incidents in "There Is a Limit to China's Forbearance."

1979

January 1: Beijing and Washington establish diplomatic ties.

January 7: Vietnamese troops capture Phnom Penh.

January 10: The Hanoi-sponsored Heng Samrin regime is formed in Phnom Penh.

January 11: Sihanouk speaks at the U.N. Security Council for Cambodia.

January 14: China pledges its continuing aid to Pol Pot.

January 18: China protests against Vietnam on new "bloody" border clashes.

January 28: Deng Xiaoping arrives in Washington, D.C., for a nine-day visit to the United States.

January 31: Deng says in Washington that China may teach Vietnam "some necessary lessons."

February 2: More border clashes; 100,000–130,000 Chinese troops are amassing in the border area.

February 7: A small Soviet naval force stations off the Vietnamese coast, including four warships.

February 8: Deng returns to Beijing.

February 9: The State Department spokesman expresses U.S. "serious concerns" over any Chinese attack on Vietnam.

February 10: Pravda accuses China of amassing troops on the border.

February 12: Nhan Dan warns China: "Don't Touch Vietnam!"

February 16: China sends "the strongest protest" to Vietnam against its incursions of Chinese territory.
February 17: War breaks out.

By indicating the intensity of the development of the situation, the chronology also shows the immediate issues involved. They are the exodus of the ethnic Chinese, the Soviet involvement, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, and armed conflicts on the border. In addition, it suggests the growing influence of Deng Xiaoping on foreign affairs. In fact, he was the man who masterminded Beijing's policy for Vietnam at the time.

Moreover, several other factors are equally important. They include China's global strategy,[48] Vietnam's drive for an Indochina Federation, Chinese interests in Southeast Asia, new U.S. ties with Beijing, and Chinese national emotion against Vietnam. They also contributed significantly to the decisionmaking process in Beijing.

To bring these factors into better perspective, we can place them under three major categories: external, internal, and psychology-personality. On the basis of these categories, a model is suggested in Diagram 4.1 to illustrate Beijing's decisionmaking framework and process.[49]

Diagram 4.1 is self-explanatory. The listed factors have mostly been examined, and the remainder will be explained as the decisionmaking process is discussed further. The process is divided into three steps. It should be noted that some of the materials used in the discussion of the process contain a high degree of authentic information and are usually classified as state secrets by the Beijing government.[50]

A THREE-STEP PROCESS

Students in the field have suggested several important elements that have great influence on the process of decisionmaking, such as the urgency of the crisis, the pressure of time, decision alternatives, and the final choice. They are all closely related.[51] The greater the urgency of the crisis, the greater the pressure (shorter decision time). Greater pressure tends to increase the tension and force decisionmakers to engage in a vigorous search for alternatives; it may also limit such a search. Finally, greater pressure may lead decisionmakers to adopt the alternative that first appeals to them; on the contrary, less pressure (longer decision time) may allow a compromised alternative.

In the case of China's war with Vietnam, the urgency was not strongly felt until the conclusion of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty in November 1978.

DIAGRAM 4.1

A MODEL OF BEIJING'S DECISIONMAKING PROCESS ON VIETNAM, 1978–1979


External Factors
China's global strategy
Vietnam's Indochina strategy
Soviet involvement
The Cambodian issue
Territorial and border conflicts
Ethnic Chinese
The U.S. factor
World public opinion
input
Psychology-Personality Factor
(Deng as the decisionmaker)
Pragmatic
Resourceful
Confident
Iconoclastic
Daring, risk-taking
input
Internal Factors
China's interests and values
National emotion
War capability of the PLA
China's modernization drive
Deng's leadership
input
Decisionmaking Process
Bureaucratic-institutional (Politiburo, Central Work Conference, and Military Council)
A three-step process
output
Policy, Action

It was therefore not as urgent as the Korean War or the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet it had an increasing urgency that led to increasing pressure for decisionmaking. Compared again with the Korean War, it allowed Beijing's leaders to engage in a longer search for alternatives. As a result, a limited military operation, which was first suggested by several military leaders but carefully studied, was decided upon as the final choice—a compromised alternative. The following three-step process describes closely what happened.

Prior to June 1978, the Beijing leadership had not yet decided to move militarily against Vietnam. Although the two nations' relationship had deteriorated for some time, and for several years a number of Chinese officials had wanted to give Vietnam a lesson, Beijing still maintained a wait-and-see policy.[52] As Deng told a group of visiting Thai journalists in Beijing on June 7, 1978, Vietnam had taken its eleventh step against China, while China had just taken its first step in response. China, he added, was waiting for Vietnam to make further moves.[53]

Beginning in August, however, the situation changed. In addition to the ever-increasing border clashes and the deadlock of the refugee talks, the Soviets had reportedly built a military base at Cam Ranh Bay.[54] Meanwhile, the Beijing leadership learned that Hanoi had decided to oust the Pol Pot regime by force. Beijing, according to a PRC official, began to deliberate on action against Vietnam.[55] In September–October, as the refugee talks broke off and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia became imminent, Beijing leaned toward a military punishment.[56] It was, nevertheless, not until after the conclusion of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty in early November that Beijing sensed the great urgency of the crisis. A decision had to be made. At this juncture, the United States took the initiative to push forward the normalization process with China. On November 4, Washington sent Beijing a draft of a U.S.-China joint communiqué for normalization; President Jimmy Carter personally wrote in the target date—January 1, 1979.[57] China did not respond until mid-November, asking for clarification on several points. It was one day after Deng Xiaoping's return to Beijing from Southeast Asia. Pressure to make a decision grew greater. Deng immediately called for a top-level political meeting.

The First Step

From November 15 to December 15, Beijing held an enlarged Politburo meeting as previously discussed. The agenda included domestic affairs and the Indochina situation. A vigorous discussion on Indochina ensued on decision alternatives. Apparently, the debate was centered around one single issue—to intervene or not to intervene. In the early session, as revealed in Geng Biao's secret speech on January 16, 1979, military members in the Politburo expressed hawkish views, while the civilian members hesitated.[58] Wang Dongxing, who rushed to Phnom Penh on November 5, 1978, reported to the meeting about Pol Pot's request for a dispatch of Chinese troops to Kampuchea. Wang recommended honoring Pol Pot's request. Moreover, Su Zhenhua, then the first political commissar of the Navy (who died on February 7, 1979, before the Punitive War broke out) suggested that Beijing send a detachment of the Chinese East Sea Fleet to Cambodia to help the Khmer Rouge guard the Cambodian coast. If this could not be done, Su continued, then a visit to Cambodia by a Chinese fleet would be desirable. Furthermore, Xu Shiyou, commander of the Guangzhou Military Region, also proposed using military force and requested permission to command troops to launch the attack from Guangxi province.

After long deliberation, Geng Biao reported, the meeting turned down Wang Dongxing's recommendation and Su Zhenhua's suggestion but leaned toward Xu Shiyou's proposal.[59] It was a somewhat compromised decision, dealing with Indochina on two fronts: to absolutely send no troops to Cambodia but to tentatively launch a punitive assault against Vietnam. This initial decision was pending future developments for further revision.

On the Cambodian front, Geng Biao, in the aforesaid speech, explained extensively why China should not send troops to rescue the Pol Pot regime. First of all, China, as a Socialist country, had maintained the principle that it would never dispatch troops, war planes, or warships to other countries. It was also opposed to any other country doing so. China's agreement to the U.S. military presence in the Asian-Pacific area was only an expression of China's understanding of, not support for, the U.S. permanent bases in foreign countries. Should China send troops to Cambodia, it would not only violate the above principle but also become a hegemonist power, a concept to which China was also violently opposed. Second, China would lose the support of the majority of member nations in the United Nations on the Kampuchean membership. Vietnam would then accuse China of becoming an aggressor, intervening in other nation's internal affairs. Third, owing to complicated geographical, political, and economic factors in Indochina, China's intervention would not settle the matter in a few months. It could well be drawn into the Indochina quagmire. Mindful of the United States' long involvement in Indochina, China felt incapable of engaging in such a long war of attrition in the same area. Fourth, the Soviet Union would have a good excuse to promote unfavorable international opinion against China. If China's war in Cambodia spread into Vietnam, the Chinese force would be vulnerable in a large region, and the situation would increase the possibility of Soviet attack from the north. A Chinese-Soviet war would greatly damage the chances of foreign investments in China's Four Modernizations programs. Consequently, Geng Biao concluded, China decided "first, to send no troops [to Cambodia], second, to continue aid [to the Pol Pot regime], and third, to support it [the Khmer Rouge] to the end."[60] On the Vietnam front, Geng Biao offered no details.

Judging by later developments, Geng Biao's speech of January 1979 can only be interpreted as factual about Kampuchea (aid with no Chinese military intervention) and secretive about Vietnam (concealing China's militaristic plans for the near future). In view of the fact that the regrouping of Chinese troops on the Vietnamese border began in December, Geng Biao's silence on Beijing's initial decision on Vietnam was deliberate.

Realizing that the target date for the establishment of the official U.S.-China diplomatic relationship was January 1, Deng sped up the process of normalization and made an accommodating posture toward the United States. He expressed his hope to visit there on November 25 and delivered a Chinese draft of a joint communiqué for normalization to the United States on December 4.[61] Apparently, the favorable normalization process had strengthened his position on Vietnam.

It was at the later session of the Central Work Conference in December that the Chinese leadership tentatively decided to wage a "punitive" war. The decision was reached after further deliberation and vigorous debate.[62] Deng Xiaoping summarized the considerations and offered explanations.[63]

First, Deng reasoned, if a self-defensive counterattack on Vietnam provoked Soviet military intervention, it could be on a large, medium, or small scale. Large-scale intervention could be a massive military operation, driving toward Beijing. According to U.S. military intelligence, Deng said, there were only about 430,000–450,000 Soviet troops on the Soviet-Chinese border. This figure seemed to agree with Soviet global strategy of troop deployment, that is, to station heavier forces in Europe than in Asia. With so few troops, the Soviet forces could not drive rapidly toward Beijing. Moreover, it was not in Soviet interests to transport one-half million more troops from Europe to China. Deng calculated it was thus unlikely that the Soviet Union would launch a large-scale attack on China. Medium-scale intervention would be an attack in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, or Heilongjiang, similar to the 1969 conflicts. A small-scale attack would be border harassment or clashes. Conflict on both of these scales had occurred from time to time. They would not be serious. China was prepared for them.[64]

Second, Deng continued, intervention would not invite unfavorable international opinion. China's self-defensive counterattack would be an attack on Vietnam, not intervention in Cambodia. Most of the nations in

Southeast Asia and even in the world might endorse China's military action as a sanction against Vietnam's aggression in Cambodia. If the Soviet Union criticized China, it might also be criticized by other nations.

Third, it would not interrupt the progress of modernization. Vietnam might have calculated that China, because of its preoccupation with its modernization program, would not divert its efforts and react decisively to Vietnam's challenges. China's modernization program had not yet been launched, however. Vietnam's arrogant and aggressive actions, Deng argued, had actually diverted China's efforts to modernize. A punitive war would demonstrate China's determination.

Fourth, the war would bring China neither a great victory nor a disaster. In dispelling the fear of a military failure, Deng argued that China might achieve about 70 percent of its war objectives. The 30 percent failure would serve as a stimulus for military improvement. It would actually help China's military modernization.

Politically, Deng continued, China's invasion and strategic withdrawal would prove China's control of the situation. Such a commitment would demonstrate to the Soviet Union and Vietnam China's determination and ability to break through their encirclement device. Soviet global strategy would suffer a setback in Asia, Deng concluded.

Measured by events after the war, Deng Xiaoping's judgment was reasonably accurate. It is also characteristic of Deng's strategic thinking. It thus explains how the first step in the decision to go to war was made.

Immediately after the initial decision was made in mid-December, Beijing began to select troops from five military regions (Guangzhou, Kunming, Fuzhou, Chengdu, and Wuhan). They were transported to the southern border area. Reorganized into two major units, left-wing and right-wing, they had a strength of approximately 330,000 men (later increased to 400,00 men; see Chapter 5). Significantly, China analysts in Hong Kong accurately predicted at this juncture that a Chinese-Vietnamese war was forthcoming.[65]

Around this time, Hanoi repeatedly denounced China's schemes of aggression and called it a "military ally of imperialism."[66] On December 11, 1978, four days before the conclusion of the Central Work Conference, the Carter government invited Deng Xiaoping to visit the United States. The establishment of Beijing-Washington diplomatic relations was only a matter of days away.

The Second Step

The Central Work Conference from November 15 to December 15 was a productive meeting. Apart from the initial decision on Vietnam, great progress was made in the U.S.-China normalization process, and the new ideological line, "practice is the only criterion of testing truth" was adopted. Moreover, considerable party unity was achieved, and China's modernization program further planned. At the end of the conference came the news of the establishment of U.S.-China diplomatic relations. It gave a substantial boost to the PRC and a significant endorsement to Deng Xiaoping's leadership. Three days later, the important Third Plenum of the Central Committee was held from December 18 to 22. It endorsed, as mentioned previously, the Party's policy of unity and the war against Vietnam. This was the second step of the decision.

The Vietnamese offensive on Kampuchea in December was destroying the Khmer Rouge. The fall of Phnom Penh was imminent. This development reinforced the determination of the Beijing leadership to take the second step. After the conclusion of the Third Plenum on December 25, Beijing gave Vietnam a stern warning:

> China . . . will never attack unless it is attacked. But if it is attacked, it will certainly counterattack. China means what it says. We wish to warn the Vietnamese authorities that if they count on Moscow's support to seek a foot after gaining an inch and continue to act in an unbridled fashion, they will decidedly meet with the punishment they deserve. We are telling you this now. Don't complain later that we've not given you a clear warning in advance.[67]

The meaning of this warning is twofold: first, Beijing was prepared to counterattack if Vietnam continued to run on a rampage in the border area; second, Beijing opened the negotiation door to Vietnam for the last time. The motivation on both sides were probably too strong to be influenced solely by mutual threats or warnings. It can be argued, however, that the conflict could still have been avoided in late December if a powerful third party had actively sought to arrange peace negotiations between Beijing and Hanoi. Nevertheless, neither the United States, the Soviet Union, nor the ASEAN member nations ever tried to make such an arrangement. The United Nations was in an even weaker position to act upon this crisis (see following chapters).

Up to this point, Beijing had gone through the five stages of the decisionmaking process as suggested by Janis and Mann. The above official warning was Beijing's sixth stage in completing its process for arriving at, theoretically, a stable decision. This unusual stage was probably one China would have taken only for Vietnam, and not for other nations. However, the decision was not necessarily a guarantee of successful execution. Many factors on the Vietnamese side were unknown to the decisionmakers in Beijing.

In late December, the train service between China and Vietnam was completely suspended. Chinese Ambassador Yang Gongsu and Military Attaché Lu Tianwei returned to Beijing on January 1, for an indefinite stay.

Also in December, China began its intensive military preparations. Two fronts were organized—north and south. In the Northern Front, which was prepared for the defense of northern China, Li Desheng, commander of the Shenyang Military Region, was named commander. In the Southern Front, which was organized for the attack on Vietnam, Xu Shiyou, commander of the Guangzhou Military Region, was appointed the commander; Yang Dezhi (Yang Te-chih), who replaced Wang Bicheng as commander of the Kunming Military Region, was named deputy commander. Zhang Tingfa, a Political Bureau member and commander of the Air Force, was appointed chief of staff. Beijing also established an Eastern Xinjiang Military Region on January 8, for the strengthening of the defense in the north (see Chapter 5). It appeared almost definite that if Deng Xiaoping, on his visit to the United States, received no strong objection to China's decision from Washington, the plans to go to war would soon be executed.

To determine when Beijing placed its Southern Front commanders in position for its active preparation for the war, Table 4.2 has been devised showing the commanders' public appearances from December 1978 to February 1979.

Several important conclusions can be drawn from Table 4.2. First, the key persons were Xu Shiyou and Yang Dezhi, especially Yang.[68] It was widely reported that when the punitive war began, Yang directed the fighting inside Vietnam.[69] In December, Yang Dezhi made one public appearance; Wang Bicheng made two (Yang on December 24, Wang on December 24 and 26). The official capacity of Yang was still the Wuhan commander; Wang, the Kunming commander. This indicates that Yang had not officially replaced Wang in Kunming before December 26, although the appointment might have been made at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress in late December. Second, while Wang Bicheng had made six public appearances as the Wuhan commander in January (the first appearance was on January 20), Yang Dezhi made none. This is solid proof that Yang had replaced Wang in late December–early January. It also disproves the report that the appointment of these commanders was made as late as February 9–12, 1979.[70] Third, both Xu Shiyou and Yang Dezhi made no appearances in January 1979, not even at the military Spring Festival Party (New Year's party) in Guangzhou (January 28) and in Kunming (January 26). Obviously, they were too preoccupied with war preparations to appear in public. Fourth, the February figure shows that Xu Shiyou continued to remain absent from the public eye, but Yang Dezhi appeared once in Kunming for a military conference in early February. This is a clear indica-

TABLE 4.2
PUBLIC APPEARANCES OF THE SOUTHERN FRONT COMMANDERS
(December 1978–February 1979)

Name	*Dec. 1978*	*Jan. 1979*	*Feb. 1979*
Xu Shiyou	1	0	0
Yang Dezhi	1[a]	0	0[b]
Wang Bicheng	2[c]	6[d]	1[d]

Sources: Renmin Ribao, December 1978–March 1979; *Studies on Chinese Communism* (monthly), January–March 1979.

Notes:

[a] As the Wuhan Military Region commander.

[b] As the Kunming Military Region commander (attended a military conference in early February).

[c] As the Kunming Military Region commander.

[d] As the Wuhan Military Region commander (first appearance on January 20).

tion that the Chinese forces were getting ready to strike. In sum, we can determine that China's war preparations began to intensify in early December. January was the month to place the commanders in order and get ready for the war. The U.S. intelligence community also predicted in January that China might launch a localized attack.[71]

Deng Xiaoping's whirlwind visit to the United States from January 28 to February 5 reaffirmed Beijing's decision to go to war with Vietnam. The fact is that Deng had discussed twice the possibility in confidence with President Jimmy Carter in the White House. The first meeting was held in the afternoon of January 29 together with both sides' top aides. Deng carefully outlined China's tentative plans for a punitive attack against Vietnam, similar to the 1962 Sino-Indian war. He said, "We consider it necessary to put a restraint on the wild ambitions of the Vietnamese and to give them an appropriate limited lesson." He also presented various possible Soviet reactions and how China would counter them. All he requested was U.S. moral support.[72] He then asked President Carter's advice. Carter replied that Vietnam was being condemned for its aggression in Kampuchea, but if China moved against Vietnam it might arouse sympathy for Vietnam, causing some nations to brand China as the culprit. Moreover, Carter added, China's military move would help to refute one of the best arguments for the new Sino-American relationship, that it would contribute to more peace and stability in Asia. Deng expressed his appreciation for Carter's comments but said that China could not let its arrogant neighbors disturb the region with impunity.[73]

The second meeting took place the next morning with only three persons present—Carter, Deng, and the interpreter. Carter read and gave

Deng a handwritten note about his reasons for discouraging a Chinese invasion on Vietnam. Deng replied, "China must still teach Vietnam a lesson."[74] Deng also said that China would withdraw its troops after a short period of attack. He appeared determined and tough. As Carter observed: "My impression was that the decision had already been made. Vietnam would be punished."[75]

In his interview with U.S. television commentators in Washington on January 31, Deng reiterated China's warnings that Beijing would take military action against Vietnam because of its aggression in Kampuchea and its provocative border incidents with China. When asked, he said, "I can tell you all that what we Chinese people say counts. Any action taken by the Chinese is through careful consideration."[76] In his private conversations with Senator Henry Jackson, Deng also gave Jackson the impression that China would take action against Vietnam. Everything he said about military action was well publicized. However, he received no public rejection or criticism from either the Carter administration or the Senate. On his way home via Tokyo, Deng repeated his warnings about such a punitive action.[77]

The Chinese warning was clear. Hanoi received it. In response, Hanoi attacked Deng's trip to the United States as a "sinister policy of ganging with U.S. imperialism" against Vietnam. It also warned the Beijing leaders, "If they want to learn a lesson, let them learn one from their U.S. masters."[78] Meanwhile, Hanoi played the Soviet card against China. A small Soviet naval force of about fifteen ships was built-up off Vietnam's coast, near the Chinese Hainan Island. Two additional large Soviet warships were being sent to Vietnam. This was the first sign of Soviet reaction to Sino-Vietnamese border tension. As observed by U.S. officials, the Soviet naval buildup might have been aimed at keeping China from using the sea to reinforce and resupply Pol Pot's forces in Cambodia.[79] It certainly let China know the risks of using force against Vietnam.

The Third Step

In spite of the presence of the Soviet naval force off Vietnam and Vietnamese counterwarnings, Beijing finalized its war plans immediately after Deng Xiaoping returned to China on February 8.

The third step was taken from February 9 to 12 when a meeting of the Chinese Central Military Commission was held in Beijing under Deng's authority.[80] Deng made an overall report on his observations in the United States and Japan. Then he asserted that it was the best time to teach Vietnam a lesson because the Southeast Asian nations had condemned the Vietnamese aggression and feared that the Vietnamese-Cambodian war might spread to Thailand. In addition, the United States had expressed no strong opposition to a possible Chinese attack. After his report, two questions were raised: If the war broke out, would the Soviet naval force off Vietnam intervene? What would be the exact date of the assault? After long discussions, Deng and his associates saw no likelihood of a Soviet naval intervention. Meanwhile, they decided that China would employ absolutely no naval force in the attack. As to the second question, the meeting suggested that for secrecy the exact assault date would be determined by the supreme commander in a short period of time. It was reportedly February 17.[81]

At this time, the possibility of another Vietnam War caused great international concern. On February 9, U.S. State Department spokesman Thomas Reston expressed the United States' serious concern about any Chinese military move against Vietnam. On the following day, *Pravda* accused China of amassing troops on the border.[82] The same day, Japanese *Sankei Shimbun* predicted that a Sino-Vietnamese war would break out on February 14, the anniversary of the expired Sino-Soviet Treaty.[83] On February 12, Deputy Premier Li Xiannian said to a visiting Pakistani military delegation that Vietnam should not ignore China's repeated warnings.[84] The same day, *Nhan Dan* sent out a stern warning to China: "Don't touch Vietnam!"[85] Four days later (February 16), China gave Vietnam "the strongest protest" against its incursions on Chinese territory.[86] This was actually a notification of war to Vietnam. Finally, war broke out on February 17, one day before Pham Van Dong's visit to Heng Samrin's Kampuchea.

In summary, the foregoing illustrates the gradual and pragmatic process of Beijing's decisionmaking in the war. It was a step-by-step development of a causal relationship rather than a hasty decision prompted by an unexpected incident. Deliberations began in August 1978. It was not until November that pressure grew, tensions increased. Decision alternatives were repeatedly and carefully sought and weighed. After the first step of the decision was taken by the Central Work Conference in mid-December 1978, the second step was taken on December 18–22 by a larger institution, the Third Plenum of the Central Committee. The final step was actually a military decision, taken by the Central Military Council on February 9–12. The development demonstrated that Beijing's leaders had employed extensively a bureaucratic-institutional approach to completing the three-step process. Whereas all the external and internal factors listed in the above model had played a role in the decision formulation, Deng's leadership was an indispensable element to the accomplishment of the decisionmaking process.

THE NATURE AND RISKS OF THE WAR

Beijing's policy mentality, as discussed in the first chapter, is demonstrated clearly in its decisionmaking process. Guided by the principle of prudence and restraint, the Beijing leaders decided on the nature and objectives of the war and took the calculated risks to achieve them. Their decision carries a similar pattern to that of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war.

It was reported that an important briefing session was held in Beijing in the afternoon of February 16 for leading Chinese officials.[87] The purpose of the briefing was to directly inform the attendants about the imminent war and indirectly inform their respective subordinates (provincial and city) through them. Once again, the oral communications system was employed for disseminating important information.

The meeting was presided over by Hua Guofeng. Hua briefly stated that after repeated consideration and discussions, the central leadership had decided to launch a war against Vietnam on the next day. Then Deng Xiaoping explained the nature and objectives of the war and calculated the risks.

According to Deng, the nature of the war was as a self-defensive counterattack. It was limited in time and space, and also limited to ground fighting, similar to the Sino-Indian border war of 1962.[88] No naval or air forces would be used. It was also a testing ground for the Chinese army, which had had no actual fighting experience since the Sino-Indian border war—almost twenty years ago. The Sino-Soviet border conflicts of 1969 were small-scale and short in duration. The Chinese army would gain experience from this counterattack.

The main objective, Deng continued, was to give Vietnam a lesson. Vietnam had become extremely arrogant, boasting to be the third strongest military power in the world.[89] Apart from invading Cambodia and expelling Chinese residents, Vietnam had also made repeated border incursions in China and killed Chinese soldiers as well as civilians. China had to fight back but would not take one inch of Vietnamese territory. As soon as Chinese forces had achieved the objectives, they would unilaterally withdraw.

Deng's scenario of risk calculation ran similar to his statement at the Central Work Conference in December 1978, as previously discussed. China would take some risks in launching the war, including meeting a Soviet attack and suffering some losses. But Deng defended his position that, since the war was limited in time and space and since China's military power was stronger than Vietnam's, China would win the war. After all, some possible losses would expose the weaknesses of the Chinese army for future improvement.

What were the exact objectives of the "punishment"—to wipe out a few divisions of Vietnamese forces and military bases, or to occupy a portion of the border land? Deng never disclosed this. The only known statement he made was on February 26 (nine days after the war had broken out), when he said, "We would not mind military achievements."[90]

Beijing's objectives might have been the destruction of a few divisions of Vietnam's regular army and several military centers. In doing so, the war would serve as a retaliation to the expulsion of the Chinese residents and border conflicts. It might also significantly relieve Vietnam's continuing military pressure on Pol Pot's forces. Moreover, such destruction would show China's determination to meet the challenge of the Soviet-Vietnamese encirclement, and it might win ASEAN nation's support. In a traditional and remote sense, it would also be a demonstration to reassert China's dominant position in Asia.

What is important in this decision making process, however, is the quality of prudence and restraint. The three-step process, the repeated warnings, the limits of the fighting space and time, the prepared but unused naval and air forces, the newly established Eastern Xinjiang Military Region, and the highly unprecedented discussions on the military move with the foreign leaders of a capitalist country (the United States), all were done under the principle of careful deliberation. However, it must be pointed out that such a guiding principle was developed from Beijing's limited capabilities as well as restrained policy. Consequently, the war was fought at a limited level. Its low scale, limited cost, and calculated risks with an attempt to achieve high gains correspond to the pattern of Beijing's crisis management as illustrated in Table 1.1 (Chapter 1). The Punitive War was representative of Beijing's foreign policy since 1949.

5

The War

In writing on war in 1938, Mao Zedong interpreted Lenin's (actually Karl von Clausewitz's) views on the meaning of war and politics.[1] Mao wrote, "When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep away the obstacles in the way."[2] China's Punitive War against Vietnam, albeit in the name of self-defensive counteroffensive, was launched exactly under such a policy consideration.

Broadly speaking, the Chinese leadership had pondered over a punitive action for almost two years (1977–1979).[3] Its general purpose was to sweep away the obstacles by military means in hopes that normal Sino-Vietnamese relations would be restored. Although the use of military forces to settle international disputes would be disapproved of and condemned, Beijing's action was taken as a last resort.

THE PLA'S STRATEGY AND MANPOWER FACTOR

Since its founding in 1927, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has survived and grown under the doctrine and operations of People's War.[4] Even in the nuclear era, Beijing still praised, as recently as July 1977, the might of people's war over that of nuclear weapons: "The might of people's war is tens of thousands of times greater than the nuclear arms of imperialism and social-imperialism. People's war is the most effective magic weapon to deal with them."[5]

If we develop a formula for people's war, we can conclude that it must be fought generally on six conditions to assure victory. These conditions are (1) the organization of a party, army, and united front with the party in command; (2) support from the masses; (3) underdeveloped countries; (4) foreign intervention; (5) conventional weaponry and backward technology; and (6) strategies of protracted war.[6] The victory of the Chinese revolutionary war was conditioned by these factors; so was the Vietnamese national liberation war. In its fighting experience, the PLA placed special emphasis on defensive strategy and on the factor of manpower-over-weapons.[7] This is a legacy of Mao's military doctrine, significantly germane to China's Punitive War against Vietnam. A discussion of it is appropriate.

Whatever their intentions might be, the Beijing leaders since 1949 have constantly cautioned the Chinese people against potential external threats. The following examples will substantiate this observation. China's intervention in the Korean War was labelled by its leaders as a war of "resist America and assist Korea." The U.S. containment policy in East Asia in the 1950s was interpreted as U.S. imperialist encirclement of China. After the Vietnam War escalated, Mao saw in 1965–1966 the danger of a U.S. invasion of China; it never materialized. As a result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Sino-Soviet border conflicts, Mao perceived the Soviet military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border as a serious threat to China's security. Before Japan's recognition of the Beijing government in 1972, China expressed its concern about the revival of Japanese militarism. In 1973, China adopted an anti-hegemony policy, aimed at the two superpowers, especially the Soviet Union. For more than a decade, China has campaigned for "digging tunnels deep," "preparation against war" and the organization of an "international united front" against the "most dangerous source of world war"—Soviet social-imperialism.[8]

All of the above examples indicate a single perception of Beijing's leaders, that is, China has been constantly encircled by real or potentially hostile forces threatening its security. Due to this perception, they have emphasized a defensive military strategy although they have never ignored an offensive one. Guided by such a strategy, the PLA has directed its training and developed its weapons for the defense of China against foreign invasion. Even after China had developed nuclear weapons, its strategy remained unchanged. As the previously cited article explains:

> In order to defeat the nuclear weapons of imperialism and social-imperialism, we too must develop nuclear as well as other weapons.
>
> We were not scared of nuclear arms when we did not have them. Nor do we make a fetish of them when we have got them. It is purely for defence . . .[9]

China's emphasis on defensive strategy at the present time is motivated by two factors: its need of a period of peace for its much delayed modernization program, and its limited military capability. Beijing's military leaders may have ambitions of promoting their power and position by launching attacks on China's neighbors, but such attacks in the past have been short-term and low-risk except for the Korean intervention.[10]

China's offensive strategy should also be discussed, especially in reference to the 1979 Punitive War. Up to the present time, the PLA has continued to inherit Mao's military thinking on strategic offense based on its experience in the civil war. Mao merits a quotation here:

> Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective . . . In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net . . . Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning . . .[11]

With such offensive principles, the PLA not only won the civil war but scored several victories in the Korean War and the border conflicts with India and the Soviet Union. Needless to say, these gains were not achieved by advanced weaponry but by overwhelming manpower. In consequence, Mao's theory of men over weaponry has been regarded by the PRC for years as an iron law of people's war. It calls the atomic bomb "paper tiger," a theory that had been upheld at least until 1979. A few examples are discussed here.

In 1955–1956, when the PLA leaders for the first time held a debate on military modernization, including a nuclear program, manpower was defended as the decisive factor of war. As Tan Zheng (T'an Cheng), then vice-minister of National Defense, put it:

> When we emphasize the importance of technology we do not mean that the role of men and the role of political factors can be reduced. On the contrary, the factor of men is always the decisive factor in a war . . . Technology is handled by men and no new technology can play its part unless it is combined with the factor of men.[12]

Military modernization made almost no progress for over two decades after China first probed the issue in 1955–1956. Even thirteen years after China's first nuclear tests (1964–1977), during which more than 24 tests were successfully carried out, the manpower factor was still regarded as the top priority.[13] For instance, *Renmin Ribao* carried two articles in May and June 1977, asserting that manpower, not nuclear weaponry, was the decisive factor in warfare.[14]

The Four Modernizations campaign has certainly encouraged the Chinese people to place high hopes on the improvement of the economic situation as well as modern weaponry. Among several indications, an article from the National Defense Science and Technology Commission typified the military expectations:

> In any future war against aggression, if anyone still thinks it is possible to use broadswords against guided missiles and other nuclear weapons . . . then he evidently is not prepared to possess all the weapons and means of fighting . . . This is a foolish and even criminal attitude . . . Our armed forces must have an automatic computerized countdown, communications and command system, and rapid, motorized modern transportation facilities.[15]

For a short while, the drive for military modernization seemed to support a new strategic concept which pushed aside the doctrine of people's war as obsolete and even as an obstacle to modernization. (This commission and other advocators of military modernization can be arbitrarily called military modernizers.) Resistance soon developed among mostly the veteran fighters, however. At the All-Army Political Work Conference in April–June 1978, the resistance reasserted its old theories and strategic line. While Deng Xiaoping emphasized the importance of adjusting military development to new historical conditions, the resistance argued that "revolutionization should command modernization," an argument presented by Hua Guofeng.[16] It is beyond doubt that the 41-day Political Work Conference must have been an important and controversial meeting. In adopting the principle of adjusting the direction of military development to new historical conditions, the conference concluded with the reassertion of strengthening ideology and the endorsement of the new slogan, "revolutionization commands modernization."[17] It seems that the two forces (the military modernizers and the resistance) had reached a temporary but controversial compromise.

A further explanation appeared two months later. In celebrating the PLA's Establishment Day on August 1, Defense Minister Xu Xiangqian argued strongly in an important article that the theory of people's war ought to follow the principle of seeking the truth from facts and be closely coordinated with modern conditions. Under new historical conditions, Xu continued, the strategy and tactics of people's war should be flexibly applied, and national defense must be highly modernized for modern warfare. "Only then, can revolutionization truly command modernization."[18] Apparently, Xu was speaking about the PRC's military policy, skillfully tilting toward the modernization side.

The military modernizers continued to compete with the resistance. On December 2, 1978 (sixteen days before the important Third Plenum of the CCP opened), Tao Hanzhang, deputy commandant of the PLA Military Academy, wrote a sophisticated article strongly urging military modernization. His article was written shortly after his official visit to Great Britain in October 1978. He argued emphatically that China must not only catch up with U.S. and Soviet military technology but pursue correct military theory and establish a modern command system as well.[19] On the day when the Third Plenum began (December 18, 1978), the Editorial Board of *Junshi Xueshu* [Military Scholarship] published a highly assertive article in both *People's Daily* and the *Liberation Army Daily*, emphasizing the importance of a complete comprehension of Mao's military thought. It advocated study and development of Mao's military theory, condemned the "ostrich policy" toward new weaponry, and demanded untiring research on new questions of modern warfare.[20] At the Third Plenum, Deputy Defense Minister Su Yu repeated almost the same thesis, adding that even though "weaponry is a main factor of war, manpower is also a decisive element."[21] Moreover, Rao Shoukun, commander of the North Sea Fleet, severely criticized the "ossification of thinking" of some veteran comrades at a meeting on January 23, 1979, and urged that the military men "study again, learn from advanced things in foreign armies, and study the characteristics and demands of modern warfare."[22] Zhang Tingfa, air force commander, repeated a similar view on February 11, 1979, at a meeting of the CCP cadres in the air force.[23] From all of these statements, one can see clearly that the military modernizers were engaged in a campaign against the resistance for the modernization of weaponry and military thinking. Following Deng's leadership and modernization drive, they managed to move slightly ahead of their competitors.

In any event, before the new military theorists had a chance to win the competition, the Punitive War broke out. It was a war fought under the strategy of people's war without its name. The manpower factor was still overwhelming. The PLA's command system, operational tactics, logistics, and above all weaponry were far from modern. They were well behind the times.

THE PLA'S STRENGTH AND COMMAND ARRANGEMENT

The total manpower of the PLA is about 4.3 million in the army, navy, and air force.[24] The army, which is still the main force of the PLA, has 3.6 million men in 175 divisions (121 infantry, 11 armored, 3 airborne, and 40 artillery). These forces are stationed in eleven first-class military regions, with a heavy deployment in Beijing and Shenyang areas (52–55 divisions and 4,700 tanks).[25] The Guangzhou and Kunming military regions have approximately 12–16 divisions.

Manpower and Equipment

Prior to the 1979 Punitive War, the army had 9,000–10,000 tanks (T59), mostly outdated. Its anti-tank weapons—conventional 100-mm anti-tank guns and rocket launchers—were old. It possessed no advanced firing equipment and techniques, such as laser or infrared. Its artillery had 16,000–20,000 field guns and rocket launchers. Their effectiveness was limited by low mobility and lack of sophisticated, sensitive, range-sighting devices. Some of the guns were World War II leftovers. They were so old that if they were not used in Vietnam in 1979, they would have been discarded as waste matériel.[26] Transportation facilities were mostly out of date, and the ratio of trucks to troops was low. In the punitive war, logistics proved to be a serious problem.

Prior to the war in February 1979, the Chinese navy had a manpower of 280,000–300,000. Its North Sea Fleet had about 300 vessels; East Sea Fleet, about 450; and South Sea Fleet, about 300. It had 6–8 Luta-class destroyers, 16 destroyer escorts, and 40 submarine chasers. Although the destroyers were equipped with surface-to-surface missiles, expansion had been slow mainly because of the backwardness of military technology and financial difficulties.

China had 73–75 submarines as of February 1979. The fleet included 48–50 Romeo (R)-class, 21 Whisky (W)-class, 1 Golf (G)-class, 2 Ming-class (Chinese-made), and 1 Han-class (Chinese-made). Except for those Chinese-made, they were mostly Soviet products from World War II. Only the G-class submarine was comparatively new with possible equipment of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); the others were far behind their U.S. and Soviet counterparts.

Up to February 1979, China had made considerable improvements in its fast patrol boat fleet. Equipped with approximately 400 guided missiles (the Styx SS-N-2), the fleet of 141–160 fast boats provided China with a fast-moving and formidable force to patrol the Chinese coast. In addition, China had 440–500 gun boats without guided missiles as an auxiliary force to the fleet.

Two areas of weakness remain. One is its amphibious force, including its small unit of landing craft; the other, its anti-submarine capability. China still has almost no effective force against nuclear submarines.

The air force in early 1979 had about 400,000 men. Its 5,000 combat planes were generally backward or obsolete. For instance, its 4,100 interceptors were mostly MIG-15's, MIG-17's, and MIG-19's, with only 80 MIG-21's. Some of them were armed with Atoll air-to-air missiles, some with cannon.[27] China produces Shenyang F6's (MIG-19 model), F8's (MIG-

21 model), and F9's (F6 model), but they are underpowered. They have no capability to meet the challenge of MIG-23's or MIG-25's. Even their best missile, according to an observer who accompanied Defense Secretary Harold Brown to China in January 1980, was a twenty-year old weapon by U.S. standards.[28]

With a general background of the manpower and weaponry of the Chinese armed forces, let us turn to the specific command and force arrangement for the war.

The Command and Force Arrangement

Deng Xiaoping was named the overall commander of the Punitive War. Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen were appointed deputy commanders; Geng Biao, the general chief of staff. It appears that the war authority came directly from the Party Central.

Under the central commandership, two fronts were established, northern and southern. The Northern Front, which included the Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Lanzhou, and Xinjiang military regions, was placed under the commandership of Li Desheng (commander of the Shenyang Military Region). Before the war began, the Chinese government had already evacuated 300,000 inhabitants from exposed border areas in Heilongjiang and Xinjiang and put the entire Northern Front on maximum alert.[29] It was a precaution against possible Soviet strike from the back. After one week of fighting in the south, the potential tension in the north eased when a Soviet attack appeared unlikely.

Since the war was being fought in the south, the arrangement for the Southern Front was more important and complicated. Xu Shiyou (commander of the Guangzhou Military Region) was appointed commander; Yang Dezhi (new commander of the Kunming Military Region), the deputy-commander; and Zhang Tingfa (commander of the air force), the chief of staff. The Southern Front was divided into the Eastern and Western Wings. The Eastern Wing covered Guangxi and Guangdong provinces under the commandership of Xu Shiyou. The Western Wing was under Yang Dezhi, covering Yunnan. The air force was under Zhang Tingfa. The South Sea Fleet was deploying in the Zhanjiang-Hainan area.

Drawing from several military regions, the Chinese assembled approximately 31 divisions (330,000 men, about 10 percent of the total ground forces) and 1,200 tanks on the border. In the Eastern Wing, under Xu Shiyou, there were 5 armies (A) and 2 divisions (D). They were: 41A and 55A (Guangdong), 42A (Guangxi), 43A and 54A (Henan), ID-artillery (Guangdong), and 70D-anti-aircraft (Hunan). In the Western Wing, under Yang Dezhi, there were 3 armies and 4 divisions: 11A and 14A (Yunnan), 13A (Chengdu), 43D, 49D, and 4D-artillery (Yunnan), and 65D-anti-aircraft (Fujian). Several divisions from Nanjing and Fujian (Fuzhou) were placed as reserve units. They carried T-62 light tanks, T-59 tanks; 122mm, 152mm artillery pieces; 107mm and 140mm multi-rocket-launchers; 37mm anti-aircraft guns; Sam-2 missiles (probably never used); and others. There were 948 aircraft (February–March 1979) stationed in 15 air bases in Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hainan. The South Sea Fleet had deployed 2 destroyers (missile), 4 destroyer escorts (missile), 27 fast patrol boats (missile), 20 submarines, and 604 other boats.[30]

To illustrate the force arrangement in the Southern Front, Chart 5.1 is given.

In addition to the regular forces, regional and militia units were also employed for logistics and security duty on the front and in the border areas. On the Xisha Islands (the Paracels), a garrison of 1,000 men increased their anti-aircraft gun positions. So did the number of patrol boats around the islands. The air force in Guangdong and Hainan kept a close watch on the area from Hainan to Xisha.

In contrast, the Vietnamese People's Army in early 1979 had a manpower of approximately 600,000 men. When the war broke out, Hanoi stationed about 150,000–200,000 men in Cambodia, 100,000 men in Laos, 100,000 in the south, and 200,000–250,000 in the north. Around the Hanoi area, there were only five regular divisions (308D, 320D, 329D, 386D, and 431D) and four brigades (45B-artillery, 329B-engineer, 202B-armored, and 241B-anti-aircraft). In the Vietnamese-Chinese border area, however, there were 150,000 local troops and militia, including six regional divisions (325D, 332D, 334D, 337D, 338D, and 386D) and one regiment (241R). Two regular divisions (3D and 346D) were known to be near the Lang Son area.[31] The local forces were well-trained and well-equipped. Their strength may have been superior to some of the Chinese regular units.

Vietnam had approximately 300 combat aircraft in early 1979, including 70 MIG-19's, 70 MIG-21's, and some U.S.-made F-5's captured in 1975. In 1979 Vietnam's MIG-21's were more advanced than China's because they had sophisticated electronic equipment. Meanwhile, Chinese planes were vulnerable to Hanoi's large array of Soviet-built surface-to-air missiles and radar-guided anti-aircraft batteries.[32] In response to the Chinese buildup at the border, Hanoi had transferred some of its MIG-21's from the south to the north.

Prior to February 1979, Vietnam's navy had 2 Soviet-built PETYA destroyers (with anti-submarine missiles), 30 fast patrol boats (supplied by China), 32 other patrol boats, and some U.S.-made vessels. Its quantity and firepower were inferior to China's.

In comparison, the figures show that prior to the war the Chinese forces

CHART 5.1

FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN FRONT, 1979


The Southern Front
Commander Xu Shiyu
Deputy Commander Yang Dezhi
Chief of Staff Zhang Tingfa
Eastern Wing
Xu Shiyu
41st army
42nd army
43rd army
54th army
55th army
1st division—artillery
70th division—anti-aircraft
Western Wing
Yang Dezhi
11th army
13th army
14th army
43rd division
49th division
4th division—artillery
65th division—anti-aircraft
Air Force
Zhang Tingfa
MIG-21, 28
MIG-19, 560
MIG-17, 98
F-9, 120
Other planes, 142
Navy: South Sea Fleet
Destroyers, 2 (missile)
Escort destroyers, 4 (missile)
Submarines, 20
Patrol boats, 27 (missile)
Other boats, 604

Source: See Note 30 of this chapter.

on the border area were quantitatively superior to their Vietnamese counterparts by 3 to 1. Undoubtedly, China had employed Mao's strategy that "in every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force" against the Vietnamese enemy. Manpower was upheld as the decisive factor. Yet, both Chinese strategy and manpower soon met a serious test.

THE MILITARY OPERATION

For the sake of simplicity, the PLA's self-defensive counterattack is divided into two periods: the first period covers February 17 to 26, the second February 27 to March 5. Chinese withdrawal began on March 5 and was completed on March 17. In order to bring the complicated situation into better focus, the reaction of the Soviet Union and the United States during the sixteen-day war period will also be discussed.

First Period: February 17–26

At 5 a.m. on February 17, 1979, a Chinese force of approximately 100,000 men kicked off their counterattack by launching extremely power-

MAP 5.1

THE PRC'S ATTACK ON VIETNAM, FEBRUARY 1979


YUNNAN
0 Miles 100
C H I N A
KWANGSI
Shihping
Ha Giang
Cao Bang
Friendship Pass
Lai Chau
Lao Cai
②
Lang Son
①
Hanoi
LAOS
VIETNAM

Source: Journal of East Asian Affairs 3, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 1983): 247.

ful artillery shellings, followed by tank units and waves of troops. In the East Wing with the front-command post in Nanning, two main columns of forces advanced simultaneously. The first, led by 42A, advanced from Longzhou to Dong Dang, aiming at Lang Son. The second, led by 41A, moved from Jingxi and Longzhou to Cao Bang and Dong Khe. In addition, a division (165D) of 55A advanced from Fangcheng to Mon Cay on the coast.[33] The main target was Lang Son.

In the West Wing with the front-command post in Mengzi, three major columns attacked fiercely. Led by 13A and 11A, the first column advanced from Hokou to Lao Cai, a capital city on the rail-line to Hanoi; the second from Wenshan to Hai Giang (east to Lao Cai); and the third (led by 42D of the 14A) from Jinping to Lai Chau (west to Lao Cai).[34] Obviously, the target was Lao Cai.

Understandably, the Chinese offense was devised for maximum gain. The Beijing authorities had never spelled it out, however. Speculation from the Vietnamese side centered around three targets:

> (1) Quick occupation of a strip along the border, about a few dozen kilometers in depth, which would include the towns of Cao Bang, Lang Son and Lao Cai . . . From the springboard, more assaults would be launched depending on the situation.
>
> (2) Destruction of Vietnamese military forces and weakening of Vietnam's national defense capacity by "making a clean sweep" of the border guards, annihilating a major part of the regional troops, and mauling some of the regular units.
>
> (3) Destruction of Vietnamese economic bases . . .[35]

Advancing rapidly at the outset, the Chinese forces soon met with difficulties. The rugged terrain of the mountainous border area was substantially unfavorable to the movement of division-sized forces, trucks, and other motor vehicles. The Chinese, lacking modern logistic equipment and refraining from using air transportation, were forced to rely on old trucks, horses, donkeys, and laborers for logistics.[36] They were also compelled to divide and redivide their forces from the division to company and even platoon level. Their advancing speed was greatly reduced. The previously cited Vietnamese source, albeit exaggerative, reported as follows: "The invaders found themselves bogged down and encircled. The people's war fought by the Vietnamese side, in which only local forces were used, effectively stopped all Chinese assaults and broke all their spearheads."[37]

What were the Vietnamese strategy and tactics that blunted the Chinese attacks? In brief, they fully employed local troops and militia along the border area for the fighting while assembling their regular army in the plain south of Cao Bang and Lang Son. The purpose was twofold: to weaken the

Chinese forces by the border fighting and to prepare for a major battle with the weakened Chinese in the plain. It would put the Chinese in an extremely disadvantageous position: they would have a long logistic line and would be out of their artillery coverage range from the border.

The Vietnamese border defense was amazingly strong. As a Vietnamese source suggested, the border provinces (Lang Son, Cao Bang, Hoang Lien Son, Quang Ninh, Lai Chau and Hu Huyen) literally formed an "impregnable fortress."[38] Such a fortress was characterized by tunnels, caves, and trenches manned by well-trained and well-armed militia all over the mountain range. They also employed various tactics and forms of warfare, such as tunnel warfare, jungle warfare, surprise attacks, booby-traps, land-mines, laser ("death ray") weapons, and bamboo *punji* stakes (familiar to Americans who fought in the Vietnam War).[39] The current, young generation of the PLA lacked fighting experience. This weakness, coupled with the unfamiliarity of the rugged terrain, brought about enormous suffering.

Facing these mostly unexpected obstacles inside Vietnam, the Chinese forces, in addition to their division and redivision at company and platoon levels, adopted counterstrategy and countertactics. They were reportedly under orders not to advance more than 50 kilometers into Vietnam to avoid the traps of a major battle on the plain.[40] Meanwhile, the Chinese reserved more than half of their forces inside China as fresh and energetic units for replacement when needed. In doing so, they would not leave their weakened forces in the lurch. Moreover, they employed the tactics and methods of fire wave and human wave, tunnel search and dynamite detonation, mine explosion, surprise attacks, encirclement, and other forms of guerrilla warfare.[41] During the first few days of the fighting, China issued little news on the war. Although Vietnam offered some, information on the war was so scarce that even the Soviet researchers of the Far East Institute under the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow were unable to write up a comprehensive report on the war.[42]

In brief, the first day of the Chinese attacks was a powerful and successful beginning. Fire waves and human waves were coordinated well. The heaviest fighting, according to Hanoi radio, was in the northwest border areas of Bat Xat and Muong Khuong and around the northeast frontier towns of Dong Dang, Huu Nghi, and Thong Nong.[43] The Chinese advanced more than ten miles into Vietnam and took several border towns. They also crossed the Hong [Red] River, pushing hard toward Lao Cai.

As soon as the war broke out, the United States made its official position clear. While maintaining a neutral stand, the State Department called on February 17 for an "immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and Chinese troops from Vietnam."[44] It also stated that the

"Chinese invasion of Vietnam was preceded by the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea." On the following day, the Soviet government issued a statement citing its treaty obligations with Vietnam, urging China to "stop before it is too late" and demanding an immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam.[45]

On the second and third days (February 18–19), the fighting increased. Again, Vietnamese resistance was incredibly strong, and their morale was high. Chinese manpower on the division level could hardly maneuver. Only small units could operate. The Chinese forces were gingerly and painfully applying their revised tactics and methods, including tunnel search, dynamite detonation, mine explosion, and others. Advance was made tunnel by tunnel, hill by hill. Their slow progress was observed as a pause for reinforcement or withdrawal.[46] However, they took Muong Khuong (Hoang Lien Son Province), Trung Khanh (Cao Bang Province), and Dong Dang (Lang Son Province). The battle of Dong Dang was a fierce encounter in which the Chinese defeated the Vietnamese Flying Tiger Regiment (regular army).[47] In the Mon Cai area (Quang Ninh Province), the conflict became a seesaw match. Both sides suffered heavy losses.

While the battle continued during the week of February 20 to 26, several important developments took place. The first concerned the early accounts of the war. On February 20, Beijing reported for the first time that the Chinese had caused very heavy losses on Vietnamese forces since the beginning of the war. They had advanced 10 miles into Vietnam, occupying 26 points. There were 10,000 killed and wounded on the Vietnamese side, with only 2,000–3,000 on the Chinese side.[48] In addition, seven Vietnamese missile bases were destroyed. The Vietnamese gave a different account. After only three days of fighting, the Vietnamese had inflicted heavy casualties on the Chinese. In Cao Bang Province alone (including Trung Khanh), four Chinese battalions were badly damaged and scores of tanks and armored cars destroyed.[49] As both sides made different claims, accounts of the fighting became contradictory.

The second development was China's capture of Lao Cai and Cao Bang, and readiness to launch a battle at Lang Son. On February 21, the Chinese forces, reinforced with two divisions, resumed their more powerful attacks. After fierce, seesaw battles, they captured the cities of Lao Cai and Cao Bang on the following day. As they continued to advance, they occupied more areas in the provinces of Ha Giang, Cao Bang, Lang Son, and Quang Ninh. New fighting also broke out in the Mon Cai, a coastal town, area. It was reported that Vietnamese reinforcements—regular combat divisions, artillery, and armor—had moved northward.[50] The Chinese forces began fighting with the reinforced Vietnamese regulars on February 22.[51] By February 26, more and more Chinese troops were assembled near Lang

Son. While the fighting continued in the Lao Cao and Cao Bang areas, the battle of Lang Son began.

The third development was the repetition of the Chinese public message that the Punitive War was a limited operation in time and in space and that the Chinese would withdraw from Vietnam immediately after its limited objectives had been obtained. The first such statement was made by Deng Xiaoping on February 19 in conversation with Alejandro Orfila of Argentina, secretary-general of the Organization of American States.[52] Geng Biao made a similar comment to a Western ambassador on February 23 in Beijing, adding that the war would last "about another week, maybe a little more . . ."[53] On the same day, Deng Xiaoping again offered a similar view to Roy Jenkins, chairman of the European Economic Community.[54] Deng was a little more specific when he talked with Takeji Watanabe, president of Kyodo news service, also on February 23. Deng said that the fighting would end in "about ten days" or "a few days more," and that China would pull out as soon as its objective was achieved.[55] A supplementary statement was made on February 25 by Wang Zhen, a deputy premier for industry, at a banquet for Eric Varley, Britain's industry minister. Wang also stated that China had no intention of moving into Hanoi.[56] Undoubtedly, these public messages were disseminated for external as well as internal consumption. Externally, they served as evidence to dissuade the Soviet Union from intervening, a response to the United States' call for withdrawal,[57] a tranquilizer to ease several nations' anxiety about a much larger war, and an unusual disclosure to puzzle Hanoi. Internally, the messages disappointed warriors but cooled down opposers of war.

The fourth development concerned Soviet moves. In addition to a squadron of eleven Soviet naval vessels off the coast of Vietnam, the Soviet Union sent on February 21 a cruiser of the Sverdlov class and a destroyer of the Krivak class to the South China Sea. It was reported that the two ships would join the Soviet squadron off Vietnam.[58] Meanwhile, Soviet airlift of arms to Vietnam was reported to have begun. Two special Soviet and Bulgarian flights with military supplies flew to Hanoi via Calcutta. A military delegation from Moscow also had departed for Hanoi.[59]

In continuing to voice Moscow's support, Soviet military men spoke out. First Deputy Defense Minister Marshal S. L. Sokolov demanded in Moscow on February 22, in celebration of the Sixty-first Soviet Army and Navy Day, that Peking take its "hands off" Vietnam.[60] On the same occasion in Hanoi, Colonel N. A. Trarkov, military attaché of the Soviet Embassy, also demanded China's immediate withdrawal. Trarkov, in a militant mood, further stated that the Soviet Union would "carry out its obligations under the Soviet-Vietnam treaty."[61] Apparently, Trarkov's message was more for Vietnamese, than for Chinese, consumption.

Despite these tough talks, a realistic and sober message was offered by Soviet officials to several Western and Asian diplomats in Moscow. It indicated that the Soviet Union did not plan to intervene in the Sino-Vietnamese war as long as the scale of fighting remained limited.[62]

In sum, at the end of the first period of the fighting (February 17–26), the development of the war became relatively clear: the Chinese had taken several border cities while maintaining no intention to advance to Hanoi, the war would continue for ten more days or so, and the Soviet Union would not intervene in the conflict. Meanwhile, casualties were extremely high.

Second Period: February 27–March 5

Despite the continuing fighting in the areas of Lao Cai, Cao Bang, and Mon Cai, the war during this period was centered around Lang Son. Approximately 10 miles to the Friendship Pass and 85 miles to Hanoi, Lang Son faces a rugged region in the north and an open plain in the south. It is a difficult post to take but favorable for launching a major drive toward Hanoi. It is a strategically important city to Hanoi's defense.

The battle of Lang Son began on February 27. China dispatched two more divisions from Dong Dang and Loc Binh (southeast of Lang Son) for reinforcement. New and fresh units also crossed into Vietnam.[63] The stormy Chinese attacks met with fierce Vietnamese resistance on Hills 417, 473, 556, 568, 608, and 800.[64] Heavy casualties were reported on both sides. Thousands of corpses scattered along Highway 1A (southwest of Lang Son to Hanoi).[65] As the Chinese forces attacked, they also began systematically cutting off all the roads connecting with Lang Son. The PLA, although on a small scale, was employing Mao's strategy of "the countryside surrounding the city" to avoid a Vietnamese trap of a second Verdun at Lang Son.[66] It is important to note, while the battle of Lang Son was running apace, the Vietnamese forces managed to attack two Chinese border towns in Guangxi, Malipo and Ningming.[67] There was no significant damage, but it revealed some degree of vulnerability of the Chinese rear.

By March 2, the PLA had generally surrounded Lang Son. It had secured its control over most of the hills around that city except the strategically indispensable Khua Ma Son Mountain. *Renmin Ribao* described the mountain as the "key position for launching attacks from and defending Lang Son."[68]

The final assault was launched on March 3 preceded by the seizure of Hill 303. Tanks led the infantry in a head-long rush for only ten minutes; then the hill was captured. Shortly after, the Vietnamese artillery on Khua Ma Son Mountain heavily bombarded the PLA on that hill. The Chinese tanks once again coordinated with the infantry. After fierce exchanges of fire power, mine explosion, and tunnel destruction, the six Vietnamese firing positions on the mountain were destroyed one after another. Finally rockets fired from the mountain's top signaled its capture.[69] Soon after, Lang Son was taken. In this newly captured strategic city, the Chinese forces found extensive tunnel-works, including a road wide enough for several vehicles to drive abreast along it and an assembly hall for political meetings and entertainment.[70]

Minor fighting was also reported in other areas. According to Vietnamese sources, Dong Dang was completely leveled. The Chinese forces, as psychological warfare, offered rice to the Vietnamese people in Cao Bang and Cam Duong after they had taken or destroyed the areas.[71] After Lang Son was reportedly taken, fighting was still in progress around Loc Binh and Mong Cai. To secure their withdrawal, the Chinese forces blew up the bridge south of Lang Son.[72]

On March 5, the Chinese government announced the withdrawal of the PLA from Vietnam.[73] Ironically, the Vietnamese government called, on the same day, for a nationwide general mobilization for the war. A circular from the Central Committee of the CCP to all the party offices throughout the country gave some additional information about the war. It stated that the PLA had "advanced 30 . . . to 80 miles, taken the capitals of Lang Son, Cao Bang, and Lao Cai and 17 other counties and cities, and damaged severely 4 regular divisions and 10 regiments of the enemy forces."[74] On the same day, Li Xiannian, at an interview with a Japanese editor, warned Hanoi against any Vietnamese attack during withdrawal.[75] In reply to Li's warning, Hanoi offered China a red carpet exit. It announced on March 7 that to show Vietnam's "good will for peace," Vietnam would allow the invading Chinese army to withdraw.[76]

The Soviet position during this period should be mentioned here. In harsh language, both Kosygin and Brezhnev criticized China's attack as a "cynical and barbarous act of international piracy," demanded an immediate end of the Chinese "war of aggression," and warned China of Soviet "loyalty to the [Soviet-Vietnamese] treaty."[77] However, there was little further Soviet action beyond these warnings except for the continuation of arms airlift and naval deployment off the Vietnam coast. Cuba, on the eve of the Chinese withdrawal, also warned China that it would offer Vietnam assistance, including troops if necessary.[78] Since the Soviet Union had not involved itself militarily in the war, a Soviet promise of post-war aid to Vietnam became a matter of obligation. So, Kosygin, in his visit to India on March 10, made such a commitment to Hanoi.[79]

A dilemma developed in the United Nations. Originally requested by Norway, Portugal, Great Britain, and the United States, was the debate on "the situation in Southeast Asia and its implications for international peace and security." The Security Council found itself irreconcilably divided after five meetings on February 23, 24, 25, 27, and 28.[80] The debate was serious and acrimonious. The ASEAN members disapproved of the invasions by China and Vietnam and urged the two countries to pull back their forces.[81] The U.S. delegation, led by Andrew Young, favored a resolution along the lines of the ASEAN position, asking for the withdrawal of foreign troops. No nation was named. The USSR and PRC argued with each other. The Soviet delegation, led by Mikhail A. Kharlamov, warned that the Soviet Union would not support a resolution that did not condemn China and call for the withdrawal of Chinese troops. It submitted (together with Czechoslovakia) a draft resolution on February 23 which condemned China for its invasion, demanded the withdrawal of all Chinese troops and a full reparation for Vietnam's war damages, and called for an arms embargo against China.[82] Chen Chu, the Chinese delegate, criticized Soviet encouragement of Vietnam's attacks against China and its aggression against Kampuchea. The Chinese delegation submitted its draft resolution on February 24, calling for an immediate withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea.[83]

As the war ran apace, disagreements on proposed resolutions dragged on. Both the Soviet and Chinese resolutions had no chance to pass. Even the most agreeable ASEAN draft resolution, which was submitted on March 16 when the withdrawal of Chinese troops was completed, faced a Soviet veto, especially since it employed diplomatic terms such as "parties to the conflicts," asking "all the parties" to withdraw without condemning China.[84] To the Chinese delegation, the ASEAN resolution was acceptable because it would cover China's invasion and urge the Vietnamese to withdraw from Kampuchea. If the Security Council pushed to adopt the ASEAN resolution, it would not only invite a Soviet veto and a more serious Sino-Soviet quarrel that most Third World nations feared but also appear to accept a one-sided "pro-China" resolution. Trying hard to remain neutral, most of the council members backed off. Consequently, the Security Council failed to come up with a resolution during the war.[85] This experience ironically confirmed what a United Nations diplomat had told the author during the first week of the war: "When there is a dispute between big powers, the United Nations disappears!"[86]

AN EVALUATION

The PLA began to withdraw on March 5. It was a rotation process of withdrawal. In other words, as the front units withdrew, the units in the rear safeguarded the movement for an orderly retreat until the rear units appeared to be in the front; then the second run of retreat began. It was easy to manage because the retreat line was short and the Vietnamese were not pursuing. The withdrawal was complete on March 16. Despite Deng Xiaoping's assertion that the PLA "could have gone all the way to Hanoi if they wanted," a quick withdrawal was the right decision for financial and military reasons.[87] As Chen Yun pointed out at the Central Work Conference in April 1979, if the war continued six more months, the financial burden would have been unbearably heavy. "After all," Chen argued, "what purpose will it serve even if we capture Hanoi?"[88]

The PRC leaders held several discussions evaluating the war. Different views and criticisms were voiced. In acknowledging a heavy loss on the Chinese side, both Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun pushed aside further argument and a thorough evaluation. Whereas Chen Yun implied that such a no-win war should not be repeated for financial reasons, Deng asserted a political victory of the war in spite of some military losses. It was still a Chinese victory, Deng declared.[89] Since Deng was the actual leader of the government, his views prevailed over those of Chen Yun.

Gains and Losses

During the sixteen-day battle, the Western Wing under Yang Dezhi fought more successfully than the Eastern Wing under Xu Shiyou. Casualties were also lighter in the west. Xu's less successful commandership in the war, criticized severely by the Whatever Faction, coupled with his opposition to de-Maoization, led to his removal from the post of the commander of the Guangzhou Military Region in January 1980.[90] In contrast, Yang Dezhi was promoted to general chief of staff of the PLA in March 1980.

As the war ended, there were several conflicting accounts of casualties. Hanoi Radio claimed that the Vietnamese forces had killed or wounded 42,000 Chinese.[91] General Wu Xiuquan, deputy chief of general staff of the PLA, stated that the Chinese had killed or wounded 50,000 Vietnamese, compared with 20,000 on the Chinese side.[92] Another source revealed that the losses were "about equal."[93] Succinctly, Table 5.1 lists both sides' major losses.

The Chinese treated the Vietnamese prisoners of war (POWs) with leniency.[94] Among the Vietnamese POWs, a colonel and a lieutenant colonel were reportedly the highest in rank.[95] Visitors from Guangxi to Hong Kong in late March 1979 informed the author that Vietnamese POWs were treated well, but that there were at least 30,000 wounded Chinese soldiers in all the major hospitals in Guangxi.[96]

In other areas of the balance sheet, the Chinese had gained perhaps 50–55 percent of their limited objectives. Generally speaking, the PLA

TABLE 5.1
WAR LOSSES

	Chinese	*Vietnamese*
Killed	26,000	30,000
Wounded	37,000	32,000
Prisoners of war	260	1,638
Tanks, armored vehicles	420	185
Heavy mortars and guns	66	200
Missile stations	0	6

Sources: Tongzhi, p. 2; *P'ou-hsi Pao-kao*, p. 16; *Chan-cheng chih Yen-chiu*, p. 2; *FBIS*, May 3, 1979, p. E1; *NYT*, March 5, 27, 28, April 9, and May 3, 1979; *CSM*, March 7, 1979; and *Cheng Ming*, April 1, 1979, p. 10.

maintained its initiative in war, following closely its plans for advance and retreat. It operated quite well, however slowly, in the unfamiliar, rugged terrain, including its anti-tunnel and anti-mine warfare. Due to a lack of modern logistic equipment, it made full use of the militia for logistic functions.[97] It destroyed six missile stations, numerous bridges, roads, rail-lines, and electric power poles. As one reporter described shortly after the war:

> Everywhere bridges have been blown up and roads have been mined and destroyed.
>
> The hospitals in Lao Cai, Lang Son and Cao Bang were demolished. In all three towns . . . everything lies in ruins and all is silent. About 80 percent of the buildings were destroyed.
>
> Not a single electric power pole remains standing in or around the three towns . . . There is a water shortage throughout the region and electricity has been cut off.
>
> Nearby villages also lie in ruins . . ."[98]

The destruction in the region was rather thorough. Although no one can deny that the great majority of it was done by the Chinese, it may not have been done totally by them. As the same reporter wrote, "It would be impossible to determine how much of the damage was caused by Chinese troops . . . and by Vietnamese troops as they attempted to regain Vietnamese territory."[99] Regardless of a possible minor share of Vietnamese troops in the destruction, the immediate reaction of the Vietnamese people who suffered from the devastation was undoubtedly an intensive hatred for the Chinese.

Although the superior Chinese forces had partially damaged several Vietnamese regular divisions, such as the 3D at Dong Dang, the 345A and 316A at Lao Cai and possibly the 346A at Lang Son, they had not been able to destroy one or two divisions.[100] One of the biggest Chinese weaknesses was the backward weaponry and logistics. The lack of modern weapons and logistic equipment, in comparison with Vietnam's, greatly disabled the Chinese forces in firepower, troop mobility, attacks, and communications networks.[101] In addition, they underestimated Vietnamese military power. For instance, Deputy Defense Minister Su Yu reported to the Third Plenum of the CCP in late December 1978 that the PLA could take Hanoi in one week with only partial strength from the Guangzhou and Kunming military regions.[102] In fact, it took the PLA sixteen full days to capture Lang Son (85 miles from Hanoi) with a strength of ten divisions drawing from six military regions—a strength almost as great as the Guangzhou and Kunming military regions combined.

Inexperience also contributed to the weakness of the Chinese forces. The Chinese leaders were aware of the situation, but they probably had not expected two subsequent developments. One was the inability of low-ranking officers to make independent judgments and coordinate operations at critical moments; the other was the problem of morale.[103] They reduced considerably the effectiveness of Chinese assaults.

The morale problem was not an isolated case. It was, and still is, a general issue in the military as well as in the entire population during the post-Mao era. A broad discussion of the issue here is beyond the scope of this study; yet it is appropriate to review briefly the problem as specifically related to the war.

In the Eastern Wing under Xu Shiyou, the morale of some units, however small in number, was so low that superior officers had to force their men to advance.[104] Low morale was also seen in the rear. According to the previously cited semi-secret document, several local leaders and cadres in a few places "far away from the front" nervously made arbitrary decisions, after the war broke out, to evacuate their families and residents. Several cadres were even "absent from duty, creating serious ill effects."[105] The Vietnamese mass media also publicized the Chinese morale problem as one of the three factors of China's defeat.[106] This problem is considered serious today, one of several problems in the Chinese forces yet to be resolved.

Summary

In spite of the fact that both China and Vietnam had claimed a victory over the other, neither had achieved its major objectives.[107] So far as China is concerned, its publicized limited objectives were only partially obtained. First of all, it had not destroyed any of Vietnam's strong divisions. Second, it was unable to make the border area free from armed conflicts. Third, it had not forced the Vietnamese army to withdraw from Cambodia. Fourth, it failed to influence the Hanoi government to change its policy toward Chinese residents in Vietnam. On the other side of the ledger, China had raised doubts in Hanoi about Soviet willingness to intervene with force against China. Moreover, the PRC had also obtained some support from the ASEAN for its attempt to stop Vietnam's further move in Southeast Asia, and it had caused an immediate ill-effect on the Vietnamese economy.

However, a much more significant evaluation should be made on China's strategy. How did the doctrine of men-over-weapons hold out in the test? Or, more broadly, was Mao's theory and strategy of people's war proved correct or anachronistic? Obviously, the strategy of people's war in modern conditions, as discussed earlier, was employed in the war. Some of the senior military leaders still stuck to the old doctrine of people's war as a magic talisman for defeating the enemy.[108] As a result of the sixteen-day war, both the backward weaponry and the outdated strategy were exposed to the Beijing leadership. While they accepted the facts about the weaponry, the senior military leaders had difficulties in admitting those about the outdated strategy. The military modernizers maintained that times had changed, and strategy had to be changed accordingly.

The admission of the outdated strategy and erroneous military thinking came about in a subtle way. On March 26, 1979, the *Jiefangjun Bao* [Liberation Army Daily] carried an editorial evaluating the war. It stated that the war had "educated and tempered our people, consolidated their unity, and enhanced their patriotism and enthusiasm for transforming China. It also helped clear away some erroneous ideas on the question of war and a number of other questions."[109]

What were the erroneous ideas and other questions on war that had been cleared away? The military paper did not specify. Even if the erroneous ideas meant Mao's theory and strategy of people's war, it would not make such an outright confession. Nevertheless, these erroneous ideas and the previously cited "ossification of thinking" in military affairs were under severe criticism. This editorial was the first document openly admitting some of these ideas along the lines of the on-going general demythologization of Maoism at that time.

A clear answer to this question was finally offered six months later. Using the occasion of celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, Defense Minister Xu Xiangqian wrote an article, expressing strongly the official position:

> Our military thinking must tally with changing conditions. If we treat and command a modern war in our old way we did in the 1930s and 1940s, we are bound to meet with a big rebuff and suffer a serious defeat. As we know,

> in war history, there were numerous defeats that were caused not by the inferior manpower or weaponry, but by the backward military thinking and erroneous war command.[110]

Such an admission of the backward military thinking would definitely not have been voiced if Mao were still in power. Clearly this self-criticism related closely to the de-Maoization campaign and the rise of Deng.

In launching the Punitive War, China taught both Vietnam and itself a lesson. Beijing's military authorities must have reached the conclusion that the PLA is incapable of fighting a modern war before it is modernized in both weaponry and strategy.

6

International Implications

The Punitive War was over by April 1979, but the problems that led to the war were not yet resolved. By employing war as an instrument, the PRC has not achieved its major political objectives. The postwar peace talks between Hanoi and Beijing were vitriolic and have been suspended since March 1980. Beijing's reminder in July 1979 about the large amount of aid to Vietnam in 1964–1971, including 320,000 army personnel, was belittled by Hanoi as "tiny" help.[1] The arguments only embittered mutual attitudes. Border skirmishes and mutual accusations still occur from time to time, running like a replay of pre-war years. Their general relationship has not improved.

However, significant international implications have resulted from the war. They concern the refugee problem, the Kampuchean tangle, ASEAN reactions, Soviet influence, the United States' stand, effects on China's military development, and the impact on Vietnam's domestic affairs. An investigation of these issues will give us a more comprehensive understanding of current Asian international politics in general and the Punitive War in particular.

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

The refugee problem has been limited mainly to the exodus of the ethnic Chinese. After the war, the issue grew into a crisis, involving all the Indochinese refugees. Although the ethnic Chinese population was reported to be about 80 percent of various Boat People groups, no exact figure has ever been given. In order to put the issue into a broader perspective, the general situation of Indochinese refugees is discussed.

Refugee Flow and Criticisms

As the war ended, Vietnam was reportedly resolved to oust nearly all ethnic Chinese.[2] To help settle the startlingly increased refugee flow, the United States in April 1979 raised the refugee quota from 1,450 a month for all refugees (from all countries) to 7,000 a month for only Indochinese. In May, the numbers of Indochinese refugees reached the highest point in history, amounting to 42,000 in that single month.

Needless to say, the peak of the Indochinese refugee flow in May–June was a result of the war. Apart from a quarter-million ethnic Chinese who entered China from northern Vietnam, another 275,000 boat and land refugees arrived in Southeast Asia. Countless sources show that most of them suffered miserably during their flight. The Boat People suffered even more. In addition to the exorbitant payments to the Vietnamese authorities of 12 taels of gold (approximately U.S. $3,000 in mid-1979) for an adult's ticket and 10 taels for children, they had to fight for their survival against drowning and piracy.[3] Murder and rape by the pirates were commonplace; even twelve-year old girls were not spared. According to one conservative estimate, the Vietnamese regime earned about $4 billion from "the boat people business."[4]

Profoundly alarmed and perturbed by this rapidly escalating crisis, the ASEAN and nineteen other nations met in Indonesia in mid-May 1979 to cope with the problem. Vietnam was among the participants. They hoped that Hanoi would promise to stop or reduce the flow. Instead, Hanoi's delegation stated its readiness to allow 600,000 of its citizens to leave if other countries would take them.[5] Suppressing their anger, the ASEAN nations considered the offer a threat, rather than assistance, to their already difficult political, economic, social, and security problems. The representatives of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees also found it discouraging.

Unwilling and unable to accept more refugees, the ASEAN nations announced their refusal to take any more. They also turned down the generous offer by the United States to increase the monthly refugee quota from 7,000 to 14,000. They wanted to attack the problem at its source, that is, to persuade Vietnam not to expel people who had not been granted residence in foreign countries prior to leaving Vietnam. Otherwise, as Foreign Minister Sinnathamby Rajaratnam of Singapore argued, "For every 7,000 you take, Vietnam will send out 14,000. For every 14,000, they will send 28,000, and so on." Politically, therefore, the U.S. offer of a new refugee quota was "a bad thing," for the refugees were being used as "a weapon of war" by Vietnam, Rajaratnam concluded.[6]

Serious world concern over the Indochinese refugees brought about the 65-nation Geneva Conference of July 20–21, 1979, under the sponsorship of the United Nations. In addition to China's criticism of Vietnam's "genocide at home" and "exportation of refugees" abroad,[7] Carlos Romulo of the Philippines, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam of Singapore, and Vice-President Walter Mondale of the United States all directly or indirectly compared Hanoi's handling of the refugees to Hitler's persecution of German Jews. Rajaratnam criticized Vietnam saying that "a poor man's alternative to the gas chambers is the open sea." Romulo called the participants' attention to the similarity between the refugee tragedy and the holocaust of Jews at Auschwitz and Buchenwald.[8] Mondale compared the Geneva Conference on the refugee plight to the Evian Conference on the persecution of Jews 40 years earlier.[9] Under harsh international criticism, Vietnam tried to show a low posture by using obscure and sometimes conciliatory language. At one time, Phan Hien, Vietnam chief delegate and deputy foreign minister, said that he was not surprised that the refugees wanted "to go abroad to live and work, or for family reunions." At another time, he was reported by Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to have made an offer to try to stop illegal departures of refugees.[10] As the conference closed, the United Nations achieved some success in receiving offers from participants of money, residence, and reduction of illegal departures for refugees. Vietnam obtained considerable advantage, however, by turning a conference for international condemnation of its responsibility for refugee tragedy into a conference for listening to Vietnam's ambiguous and conciliatory appeals. The conference failed the test of human rights and human responsibility.

In the absence of face-to-face international criticism, Vietnam dealt with the refugee issue in a more militant way. Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach stated that most of the refugees were from Saigon and had collaborated with the U.S. army. They were lazy profiteers, unwilling to work for a living. "They have guilty consciences," he said, and "they have to say horrible things to tell you that they are not economic refugees but political refugees."[11] In denying its responsibility for the exodus of refugees, Hanoi's Foreign Ministry strongly rejected charges made by the ASEAN nations and declared unequivocally:

> It is necessary to note that the root causes of the escape abroad by a number of Vietnamese people are the consequences of the U.S. imperialists' war of aggression and neocolonialism in the past as well as the extremely malicious maneuvers and tricks by the Beijing expansionists and other hostile forces against Vietnam . . . It is the U.S. imperialists and the Beijing powerholders who have triggered the exodus of tens of thousands of Vietnamese, Lao and Kampuchean people. Therefore, they must bear full responsibility for these cruel actions.[12]

The Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin regime also echoed the Vietnamese statement by blaming U.S. imperialists and Chinese expansionists for the outflow of hundreds of thousands of Kampuchean refugees.[13]

Undoubtedly, anti-Chinese feeling was a major factor. In addition to Vietnam's accusation of ethnic Chinese for being China's "fifth column," the Soviet Union was involved.[14] According to one Vietnamese account, Vietnam was in fact heeding Soviet advice in expelling ethnic Chinese for fear that they might eventually subvert Vietnam at the urging of Peking.[15] Yet, the exodus also included skilled ethnic Chinese; many were medical doctors, law students, international businessmen, technicians, skilled workers, and other professional people.[16] Many skilled ethnic Vietnamese even used false Chinese names to join the exodus. As a result, Great Britain, West Germany, and several other Common Market nations transferred funds designated for postwar aid for Vietnam to refugee aid for Southeast Asia.[17] It worsened Vietnam's plight.

International Resettlement

Seven years after the war, the refugee problem has subsided but has yet to be settled. As of late 1985, more than 1,386,000 Indochinese refugees have been permanently resettled all over the world, including about 130,000 people who arrived in the United States in 1975 and 6,000 in Taiwan when Saigon was taken by the Vietnamese Communists. Table 6.1 gives the resettlement statistics.

Table 6.1 indicates that among more than 30 nations that have generously accepted more than 1.3 million refugees for resettlement, the United States carried the heaviest burden. It admitted more than 725,000, half of the total refugee population.

With regard to ethnic Chinese, three further implications should be discussed briefly. First, as of late 1985, the People's Republic of China had resettled more than 270,000 ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese (mainly from northern Vietnam) in Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Fujian provinces as farmers, fishermen, and workers. Among them, about 30,000 were ethnic Vietnamese. Several thousand found themselves trapped against their will in China, however, with fading hopes of being reunited with relatives who have been resettled in North America, Australia, or Europe. They dislike the bleak rural life and ideological constraints; however, they admit they are better off than in Vietnam.[18] The above figure also includes 2,550 refugees of Lao origin from camps in Thailand.[19] About 18,000 refugees registered their wish to leave China. About 850 have been allowed to do so. Reunions are permitted only for immediate family members. There has been no refugee processing center in China as in Thailand, Hong Kong, or other countries in

TABLE 6.1
INTERNATIONAL RESETTLEMENT OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES
(Figures as of late 1985)

Resettlement Countries	*Total Resettled*
Argentina	2,000
Australia	88,151
Austria	1,647
Belgium	4,226
Brazil	68
Canada	91,815
China (PRC)	270,000
Denmark	3,150
Finland	258
France	95,775
Germany (GFR)	22,432
Greece	120
Hong Kong	9,613
Iceland	34
Ireland	244
Israel	366
Italy	3,015
Japan	4,100
Luxembourg	97
Malaysia	7,137
Netherlands	5,580
New Zealand	5,659
Norway	4,544
Paraguay	31
Spain	927
Sweden	2,792
Switzerland	7,807
United Kingdom	16,447
United States	725,000
Taiwan (ROC)	13,000
Other countries	680
Total	1,386,715

Sources: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva), "Statistics of Indo-Chinese Refugees," May 31, 1984; the U.S. Department of State, Document No. 0107f, "Departures to U.S. and Third Countries," (December 28, 1982), p. 7 and (February 28, 1983), p. 4; Commission of Research, Development and Evaluation (Taipei), "General Report on Indochina Refugees," p. 7 (as of May 12, 1983); *World Journal* (New York), August 18, 1984, p. 2; U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey:* 1984 and 1985, pp. 40–58, 36–40; and *Refugee Reports*, (December 28, 1984), p. 3.

Note: Taiwan resumed accepting Indochinese refugees in August 1984 after two years of suspension.

Southeast Asia. Refugee officials from the United States, Canada, and Australia no longer consider the refugees in China to be refugees since they have lived there for more than six months. Hong Kong authorities also refuse to accept them. In addition, the Chinese government has received more than $40 million from the United Nations for resettlement funds but also contributed $1.1 million for refugees in Thailand.[20]

Second, much publicity has been given to China for its efforts to resettle refugees, but little recognition has been given to Taiwan's aid to refugees. The United States and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees have chosen not to publicize Taiwan's efforts because Taiwan is no longer a U.S. recognized country or a U.N. member nation. In fact, Taiwan is one of the few countries in Asia that not only receives refugees for temporary asylum but also offers permanent settlement. As of December 1985, Taiwan had received more than 13,800 ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese. Of them, 13,000 Chinese, mainly from Ho Chi Minh City, have permanently resettled on the island. Some came by plane from Indochina to Taipei via Bangkok. The transfer was arranged by the International Committee of the Red Cross. The remainder were Boat People and students. In addition, Taiwan has contributed U.S. $10 million worth of rice to refugees in Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Macao, and donated $2.7 million in cash to countries for refugees.[21]

Third, Vietnam may have begun to make a limited change in its emigration policy. The exodus of the Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese has not only created an international refugee crisis, but has also worsened Vietnam's economic and social situation, which has been discussed briefly and will be examined further. According to some refugees of Chinese origin, Hanoi since 1982 has made some changes in its treatment of skilled ethnic Chinese in Ho Chi Minh City. It offers them jobs, housing, transportation while on duty in foreign countries, and tries to persuade their families to return to Vietnam. Amazed by such a change, some professional ethnic Chinese still in Vietnam have decided to stay there, temporarily at least, leaving their wives and children waiting abroad.[22] The cases may be isolated. Yet, it may also be the beginning of a limited and quiet change in Hanoi's policy toward professional ethnic Chinese.

THE KAMPUCHEAN TANGLE

As discussed earlier, Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea was one of the major causes of China's attack on Vietnam. In view of the fact that China since the 1979 war has been the most vigorous supporter of Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea in its struggle for survival, any implications to Kampuchea will involve China and Vietnam.

The implications of the war lie in three major areas: the refugee problem, the international impact, and the development of domestic opposition. As of 1986, none of these three problems had been settled. Rather, they have constituted a truly complicated and tangled situation.

The Refugee Problem

Continuing their flight that began in 1975, countless Kampucheans flooded into Thailand immediately after the 1979 war. Thailand hesitated to accept them. In early June 1979, more than 80,000 Kampucheans were forced to return to their homeland by Thailand's military authorities. Nevertheless, they kept coming.[23]

Nations around the world endeavored to wrestle with the Indochinese refugee problem: some offered money, others pledged to accept numbers of the escapees, and still others criticized Vietnam. Meanwhile, the suffering and starvation within Kampuchea caught the attention of the world. It was reported in early August 1979 that about 2.25 million Kampucheans were facing starvation. The tragedy was beyond description: countless refugees were suffering from the endless fighting and were in dire need of food, medicine, and shelter. One refugee's sad story recounted how some people became so desperate that they dug up the bodies of the newly executed and cooked the flesh to eat. "My people have no food, no medicine, and we are being killed." He went on emotionally: "What do human rights mean? What does the United Nations mean? Why don't they do something?"[24] Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanand of Thailand claimed the resulting famine threatened to extinguish Kampucheans and their civilization.[25]

There were many causes for this development. First, it was a legacy of the murderous policy of the Pol Pot regime. Second, Vietnam was trying to seize the ruined country by force. Third, the Soviet Union and China helped the war and killing to continue by assisting the Vietnamese, the Khmer Rouge, or the Heng Samrin–Vietnamese authorities. Fourth, some new warlords allowed international aid only under their control. Thus the shipping of much-needed rice to areas outside their control was frequently stopped or delayed.

After great, untiring efforts by UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other agencies, relief finally seeped in through the barriers into the ruined country. By the spring of 1980, the situation gradually began to turn around.[26] It was not until the winter of 1980–1981 that the starvation was practically over, and the world witnessed the country's slow recovery. The Kampucheans have suffered immeasurably, and they continue to flock to the Thai border as refugees. To settle the refugee problem, Thailand's foreign minister Sitthi Savetsila has suggested dealing with its "political root"—the Kampuchean political problem.[27]

International Impact

The ASEAN nations have been most concerned about the implications of the Kampuchean issue. They have tried hard to maintain three main objectives: to support Democratic Kampuchea's seat at the United Nations, to convene a U.N. conference on Kampuchea, and to promote the formation of a united front regime among the anti-Vietnamese forces in the country.[28] So far as international repercussions are concerned, two items are most important: the nonalignment conference and the United Nations. The ASEAN has played an active role in both.

The 97-nation nonalignment movement held its sixth conference in Havana in early September 1979.[29] Fidel Castro, the host of the conference, took the opportunity to denounce the United States and the PRC as imperialistic and chauvinistic powers. Many participants were worried about the split of the nonalignment movement.[30] President Tito, then the only remaining founder of the movement, warned the movement against foreign influences that might divide the group. He indirectly accused Castro of moving the movement closer to the Soviet Union.[31] Meanwhile, Vietnam used the forum to severely denounce U.S. imperialism and Chinese expansionism as "the worst counterrevolutionary shock force at present."[32]

The central issues were the memberships of Egypt and Kampuchea. The Arab nations demanded that Egypt be ousted or suspended from formal membership for making a separate peace treaty with Israel. Cuba, Vietnam, and several other nations demanded Pol Pot's delegation be replaced by Heng Samrin's.

On the Kampuchean issue, there was a fight for legitimate representation. Both Khieu Samphan's and Heng Samrin's delegations arrived in Havana but were kept outside the meeting; they waited for the conference's decision. The issue dominated behind-the-scene discussions with Cuba leading the fight to seat the Heng Samrin government and moderate nations heatedly opposing it. At a tempestuous meeting of the 25-nation Steering Committee, President Fidel Castro reportedly denounced the moderates as "saboteurs, wreckers, and imperialist stooges" who imposed a compromise on the conference. In disagreement, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, Singapore's foreign minister, warned that if the conference "decides to expel the victim of an aggression and of a proxy-war, then it is only a matter of time before this movement as a whole is made proxy for a great power." Finally, it reached a compromise: the seat of Kampuchea would remain empty until a committee could study the problem and report to the conference's Coordination Bureau of 25-nation foreign ministers.[33] It was only a partial victory for either side. Whereas the Heng Samrin government was blocked from taking over the Kampuchean seat, the conference actually paved the way for unseating Pol Pot's delegation. The 1983 conference in India without the participation of Kampuchea was a case in point.

At the United Nations, the same issue has become an annual dispute. The first in 1979 took place only two weeks after the Havana conference. Unlike the conference in Havana, however, the United States, the PRC, and the Soviet Union all participated in active debate while Cuba did not. No nation had a single good word for Pol Pot's human rights record, but they disagreed on the seating problem. Oleg A. Troyanovsky, the Soviet delegate, argued that the people of Kampuchea had overthrown "the Pol Pot–Ieng Sary clique" and had been exercising full control over the entire country. He held that Heng Samrin's representative had to replace Pol Pot's. The Chinese delegate, Chen Chu, fiercely charged that Vietnamese authorities, with the backing of the Soviet Union, had imposed a war of aggression on the Kampuchean people and that the new Phnom Penh government would "not survive a single day without the backing of Vietnamese troops." To seat a Heng Samrin representative, he continued, would be to "tolerate willful foreign aggression of territories by force of arms." Richard W. Petree of the United States delegation also said that Pol Pot's rival had been supported by Vietnam's military force and had, therefore, no superior claim to the seat. The United States voted for Pol Pot's regime only on technical grounds. Ha Van Lau, the Vietnamese delegate, described the Pol Pot group as "a gang of criminals who have committed the crime of genocide against their own people." The General Assembly should not let "fascists and tyrants" continue to occupy Kampuchea's seat, he said. T. T. B. Koh of Singapore said that if a doctrine of a neighboring state's intervention existed, it "would make the world even more dangerous for small states." He opposed ousting Pol Pot's delegation.[34]

Before the final vote, India's Brajesh Chandra Mishra proposed the compromise of leaving Kampuchea's seat vacant. This would be the so-called "Havana formula" which would satisfy the Soviet delegate. It was defeated, however. The vote count was 71 against 35, with 34 abstentions, to keep the Pol Pot delegation.[35] It must be stressed that the vote was won mainly by China's active campaign and the ASEAN nations' firm support. It was, therefore, a Chinese–Pol Pot victory against the Soviet Union–Vietnam. It set an example for the next few years. Thus, when the Kampuchean issue came up again in October 1980, the U.N. General Assembly voted to keep the Pol Pot delegation (74 against 35 with 32 abstentions). The same results were reached in September 1981 (77 against 37 with 31 abstentions).

As the issue arose annually, there were other developments on Kampuchea in and outside the United Nations. On November 14, 1979, the General Assembly passed Resolution 34/22 demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea. The vote was 91 against 21 with 29 abstentions.[36] The significance of the resolution lies in its marking the first time the United Nations adopted such a specific document.

Outside the United Nations, some ASEAN leaders pondered over a political solution for Kampuchea. During Indonesian president Suharto's visit to Malaysia on March 26-27, 1980, he and Malaysian premier Datuk Hussein Onn reached an agreement, later referred to as the Kuantan principle—named after their meeting place. It asserted that there would be greater chance of a solution in Kampuchea if Vietnam were freed from the influence of either the Soviet Union or China.[37] Although the leaders of Thailand and Singapore did not refute this principle, they realized the extreme difficulty of carrying it out.[38] Nevertheless, they continued to search for a compromise or an alternative.[39]

In the fall of 1980 after the United Nations had affirmatively voted for Pol Pot's seat for the second time, the General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted an ASEAN-sponsored resolution (Resolution 35/6), calling for a special conference on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and free national elections in Kampuchea under U.N. supervision. Whereas both Vietnam and the Soviet Union opposed such a meeting, the ASEAN nations and China pressed for it. China and the ASEAN nations also suggested inviting only 30–35 countries who were involved in the Kampuchean issue, excluding Heng Samrin's delegation. The meeting was finally scheduled for July 1981. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, in disagreement with the Chinese-ASEAN group, sent out invitations to 144 nations, including Heng Samrin's Kampuchea.[40] No specific reason for inviting Heng Samrin's delegation was given. Although a general election was held in May 1981 in Kampuchea to legitimize the rule of Heng Samrin's regime and its international position, it was regarded by many as a farce.

In mid-June 1981, the ASEAN nations gathered in Manila to prepare a strategy for the July meeting of the United Nations. They came out with a declaration for a three-step political settlement: (1) the introduction of a U.N. peace-keeping force, (2) the withdrawal of the Vietnamese Army, and (3) the disarming of the warring Kampuchean factions upon the withdrawal of the Vietnamese. Carlos P. Romulo, foreign minister of the Philippines, stated with confidence: "This is not directed against the interests of Vietnam but the beginning of a common effort to enhance the longer-term interests of the region . . . ASEAN urges Vietnam to see the light of reason."[41]

However, after a U.N. conference of 92 nations concluded its week-long deliberations on July 17, the ASEAN only partially succeeded in having its original three-step political program adopted. Its long-awaited declaration states:

> With a view to reaching a comprehensive political settlement in Kampuchea, the Conference calls for negotiations on, *inter alia*, the following elements:
>
> (a) An agreement on a cease-fire by all parties to the conflict in Kampuchea and withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea in the shortest time possible under the supervision and verification of a United Nations peace-keeping force/observer group;
>
> (b) Appropriate arrangement to ensure that armed Kampuchean factions will not be able to prevent or disrupt the holding of free elections, or intimidate or coerce the population in the electoral process; such arrangements should also ensure that they will respect the result of the free elections;
>
> (c) Appropriate measures for the maintenance of law and order in Kampuchea and the holding of free elections, following the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the country and before the establishment of a new government resulting from those elections . . .[42]

Although the document stated the conference's hopes to negotiate the withdrawal of foreign troops, free elections, the maintenance of law and order by armed factions during and after elections, and the establishment of a new government, the ASEAN and the conference failed in several areas. First, two heavily involved nations, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, refused to attend the meeting. They called it illegal. Their absence made the adopted declaration unrealistic and unlikely. Second, no U.N. peace-keeping force was introduced. Third, Kampuchean armed factions were not disarmed. And, fourth, no date was set for general elections.

Nevertheless, one relatively constructive step was taken. That was the creation of a committee of seven nations charged with "maintaining contact with the parties to the conflict." The Vietnamese delegate, however, again refused to recognize and to talk with any committee created by the conference. In Phnom Penh, the Heng Samrin government called the U.N. resolution "ridiculous," rejected it categorically, and claimed it "illegal, null and void."[43] Ironically, owing to Vietnam–Heng Samrin's objection to the U.N. declaration and China's determination to keep Pol Pot's men in arms, China succeeded in blocking the ASEAN's original plan of disarming Kampuchean armed factions, pleasing both Pol Pot's guerrillas and Heng Samrin's forces.

With all of these difficulties, the long-delayed U.N. conference has achieved virtually nothing. A future compromise will require a significant change in the power relationships among the conflicting factions which, in Prince Sihanouk's views, depends on a reconciliation between China and the Soviet Union. In Hanoi's view, however, Vietnam should have a special status in Kampuchea, because Kampuchea is considered within Vietnam's sphere of influence.[44]

The Growth of the Opposition Coalition

As mentioned earlier, one of the main objectives of the ASEAN was to promote a united opposition in Kampuchea against the Vietnamese occupation. It was also a general policy of several conflicting anti-Vietnamese Kampuchean units. Each unit, nevertheless, wanted to unify the others under its leadership; no one was willing to make a compromise for the common cause. For instance, former president Khieu Samphan said in Cuba in September 1979 that he would be willing to cede his position to Prince Sihanouk in a joint effort within the framework of Democratic Kampuchea against the Vietnamese, but Sihanouk ruled it out.[45] Instead, Sihanouk predicted in Peking in October of the same year that the Vietnamese offensive would cripple the Pol Pot forces and would consequently open the way for a new federation of Kampuchea under his leadership.[46] Also in October, former premier Son Sann formed and organized the Kampuchean People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). He urged the Khmer leaders, except those who had killed wives and children of his associates, to join the front under his leadership.[47] Both Sihanouk and Son Sann understood China's determination to support the Khmer Rouge; they tried but failed to dissuade China from dropping such support. Throughout 1979–1980, therefore, their efforts to organize a coalition made little progress.

China's refusal to drop its support for the Khmer Rouge was based on the argument that the Khmer Rouge with 35,000–40,000 men was the most effective force to fight the Vietnamese and that cessation of the support would not persuade the Vietnamese to withdraw. Rather, it would indirectly help them to eliminate the Khmer Rouge. Only the continuation of military, political, and economic pressures could force the Vietnamese to leave. Beijing therefore actively advised the Kampucheans that the "insistence on fighting" against the Vietnamese would lead to victory.[48]

Nevertheless, the Khmer Rouge's leadership for a united opposition was too notorious to be accepted by any other Kampuchean forces or endorsed by the ASEAN. Harsh international criticism was voiced and echoed at the U.N. General Assembly every year. China was well aware of the situation. This led China and the ASEAN nations to search for an alternative.

In October and November 1980, when Prime Ministers Prem Tinsulanonda of Thailand and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore visited Beijing, they discussed the Kampuchean issue with the Chinese leaders, including the need for a coalition. China reportedly put forward a three-part proposal: (1) the establishment of a united front of all different resistance factions in Kampuchea headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, (2) the set-up of a Kampuchean non-communist armed force assisted by the ASEAN, the United States, and other parties, and (3) free elections in Kampuchea to decide its future social system.[49]

By that time, the Khmer Rouge itself had also instituted several improvements. It appointed Khieu Samphan to replace Pol Pot as the ousted regime's prime minister,[50] conceded its serious errors, and asked the world to forget about the past.[51] It also announced the abandonment of its socialist revolution program.[52] Clearly, domestic and foreign pressures had compelled the Khmer Rouge to make these changes to pave the way for further development.

At the end of 1980, a preliminary signal for a coalition was sent out by Beijing. China urged the Kampucheans to form a united force against the Vietnamese.[53] In January 1981, the Khmer Rouge radio announced that its deposed cabinet, after a five-day meeting (January 3–7), had adopted a new strategic and political program for uniting Kampucheans to fight against the Vietnamese occupation.[54] During the same month in Thailand, Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang expressed China's support for such a united resistance. Different Kampuchean factions also began to act. Son Sann, now head of the KPNLF, visited Beijing to persuade the Chinese not to support the Khmer Rouge but to guarantee a neutral nonaligned Kampuchea. He achieved partial success—the guarantee of a neutral Kampuchea.[55] Khieu Samphan and Inn Tam, another former prime minister, also visited China and North Korea to meet with Sihanouk. The deposed prince, like Son Sann, still loathed the Khmer Rouge and did not want to cooperate with them. As he put it, "They have killed many of my compatriots, my children, my grandchildren, and my in-laws. It is terrible to have to cooperate with such monsters, with such murderers."[56] Non-communist Kampucheans inside and outside the country urged him to do so, however. China's and ASEAN's repeated appeals and the U.S. intention to support a more unified resistance movement under his leadership also strongly encouraged him to assume the post.[57]

At this juncture, Hanoi was very concerned over such Kampuchean unity. In response, it offered a partial troop withdrawal from Kampuchea. The offer was made in a statement issued by the Foreign Ministers' Conference of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea held in late January 1981. It promised an immediate withdrawal of some of its 200,000 troops if Thailand ceased making Thai territory available to the Khmer Rouge and other anti-Vietnamese forces, stopped supplying them with weapons and food, and disarmed and concentrated them in camps.[58] The conditions were apparently unacceptable to Thailand because Vietnam accused Thais of wrongdoing for their involvement in Kampuchean affairs. After eighteen months nothing had happened.

The political survival of the conflicting Kampuchean factions depended on the support from China and the ASEAN. Pressures compelled the rival factions to temporarily put aside their differences. On September 2–4, 1981, after six months of contact and informal meetings, three major factions, represented by Khieu Samphan, Son Sann, and Norodom Sihanouk, finally met in Singapore. In a joint statement, they agreed on four items: (1) to form a coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea, (2) to set up an ad hoc committee to study the principles and form for such a coalition, (3) to support the declaration and resolutions of the U.N. International Conference on Kampuchea, and (4) to appeal to the world for support.[59] An ad hoc committee from the three factions met in nine sessions in Bangkok between September 13 and November 14 to work out a political program. Before the program was finalized, Singapore presented a proposal in November for a loose coalition with Sihanouk as its president and Son Sann as prime minister. Thailand and Malaysia supported it; the Khmer Rouge hesitated. Lee Kuan Yew warned that the ASEAN might reconsider its support for Democratic Kampuchea at the United Nations if the Khmer Rouge rejected the proposal.[60] Then on December 6, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) under Pol Pot announced its definitive dissolution. The decision was said to have been made after a "scrupulous discussion" at the party congress on September 3–6.[61] To further rebuild its image, the Khmer Rouge announced Pol Pot's retirement in September 1985.

After ten months of continuous negotiations and bargaining (from September 1981 to June 1982), the three factions met again in Kuala Lumpur and signed a declaration on the formation of a coalition government on June 22, 1982. Its purpose was "to mobilize all efforts" in the guerrilla struggle against Vietnam and to implement the U.N. declaration and resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and free elections. The coalition government is headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk (president), Khieu Samphan (vice-president in charge of foreign affairs), and Son Sann (prime minister), who constitute the ruling inner cabinet. Although the coalition is to be guided by the principles of "tripartism, equality, and non-preponderance," Khieu Samphan preserves the right for his State of Democratic Kampuchea to resume its functions as the legal nation of Kampuchea should the coalition become ineffectual.[62] Needless to say, the ASEAN, a midwife of the coalition, welcomed it with enthusiasm. China "heartily rejoiced" at the coalition and promised to always support Kampuchean people's struggle and unity against Vietnamese aggression.[63] The U.S. government welcomed the coalition as a positive step forward toward the ultimate self-determination of the Khmer. It also expressed the possibility of political and moral support for the group as well as financial assistance.[64] Hanoi immediately denounced it as a "corpse" made up by China and the United States. It also warned that "it is very dangerous [for the coalition] to fall into China's trap."[65] The Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh vehemently condemned it in August as a farce. Moreover, at the end of a four-day official visit to Moscow by Vietnamese President Truong Chinh in October of the same year, a Soviet-Vietnamese joint communiqué also denounced the coalition. It stated that "the fuss has been unleashed by imperialist and hegemonist circles and is a direct interference in the internal affairs of the PRK."[66]

In July 1982, Hanoi pulled out some troops from Kampuchea. Its foreign minister, Nguyen Co Thach, offered to further withdraw troops if Bangkok would respond positively to Hanoi's demands that it stop aid and support for the opposition groups.[67] However, evidence showed that Vietnam also sent in some fresh troops in July while withdrawing; thus it was a troop rotation, not a withdrawal.[68] China criticized it as a "fraud."[69]

From the opposition standpoint, the formation of the coalition has unified the most important factions and rallied more support than before inside and outside Kampuchea. However, it is not a panacea for the opposition parties. Difficult problems remain, and they may not be resolved. Broadly speaking, they can be divided into two categories: the determination of Vietnam to stay in Kampuchea and the conflict among the coalition factions.

The first problem, Vietnam's presence in Kampuchea, is probably the most difficult issue to be resolved. Several reports from Kampuchea strongly suggest that the Vietnamese are not "willing to go far toward a compromise on Kampuchea, a country they consider of vital importance." They are "digging in," and there is no time limit for their stay.[70] These reports explain why Le Duan, at the Vietnam Communist Party Congress in March 1982, stressed the importance of strengthening the military relationship among the three Indochinese states. They also offer an answer to the question of why the meeting of their three foreign ministers has been held twice a year.

Whether or not a Brezhnev-type doctrine has been established by Hanoi for Indochina,their special relationship is closely modeled on the Warsaw Pact.[71] According to Prince Sihanouk, Vietnam's relations with Laos and Kampuchea are "stricter and stronger" than Soviet relations with its Warsaw Pact partners. Moreover, Hanoi wants to make Kampuchea a Vietnamese province. Sihanouk put it in historical perspective. "Look at the southern part of Vietnam[;] in the eighteenth century, the Annam government took it by force from Kampuchea and now has become part of Vietnam." At present, there are millions of Vietnamese who have immigrated to Kampuchea. Hanoi is "Vietnamizing" Kampuchea by encouraging Vietnamese men to marry Kampuchean women. In doing so, both the married Kampuchean wives and their children will bear Vietnamese names. "In a few decades, there will be almost only Vietnamese in the country. Kampuchea will become a province of Vietnam."[72] Son Sann holds a similar view.

Sihanouk's account of Hanoi's strict control over the Khmer state was supported by two defected Kampuchean diplomats from Phnom Penh. They said in Bangkok that the Vietnamese ambassador to Phnom Penh, Ngo Dinh, and another top Vietnamese adviser had cables from Hanoi every morning as they directed the Phnom Penh government's day-to-day decisions. Vietnamese advisers also provided Kampuchean diplomats traveling abroad with position papers and drafted the Kampuchean communiqué of meetings in Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea.[73] It leaves no room to doubt Hanoi's efforts to have complete control over the Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh.

As a result of the Chinese-Vietnamese war, Hanoi has expanded its armed forces from 600,000 to 1,000,000. Unquestionably, Vietnam could achieve complete domination over Kampuchea in a matter of weeks if China stopped assisting the opposition. Sihanouk understands this well. According to the prince, the coalition has a military force of approximately 54,000 men (Pol Pot: 40,000; Son Sann: 9,000; Sihanouk: 5,000) against the Heng Samrin–Vietnamese force of 200,000 (Heng Samrin has only 20,000 men). The coalition force is waging guerrilla warfare, inflicting destruction on the Vietnamese and killing some Russians. They want to force the Vietnamese to negotiate for "an honorable compromise" on the basis of the resolution of the U.N. International Conference on Kampuchea of July 1981. In addition, Sihanouk also has high hopes for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. He said, "Personally, I welcome such a normalization. A better Sino-Soviet relationship may bring about a better Kampuchean-Vietnamese relationship. It may help settle the Kampuchean issue with Vietnam."[74] Sihanouk's hope may sound like wishful thinking, but no one should rule out such a possibility in the future.

The second problem, conflict among the coalition factions, is also not easy to settle. Since the organization of the coalition, the factions have not significantly reconciled the differences of their political beliefs. However, all three leaders realize that they must be united, otherwise, their cause is lost.[75] Can they cooperate on the battlefield and in the coalition administration? Sihanouk replied that there are difficulties of cooperation on the battlefield between the Son Sann rightists and the Khmer Rouge leftists, but that he, in the center, tries to hold them together because he has fewer "ideological contradictions" with them. Sihanouk added that there are three ministers (one from each faction) in each ministry, such as propaganda, home affairs, education, and public health. "So, we do have some cooperation among our three units."[76]

Sihanouk has stated repeatedly that the coalition is fighting for an independent, neutral, and nonaligned Kampuchea. Can it be achieved? Will the big powers support their cause? According to Sihanouk, it depends on Beijing and Moscow. If one day the Kampuchean problem is to be solved, China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam may sign an agreement on a neutral Kampuchea with an international guarantee. Neutrality is the only future for Kampuchea, Sihanouk has asserted. China, the United States, and the ASEAN nations have already expressed their support for the cause. If the Soviet Union and Vietnam also agree to it, then "we will have all important nations' support."[77]

Sihanouk's optimism seems unrealistic indeed, but nations have permanent interests and no permanent enemies. A favorable and peaceful situation may develop in the future. Nevertheless, it will take time to reverse the situation, and the developments in Kampuchea of 1984–1986 prove that the current unfavorable situation is difficult to change.

In 1984, the coalition rebels' diplomatic and guerrilla activities gained some ground and began to cause concern in Hanoi. During the winters of 1984, 1985, and 1986, the Vietnamese once again launched heavy attacks against the Kampuchean rebels and refugees near the Thai border. The rebels suffered substantial losses, and more than 60,000 refugees fled to Thailand. The attack, however, also caused China's and Thailand's rejection of Vietnam's new proposals on Kampuchea. Meanwhile, the United States offered to speed up military aid to Thailand. In addition, the ASEAN nations unanimously criticized Vietnam's action and urged the Soviet Union to stop backing the Vietnamese forces.

In March 1986, Sihanouk's coalition announced in Beijing an eight-point proposal for the settlement of Kampuchea. It included Vietnamese troop withdrawal and the establishment of a four-faction coalition under Sihanouk's leadership (the Khmer Rouge, Son Sann's faction, Sihanouk's followers, and Heng Samrin's regime). China supported it, ASEAN endorsed it, but Vietnam rejected it.[78] It appeared to be another round of proposal and rejection. After that, ASEAN urged more dialogue with Vietnam.

ASEAN AND THE GREAT POWERS

It should be noted that after the war broke out, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Cuba, and Laos denounced Beijing, while Romania urged China and Vietnam to stop fighting and withdraw.[79] Japan and West Germany were first cautious but later cut off economic aid to Vietnam because of its occupation of Kampuchea.[80]

India, contrary to many nations' reactions, disapproved of China's military move and granted diplomatic recognition to the Heng Samrin regime. Also unusual was the reaction from Korea. Both North and South Korea were silent on the war except for one editorial in the *Korea Herald* (Seoul) that called for restraint to end the conflict.[81] Experts in Seoul on Korean affairs hold the view that the two Korean regimes maintain a strict neutral policy on this issue in order not to offend either Beijing or Hanoi.[82] Nevertheless, the ASEAN nations have been truly concerned about the postwar development in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN's Position

ASEAN's position on the Indochina conflict has been consistent since 1979. Its development can be divided into three periods: February to August 1979, September 1979 to June 1982, and June 1982 to the present.

During the first period, February–August 1979, most of the ASEAN nations quietly endorsed Beijing's military action, but publicly called for a halt to the conflict. At the United Nations, several diplomats from Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia expressed their views that they were not upset by China's limited "punitive" action against Vietnam.[83] A public statement was issued in Bangkok by the chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee saying the ASEAN countries "urgently appeal to the conflicting parties to cease all hostilities and urge that all foreign forces be withdrawn."[84] As China began withdrawing its troops from Vietnam, the ASEAN nations were satisfied with Beijing's winding down of the operation. They, of course, would have preferred that China had not attacked Vietnam. Since China had done so, they felt it was better for it to have a minor military victory with an early conclusion of the fighting than a long war.[85]

Hanoi's reaction was quick but mild. It expressed its regret that Thailand had sided with Beijing. It also warned of China's threat to Southeast Asia.[86] Beijing's ambassador to Thailand, Zhang Weilie, lost no time in promising China's support to Thailand in case of military danger.[87] The ASEAN nations still faced a dilemma at the United Nations in February–March 1979, however. They could not persuade the General Assembly to adopt a resolution condemning either China or Vietnam. They were also unable to recommend a solution to the conflict.

During the second period, September 1979–June 1982, ASEAN became more assertive than ever. It urged the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the holding of free elections in Kampuchea. Chinese military disengagement in Vietnam helped to simplify the situation.

In August 1979, Singapore began publicly criticizing Vietnamese-Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia. In the following month, at the sixth nonalignment meeting in Havana and at the United Nations annual conference in New York, the ASEAN nations officially expressed their views. They stated that the Pol Pot regime's human rights record should be criticized, that Vietnamese troops should be withdrawn from Kampuchea, and that a general election should be held under U.N. auspices to decide Kampuchea's political future. Singapore campaigned especially hard for this cause. Naturally, Hanoi's response was bitter. It denounced Premier Lee Kuan Yew for playing a "merchant's trick" and becoming "Beijing's mouthpiece" pursuing a "very violent anti-Vietnamese policy."[88] It also criticized Thailand for colluding with Beijing and Washington as well as other reactionary forces against the Indochinese people.[89] After the U.N. General Assembly passed its Resolution 34/22 in November 1979 demanding the withdrawal of "foreign" [Vietnamese] troops from Kampuchea and after the ASEAN nations met in December in Kuala Lumpur calling for a political settlement to Kampuchea, Vietnam accused the ASEAN nations of making "a crude interference in internal affairs of Kampuchea."[90] In response, ASEAN also slightly escalated its accusations against Vietnam. For instance, in March 1980, at an economic cooperation meeting in Kuala Lumpur, fourteen European Common Market and ASEAN countries jointly condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea.[91] Up to this time, however, the ASEAN nations' criticism of Vietnam was still comparatively mild.

One development in mid-1980, however, forced the ASEAN nations to stand firmly together against Vietnam. On June 23–24, about 2,000 Vietnamese soldiers attacked Kampuchean refugees inside Thailand (at Non Mak Mun and Ban Non Sao E) and stayed there for ten hours (5:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.). The resisting Thai forces suffered casualties totaling 130 killed or wounded. The Thai government issued a formal protest to Hanoi. At the annual meeting in Kuala Lumpur on June 25, the ASEAN foreign ministers strongly condemned Vietnam. They denounced the Vietnamese incursion as an "irresponsible and dangerous act" that constituted "a grave and direct threat to the security of Thailand and Southeast Asia."[92] This declaration was the strongest joint denunciation of Vietnam ever issued by the ASEAN nations. Even the previously reluctant President Suharto of Indonesia spoke out on August 16, 1980, to give his "fullest support to Thailand's right to defend" its territory; he also made known his stand that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Kampuchea.[93]

Hanoi denied the incursion and pledged to continue its respect for the territorial integrity of Thailand. To make an aggressive move, Vietnam used the occasion of the first Indochinese Foreign Ministers' Conference at Vientianne on July 17–18, 1980, to call for a nonaggression treaty between the ASEAN nations and the three Indochinese states.[94] Realizing that such a treaty would legitimize, *inter alia*, the Heng Samrin regime and Vietnamese military stationing in Kampuchea, ASEAN rejected it.

The Vietnamese incursion of Thailand certainly damaged Hanoi. It increased the ASEAN nations' fear of a Vietnamese military advance to Thailand. It also led Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang to publicly assure Thailand's Premier Prem Tinsulanonda of China's firm support if Vietnam again invaded Thailand.[95] More destructive perhaps, the incursion virtually ruined the initial Soviet effort to mend the fence between Vietnam and ASEAN.[96] As a result, it encouraged the convention of the U.N. Special Conference on Kampuchea in July 1981. The Soviet Union and Vietnam refused to attend as previously discussed.

The U.N. resolution of the above special conference is probably the ideal document for a political settlement of Kampuchea. Realistically, nonetheless, it is simply impracticable without the participation of Vietnam, Heng Samrin's Kampuchea, and the Soviet Union. The ASEAN nations, led by Singapore and Thailand, thus continued to search for a new alternative—a third alternative, different from the first and second (Pol Pot's and Heng Samrin's regimes).

Prior to the emergence of the concept of a third alternative, the ASEAN foreign ministers held their annual (fifteenth) conference in Singapore in mid-June 1982. At its close, it issued a joint communiqué, reiterating its call for the immediate and total withdrawal of Vietnamese occupation forces and free elections to establish a Kampuchean government under U.N. supervision. It also urged the United Nations and other international and voluntary agencies to assist the Indochinese refugees in a more effective manner.[97] What appeared different from previous meetings was the viewpoint of Indonesian foreign minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja. He stated that the Indochinese problem was "basically a problem between Vietnam and China but with an ASEAN angle to it because Thailand happens to be caught in the middle."[98] If one takes Prince Sihanouk's views into consideration, one will see that even the Soviet Union and the United States have an angle to the problem.[99]

During the third period, June 1982–present, the ASEAN has offered its moral and political support for the third alternative (Sihanouk's coalition) while maintaining its demand for the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and free elections in Kampuchea. No military aid to Sihanouk's coalition has ever been promised by the ASEAN countries.

Hanoi's proposals of July 1982, as stated in the Ho Chi Minh City Communiqué at the close of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Indochinese States, ignored the Sihanouk coalition as well as the Kampuchean problem. They include three parts: (1) a partial troop withdrawal by the Vietnamese from Kampuchea, (2) a safety zone along the Thai-Kampuchean border with Thai troops on one side of the zone and Heng Samrin's troops on the other, and (3) an international conference on Southeast Asia.[100] During subsequent visits to ASEAN, Vietnamese foreign minister Nguyen Co Thach offered further troop withdrawal if Thailand would stop its aid to anti-Vietnamese groups. In response, ASEAN issued a statement in Bangkok after the meeting of its five foreign ministers on August 7. It reiterated its call for Vietnamese troop withdrawal and free elections in Kampuchea. It also stated that the ASEAN nations would continue to support the Kampuchean seat of "the new coalition government" under Prince Sihanouk in the United Nations.[101]

A more detailed reply to Vietnam's proposals was offered by Thai foreign minister Air Chief Marshal Sitthi Savetsila. He revealed several matters ASEAN was thinking about. In addition to troop withdrawal and free elections, Sitthi questioned whether Vietnam's proposed troop withdrawal would not be just another routine troop rotation. He also argued that the safety zone proposal would shift attention away from the core problem, that is, the presence of 200,000 Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. Finally, he pointed out that the proposed international conference on Southeast Asia would evade the discussion of the Kampuchean question. Consequently, ASEAN "could not possibly accept" these proposals. Instead, the coalition "under the presidency of Prince Sihanouk," Sitthi added, "is a viable alternative . . . that must be explored."[102]

The above three periods present the development of ASEAN's stand on the issue, going from vague to positive. However, it would be a mistake to assume that the trend represents an increasing intensity which might lead to a confrontation between ASEAN and Vietnam. ASEAN's desire to seek a dialogue with Vietnam on Kampuchea remains unchanged.[103]

The Threat of the Great Powers

One of the most important questions in Southeast Asia today is the threat to the region's security by the great powers. China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam are often considered to be the powers that pose a threat to the area. Who threatens whom? Collectively or individually? The answers vary. To probe these problems, let us turn to the great powers first, and then to ASEAN.

China is traditionally an Asian power. Its prime interest is to promote a friendly and cooperative Asia with China as the leader. For historical, geographical, cultural, and socio-economic reasons, a change in the Chinese political system is unlikely to affect its interest in the area.

However, the PRC's past involvement in Korea, India, Indonesia (the 1965 coup attempt), and Vietnam has created some skepticism in ASEAN about the PRC's long-term objectives in Southeast Asia. In 1981, to lessen such skepticism, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang declared in Thailand that China's relations with the communist parties of the ASEAN countries "are mainly political [ideological] and moral," and that China would continue to make efforts to prevent Chinese relations with those communist parties from affecting China's friendship and cooperation with Southeast Asia.[104] When Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced in June 1981 the U.S. agreement to sell arms to China, however, several ASEAN nations were worried. They wondered whether the announcement would not undermine ASEAN's conciliatory efforts toward Vietnam at that time. They were also concerned that the arms deal might increase China's potential long-term threat to the region. Furthermore, the ASEAN nations are still dubious about the political loyalty of millions of Overseas Chinese to their countries. To Vietnam and the Soviet Union, needless to say, China is definitely an expansionist and hegemonic power in the area.

Compared to China's relations with Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union enjoys almost no geographical, historical, cultural, or socio-economical factors that can serve as a bond to strengthen its ties with the region. Prior to 1969, therefore, the Soviet Union entertained no high priority of strategic thinking about Southeast Asia. Since 1969, several developments have brought about a change in the situation, however.[105] These include Brezhnev's proposal in 1969 for a collective security system in Asia, Moscow's cultivation of Le Duan's leadership after Ho Chi Minh's death that same year, heavier Soviet involvement in military assistance to Hanoi, China's staunch support for the Khmer Rouge, and the U.S. disengagement from Vietnam. They have created an unprecedented opportunity for the expansion of Soviet influence in Vietnam as well as in Southeast Asia.

Nevertheless, Soviet involvement in the region is based on its global strategic perception. It plans to gain support from Asia and the Third World against China and the United States without risking any major confrontation with the West in Europe. Consequently, its overall strategy is to place Europe above Southeast Asia.

Although Soviet involvement in the region has been criticized by Beijing since 1973 as part of the Soviet global hegemonic drive, a concrete advance was not made until the conclusion of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of 1978. On the one hand, Vietnam is locked into a close relationship with the Soviet Union with no alternative.[106] On the other hand, the Soviet Union has increased its commitments and obtained great advantages in the region. They include its aid to Hanoi of approximately $3 million a day, establishment of a naval base in Cam Ranh Bay and an air base in Da Nang, and expansion of its naval operations from ASEAN waters to the Indian Ocean.[107]

In addition to China, both ASEAN and the United States view the Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia as alarming. At a private conference in Honolulu in early February 1982, ASEAN officials and defense analysts together with U.S. diplomats and specialists identified Soviet expansion in Asia as a major threat to the region.[108] While divided on the issue as to whether Moscow or Beijing posed more of a menace to the area, the ASEAN delegates agreed that a heavily armed and aggressive Vietnam, which has been encouraged by the Soviets, would most endanger the region.

On other occasions, senior U.S. diplomatic and military officials gave warnings of the rising Soviet threat in Asia. They stressed the common need for blocking it by the United States, Japan, and China.[109] On this particular issue, the interests of ASEAN, the United States, and China converged.

Is Vietnam a real threat to the security of Southeast Asia? It is generally believed that Vietnam, with the strong backing of the Soviet Union, could disturb peace and stability in the region. China, of course, argues that Vietnamese behavior has already posed a threat to Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries.[110] The ASEAN nations are divided as to whether Vietnam or China presents an immediate or real danger to the area.

Individually, each ASEAN nation analyzes the issue on different grounds. They base their arguments more on their own special interests than on common concern. Thailand, owing to its geographical propinquity to Indochina, sees its major danger coming from Soviet-backed Vietnam. Since 1979, the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea and Thailand's support (politically and morally) for the Kampuchean rebels have aggravated the tension between the two countries. Thailand stands constantly on guard against Vietnam's potential threat. China is not an immediate threat, nor is the Soviet Union. While exploring the possibility of a political solution to the Indochinese problem including the support for Sihanouk's coalition, Thailand strengthens its relations with China and the United States. Thailand also persuades other ASEAN countries to go along with its Vietnam policy and has scored considerable success.

An additional point must be noted here. On December 1 and 28, 1982, two communist groups of 3,000 men surrendered to the Thailand government under the 1982 amnesty program. Such voluntary moves almost exhausted the entire rebel force in northeastern Thailand.[111] This was unprecedented. The dwindling support from Beijing and the cutoff of supplies from neighboring Laos were two of the immediate factors for the communist setback. More fundamentally, however, it was affected by the geo-political implications in the area, Beijing's conciliatory foreign policy toward ASEAN in general, and the strengthened Sino-Thai relationship in particular.

Singapore is an anti-Vietnamese state at present. Because of its strong opposition to Vietnam's military invasion and occupation of Kampuchea and, perhaps, because 70 percent of the population in Singapore are originally ethnic Chinese, the island state has played an active role in criticizing Vietnam and searching for a solution to the Kampuchean problem. It disapproves of Vietnam's military action in Kampuchea, but it does not see an immediate threat from Vietnam or China. Singapore allows U.S. warships and commercial vessels to visit on the northern side of the island, and Soviet commercial and oceanographic research vessels and Vietnamese ships on the southern. Its leadership is fully aware of the Soviet long-term ambitions in Southeast Asia. As its foreign minister put it, "Laos and Kampuchea were peanuts compared with the pearls and diamonds the Soviets hoped to garner in the rest of Southeast Asia . . ."[112]

Indonesia and Malaysia hold similar views about China and Vietnam for various reasons. They maintain that China, and not Vietnam, is the major potential threat to the region.[113] To Indonesia, the reported Chinese involvement in the 1965 coup attempt still creates doubts about China's real motives in the area. Indonesia agrees with the rest of ASEAN countries that there should be no foreign (Vietnamese) intervention in Kampuchea and in Thailand but disagrees with China and even the United States that ASEAN must join the anti-Soviet campaign in Southeast Asia. On this point, Malaysia agrees with Indonesia. They both maintain that ASEAN should avoid becoming a battleground of the great powers' struggle and should be kept as the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)—a proposal ASEAN made in 1971. In 1978, Hanoi attempted to replace ZOPFAN with its suggested Zone of Peace, Independence, and Neutrality (PIN), which has not been well received by ASEAN. Although Indonesia and Malaysia have not been threatened by Vietnam as Thailand has, they are sympathetic to Thailand's stance on Vietnam.

Beijing's new diplomatic approach has impressed many Indonesians. They wonder, however, whether its conciliatory move is merely a temporary expediency to win Indochina's support for China against Vietnam.[114] President Suharto is reported to have said that he hoped Vietnam would become the "Yugoslavia of Southeast Asia" and move ahead socially and economically.[115] Such an optimistic change requires at least two preconditions: a significant Sino-Soviet thaw and a change in Hanoi's leadership. Theoretically, no one should rule out possible emergence of these conditions. Realistically, however, the situation is still remote.

Malaysia's argument that Vietnam poses no threat to the region is presented mainly by its Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed. He analyzed, "Vietnam faces a lot of internal problems . . . I am quite sure they are serious about rebuilding their country and I do not think . . . it is their intention to invade ASEAN countries."[116] Undoubtedly, 4.5 million ethnic Chinese (34 percent) in Malaysia's population are a concern to the Malaysian government. Prime Minister Mahathir argued that China should be aware of what is happening in the region (the movement for the "zone of peace") and should realize that it will have no need to interfere in the area.

The Philippines is less immediately involved in the issue. It has not publicly expressed its views on the subject of potential threats to ASEAN. Former president Ferdinand Marcos was concerned, albeit not fearful, about the growing Soviet influence in Asia. As he put it, "there really isn't any equivalent power in Asia right now."[117] The Filippino attitude is developed mainly from its alliance with the United States and its isolated geographical situation in the ocean. It has the benefit of not being directly involved.

What will ASEAN do in the face of a potential threat from the great powers? Should ASEAN arm itself for self-defense as a *de facto* military alliance? Most ASEAN leaders have not yet suggested an alliance except Lee Kuan Yew. Apparently noting the amount of ASEAN's military expenditure of 1981 ($7.6 billion), a 170 percent increase over 1975, Lee hinted that such an alliance might become inevitable.[118]

The main concern of the United States at the present time is the security of ASEAN against a Soviet advance in the area. As a senior U.S. diplomat put it, the United States will not get involved in any policy that might undermine the development of ASEAN, including "trading its security (ASEAN's) for China's cooperation."[119] However, ASEAN leaders as well as specialists hope that the United States will take more active steps to promote the region's peace and modernization, if not military affairs.

LESSONS TO VIETNAM AND CHINA

As mentioned earlier, the war indisputably taught both Vietnam and China some lessons. To see the implications, let us turn first to Vietnam and then to China.

Lessons to Vietnam

Among several major lessons of the Punitive War to Vietnam, the impact on the military and the economy is strongly felt. To increase its defense strength, Hanoi has significantly enlarged its armed forces at the expense of its economic recovery.

VIETNAM'S MILITARY INCREASE. As soon as the war was over, Hanoi's mass media carried a series of editorials and articles, urging the increase in militia and local forces for self-defense. They emphasized both quality and quantity. Quickly, they evolved into a campaign for the development of the overall military power. Vo Nguyen Giap's article in *Tap Chi Cong San* represented the official and authoritative viewpoint. He said:

> Obviously, the local people's war is a fundamental combat form of great strategic significance. While striving to increase the strength of local people's war, we must pay great attention to increasing *numerical strength and quality* of the main force army corps which includes all branches of service: *infantry*, *air force*, *air defense*, and *navy*. They must be equipped with increasingly *modern weapons and techniques* and be gradually *mechanized*, *motorized*, and *automated.*[120]

Needless to say, the campaign turned into a reality. Within a year (1979–1980), Vietnam's army increased from 600,000 to 1,000,000 men. As of this writing, its overall military power has improved significantly in both quantity and quality. Table 6.2 lists the improvement.

It is obvious that the motive for the increase of Vietnam's forces is not merely for the country's security, but also, in a more urgent sense, for its

TABLE 6.2
THE INCREASE IN VIETNAMESE MILITARY POWER

Force	*1978*	*1985*
Army	600,000 men	1,000,000 men
Navy	3,000 men	12,000 men
	————	8 frigates
	3 large patrol craft	54 large and regular patrols
Air Force	12,000 men; 300 combat aircraft	15,000 men; 270 combat aircraft; 65 armed helicopters
	6 intercepter squadrons with 70 MIG-19/F-6's, 70 MIG-21F/PF's	4 intercepter regiments with 200 MIG-21bis/F/PF's

Sources: The Military Balance, 1978–1979 (London, 1978), pp. 68–69; and ibid., *1985–1986*, pp. 136–37.

occupation needs in Kampuchea and Laos. Beijing, supported by Hanoi's documents, criticized Vietnam's military increase as promoting militarism.[121] Whether for self-defense or militarism, Vietnam's new military buildup has become a constant drain on its resources.

HOANG VAN HOAN'S DEFECTION. Four months after the war, a political fallout surprised Hanoi: the defection of Hoang Van Hoan to China in July 1979. Hoan, Ho Chi Minh's contemporary and Hanoi's first ambassador to Beijing in 1954, was dropped in 1976 from the Politburo of the party as previously noted. His defection immediately led to the arrest in Hanoi of Generals Chu Van Tan and Le Quang Ba (guerrilla leaders during the Independence War), Ly Bau (deputy foreign trade minister) and Tran Dinh Tri (secretary of the National Assembly). Le Hien Mai and few others were also dropped from the Party Central Committee. All of them were suspected to be pro-Chinese. In Beijing, Hoan's harsh criticisms of Le Duan's leadership embarrassed Hanoi. One year later, Hoan was put on trial and sentenced to death by Hanoi in his absence.[122] To appease the original Chinese-faction leader Truong Chinh, who is Le Duan's senior and chairman of the National Assembly since the late 1950s, Le Duan made him concurrently president of the state.[123] It is a ceremonial post on the Soviet model. By kicking Truong Chinh upstairs and purging his suspected followers, Le Duan reaffirmed his control over the party.

ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. Vietnam's economy is still in great distress. Its ambitious five-year plan (1976–1980) ended in failure, and its second one (1981–1985) did not succeed either. Inflation is believed to run about 100 percent a year. Food rations, mainly rice, in many parts of the country have been cut from the minimum of 33 pounds a month to 25.5 pounds. Consumer goods are extremely scarce. Chicken costs more than $2.04 a pound, and rice about 45 cents a pound. Even Le Duan and Pham Van Dong had to report to the party's Fifth Congress in late March 1982 that the country faced "many acute problems" such as shortages in nearly everything—energy, food, clothing, transportation, medicine, and even paper. The average annual income grew from $241 in 1976 to only $302 in 1984. Although the situation improved somewhat in 1982–1983, it is still an enervated economy. In a speech marking the party's 55th anniversary in February 1985, Le Duan admitted shortcomings and mistakes in economic affairs. In short, this previously economically self-sufficient land has now become one of the twenty poorest nations in the world.[124]

Undoubtedly, several factors led to the failure. In addition to the 30-year war of revolution and independence (1945–1975), numerous other factors have contributed to Vietnam's plight, such as its invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, the war with China, expulsion of Overseas Chinese including professionals and skilled workers, economic isolation, poor economic planning, mismanagement, corruption, and storms and drought. Leaders in Hanoi continued until 1985 to blame the United States and China for causing these troubles. For instance, at the party's Fifth Congress in March 1982, Le Duc Tho criticized the party officials for their serious lack of vigilance against China's hostile policies. He declared that the struggle against China was Vietnam's "most pressing political task."[125]

Unfavorable events also came from abroad. Apart from the freeze in aid to Vietnam since 1979 as announced by Japan, Britain, West Germany, the World Bank, and other lenders, the U.N. Food Program made a similar announcement. On April 30, 1982, at the executive council meeting of the U.N. World Food Program in Rome, the United States, Canada, Britain, West Germany, Thailand, Japan, and Argentina blocked a $5.3 million food-aid program for Vietnam.[126] Such action has created even more economic difficulties and isolation for Vietnam.

Economic troubles have also led to personnel changes. When Hanoi announced the failure of the 1976–1980 five-year plan, Le Thanh Nghi, chairman of the powerful State Planning Commission, was replaced by Nguyen Lam in early 1980. Meanwhile, the ministers of Foreign Trade, Communications, and Transportation were also replaced. Then in April 1982, shortly after the Fifth Party Congress, Nguyen Lam was removed from office. In June 1986, the economic failure caused a further massive removal of eight cabinet ministers.

According to reports from the International Monetary Fund and other sources, Vietnam's foreign debts reached a total of $6 billion in 1984—mostly owed to the USSR.[127] As the situation deteriorated, Vietnam was not able to meet the scheduled payments. The Hanoi government has sought other means to repay part of the debts. Beginning in 1981, it agreed to send a growing number of workers to the Soviet Union and East European countries. The figure was estimated to be 500,000 workers from 1981 to 1985, although the government's number was "up to 100,000." In addition to earning foreign credit, exported labor also relieves some domestic unemployment pressures. If what *Izvestia* reported is true—that the Vietnamese worker can earn as much as 145 to 204 rubles ($203–$286) a month—the income must be regarded as a fortune by Vietnamese standards. It was also reported that one-third of the income went to the nation's treasury, that the workers had to work three to six years, and that the working conditions were in the harsh, freezing land of Siberia. Nevertheless, more and more people are being sent to the COMECON countries. Many of them belong to privileged people—sons and daughters (17–35 years of age) of revolutionary families and returned soldiers from Kampuchea.[128] Are they "slave laborers" as some reports have labeled them? Judging from the available information, one can offer a tentative answer: the workers' earnings may be low by some standards and their working conditions may be harsh, but it is unlikely that Hanoi would send their privileged young men and women abroad to be slave workers.

To reform its economy, Hanoi adopted measures for a wider scope of private farming and incentive policies in industry. It has made considerable improvement. Foodgrain production in 1983 almost reached its target of 17 million tons. At its Central Committee meetings in December 1982 and July 1984, the party decided to continue the reform policy despite the opposition of some senior party ideologues. Yet, Vietnam's economy is still in great difficulty. In 1985, foreign diplomats in Hanoi reported that Vietnam was still "desperately in need of Western assistance."[129]

Lessons to the PRC

A SECOND LESSON? The PRC leaders set out to give Vietnam a severe lesson, but they only achieved their objectives partially. Ever since the conclusion of the war, there has been talk of a second Chinese attack. Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Huang Hua talked about it; Western journalists, U.S. officials, and Senator Henry Jackson also saw such a possibility.[130] In April 1985, when the Vietnamese again raided the Thai-Kampuchean border area, Son Sann warned Vietnam about a further Chinese lesson. After Vietnam's successful attack on the Kampuchean rebels in the winter of 1984–1985, the talk of a second lesson re-appeared.[131] With 150,000 Chinese troops at the Sino-Vietnamese border and 160,000 Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea, the PRC could certainly warn Vietnam of a second lesson at any time.

Is a second attack possible? As of this writing, it looks very unlikely unless both the Beijing and Hanoi governments drastically change their current policies. They are both striving for modernization. Realistically and rationally, they cannot afford another war which will only worsen their troubled economies. Moreover, both Beijing and Hanoi have realized that another war would benefit neither of them, and only the Soviet Union.

PRC'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION. In addition to the lesson that Vietnam has learned, the impact of the war has added impetus to the PRC's campaign for military modernization. The campaign can succinctly be divided into two areas: (1)Mao's military strategy in modern warfare, and (2) professionalization (regularization) and modernization of the military system and weaponry.

The problem of how to properly assess Mao's military thought and strategy has been part of the difficult issue of an overall re-evaluation of Mao in the post-Mao era. Since the Punitive War was executed under the guidance of Mao's strategy with only partial success, a thorough but balanced evaluation of his military thought became essential to the Chinese leadership.

Beijing began such an evaluation in late 1977. After long delay and debate, in May 1981 the party leadership finally reached "a formal judgment of Mao's achievements and mistakes."[132] It was incorporated in June into the party document, "On Questions of Party History," declaring that Mao's triumphs outweighed his debacles.[133] On Mao's military thought, an article by Song Shilun, Central Committee member and director of the Academy of Military Science, expresses most comprehensively the official viewpoint. He argues that Mao's military thought was the "crystallized" collective wisdom of the entire party and army after the long experience of war, and not developed by a single genius. Several principles on war were written decades ago and should no longer be employed, but his military thinking as a whole should still be used as the "arrow" to aim at the "target" of future warfare. To this end, the Chinese should study in depth Mao's military thought, analyze the characteristics of modern warfare, and learn from foreign experience.[134] Such a re-evaluation, albeit not definitive, is probably the most balanced and reasonable interpretation the Beijing leadership can offer in the 1980s. It discards several outdated principles of Mao and clears the way for a drive to update Chinese military strategy. The Punitive War, though not mentioned as a factor, must have served as an important impetus for the new interpretation.

PROFESSIONALIZATION AND MODERNIZATION. At a military maneuver in northern China in September 1981, Deng Xiaoping, the chairman of the Military Council, called for the building of a "modernized, regularized revolutionary army."[135] This announcement was the first such appeal in 23 years since the downfall of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai in 1958.

Deng's statement touched off the publication of a series of editorials and articles in *Jiefangjun Bao*, emphasizing the importance of military regularization and modernization. Specifically, Chief of General Staffs Yang Dezhi set forth several proposals for the drive: (1) to strengthen the military leadership of different levels; (2) to strictly execute regulations and rules; (3) to promote the quality by improving the training program and encouraging research projects; and (4) to reform and strengthen the system.[136] The key issues are the promotion of quality and reform of the system. Undoubtedly, it will take a long time to implement these proposals, yet it is the right direction to follow.

The PLA training program has also been improved since the war. It has carried out programs of "real fighting and real explosion (live ammunition)" as well as "coordinate training" of different forces instead of a single force such as the infantry. These training programs are different from the past, and they have been adopted by the Beijing, Nanjing, Shenyang, Fuzhou, and other military regions. Emphases are placed on combat abilities, command and control systems, independent judgment of middle and low ranking officers, and logistics. For instance, in June 1982, a large-scale "real-explosion" military maneuver was held in Ningxia Province. It reportedly exploded a strategic nuclear bomb and employed missiles, aircraft, and tanks.[137] It represented an important improvement in new strategy and training.

The modernization of weaponry has also been sped up since 1979. Table 6.3 indicates the PRC's progress in several strategic and advanced weapons.

It must be noted that, in May 1980, the PRC launched its first intercontinental ballistic missile from northern China to the South Pacific. On the basis of its approximate 6,000-mile range, the missile could reach most of the Soviet Union and probably the western United States. In October 1982, Beijing fired its first submarine-launched missile in the East China Sea. The successful test made the PRC the fifth country to have developed such missiles after the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France.[138] Strategically and psychologically, these new developments are significantly encouraging to the Chinese leadership.

Overall military strength is still not strong, however. To continue its improvement, the Beijing military authorities convened an all-army general staff conference in December 1982. It discussed and studied a variety of problems, such as strategy, equipment, training, and young leadership. In addition, Defense Minister Zhang Aiping published an article in the theo-

TABLE 6.3

PROGRESS IN PRC'S STRATEGIC AND ADVANCED WEAPONS

Item	*1978*	*1985*
ICBM	none	2 DF-5 (range 12,900 km), 4 DF-4 (7,000 km)
IRBM	30–40 (CSS-2)	60 DF-3 (range 2,700 km)
MRBM	30–40 (CSS-1)	50 DF-2 (range 1,100 km)
Aircraft	3 regiments	5,300 combat aircraft
Submarines	75	3 Han SSN, 107 diesel submarines
Destroyers	11	16 GW
Frigates	12	28

Sources: The Military Balance, 1978–1979, pp. 56–57; and ibid., *1985–1986*, pp. 113–115.

retical journal *Hongqi* in March 1983, urging that "defense funds should be concentrated on those badly needed programs and most important areas which affect the overall situation, such as strategic guided missiles and nuclear bombs."[139] In June 1984, Zhang Aiping visited the United States, reaching some agreements with the U.S. government on the purchase of advanced weapons. In late 1984, the United States began to sell helicopters and other advanced equipment for air fighters to China. In short, military modernization has made some progress.

7

Conclusion

The preceding chapters have examined the level of previous PRC military-foreign policy involvement, and the issues, decisions, and implications of the Chinese-Vietnamese war. In this concluding chapter, I intend to present several observations on the level of the Punitive War and policy mentality, the role of the leadership in the conflict, the complexity of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, and the prospect and problems of Vietnam's special relations with Kampuchea and Laos.

THE LEVEL OF THE WAR AND POLICY MENTALITY

To identify the level of the war is to determine whether the conflict was in conformity with the mentality and pattern of Beijing's foreign policy decisionmaking as discussed in the first chapter. The same six crisis components and their ratings are employed. The results of the application are given in Table 7.1.

In comparison with the crises of the Korean War and the Quemoy bombardment, there is no difficulty placing the Punitive War on the medium level. Although the duration was short and fighting was engaged by only the ground force with conventional (not advanced) weaponry, the comparatively massive manpower and high number of casualties qualified the war to be an "M_3."

The overall levels of the nine crises are given in Table 7.2. Two significant points deserve attention. First, the eight low- and medium-level crises account for 88.9 percent in total, while the high-level crisis is 11.1 percent. This scale reinforces the previous observation of the framework of Beijing's foreign policy decisionmaking and the pattern of its crisis management. In light of the past, it can be predicted that Beijing will continue to formulate

TABLE 7.1
LEVEL OF CHINA'S WAR WITH VIETNAM, 1979

		Level
Number of forces	300,000–330,000	H_3
Kinds of forces	ground force (active combat)	L_3
Weaponry	conventional (medium-high quality)	M_3
Duration	16 days	L_2
Casualties	26,000 killed, 37,000 wounded (approx.)	H_2
Mobilization	national-regional-local	M_3
		Average level: M_3

Sources: See chapter 6.

TABLE 7.2
LEVEL OF THE PRC'S CONDUCT IN THE NINE CRISES, 1950–1979

	Level			
Crisis	*L*	*M*	*H*	
Korean War, 1950–1953			H_2	
Indochina War, 1950–1954	L_2			
Quemoy and Matsu, 1954	L_1			
Quemoy and Matsu, 1958	L_3			
Indian border war, 1959	L_1			
Indian border war, 1962		M_1		
Vietnam War, 1964–1975		M_1		
Soviet border war, 1969		M_1		
Vietnam border war, 1979		M_3		
Total	4L (44.45%)	4M (44.45%)	1H (11.1%)	9 (100%)

low-medium risk and low-medium cost policies in the future unless compelled to respond otherwise. Second, why such a pattern? The answer is twofold: one is China's limited capabilities that prevent it from engaging in higher level and more aggressive conflicts; the other is its policy mentality that persuades the decisionmakers not to adopt policies for large-scale and prolonged wars. In the interests of the PRC, such a pattern is probably best for conducting its military-foreign policy at the present time.

In addition, the level of the 1979 border war is determined by the previously discussed three more fundamental factors: national and strategic interests, communist ideology, and nationalism. Briefly, during the 1978–

1979 policy debate, Beijing's consideration of interests covered the issues of territorial claims, border incidents, Overseas Chinese, Soviet involvement, Kampuchea's strategic value, and China's leading position in Asia. It should be emphasized that some of the issues generated high emotion among the decisionmakers. No one had perceived that China's security was in danger, however. The element of common ideology between China and Vietnam prevented the former from launching an all-out war against the latter. The bond of Marxism-Leninism limited the conflict to the medium level. A nationalistic state of mind induced China to reinforce its claims to disputed territories and to restore its past influence in the area. The sense of history is strong but not extremely so. Meanwhile, the traditional brotherhood of the two countries kept them from fighting an indefinite and bloody war. Consequently, the combined result of these three factors is also medium-level.

ROLE OF THE LEADERSHIP

Leadership decides policy, and policy determines foreign relations. This principle is valid for many countries. It is also applicable to China and Vietnam.

As pointed out earlier, the decision on the 1979 war was made under Deng Xiaoping's leadership. It is therefore appropriate to call it "Deng Xiaoping's war." While the numerous factors should not be underestimated, Deng's political style was essential to the decision. The hardships he experienced, the ambitions he embraced, and the unfulfilled expectations of Zhou Enlai that he witnessed all helped to make him a resourceful, persevering, risk-taking, and pragmatic leader. Leadership was an indispensable element in convincing Deng's opponents to go along with him. Had Hua Guofeng been in charge, the war would probably not have been fought.

Arthur Schlesinger observed that U.S. intervention in Vietnam was a triumph of the politics of inadvertence. However, the PRC's war with Vietnam was a different case. The repeated, prolonged debates of November-December 1978 demonstrated probably the highest form of intensive decisionmaking of the Beijing leadership since 1949. The decision was made not as a result of confusion as Michael Lindsay has suggested regarding the PRC's involvement in the Korean War, nor as a triumph of the politics of inadvertence such as the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. It was, on the contrary, a result of careful deliberation and calculation of various problems, including the backwardness of weaponry of Chinese troops and the lack of fighting experience. Taking into consideration these two unfavorable conditions, Deng wanted to utilize the Punitive War as a testing ground for pushing forward the PLA's modernization. In addition, the unfamiliar treacherous terrain of the mountainous borderland in Vietnam prevented the Beijing leadership from making a more accurate assessment. These partially negative factors prevented the PLA from fully achieving its objectives. Nevertheless, China's timely withdrawal (without being drawn into Vietnam's quagmire) demonstrated the leadership's firm control over its original plans. Although the war taught both countries a lesson, the PRC certainly gave a severe blow to Vietnam's economy.

On the Vietnamese side, a question has often been asked: Had Ho Chi Minh still been alive, would he have avoided the Punitive War? The answer is very likely positive. He was a man with a special quality of patience and compromise. He never allowed himself to be drawn into a situation from which he could not retreat if events ran against him. He was a man of principle keeping faith with comrades and making peace with enemies. He truly realized the value of maintaining friendships with both China and the Soviet Union, allowing no publicly defiant or suicidal act against either. Fully cognizant of past Chinese invasions, Ho was always cautious toward China. The overshadowing Chinese power made him fear, dislike, and respect the Middle Kingdom. For peace and a good relationship, he would rather make concessions to China than to present challenges, as he did to Nationalist China in 1945–1946 and again to the PRC in 1954. Although his deference to China and Russia caused some complaints from his followers, his leadership of great tolerance and skillful persuasion led Vietnam to survive and grow. If he were still alive, he would not have fought the war.

Le Duan's leadership is different. Imprisoned first on Condore Island and later revolting as a political commissar in southern Vietnam, Duan was not with Ho Chi Minh during most of the darkest days of the Viet-Minh's guerrilla era in 1940–1950. Duan had had little opportunity to experience thoroughly the value of Chinese assistance when the Viet-Minh was in dire need of help for survival. Massive Chinese, not Soviet, aid helped the Viet-Minh defeat the French in 1954. Since he was a junior in the party apparatus, rising second to Ho only after the removal of his predecessor, Truong Chinh, in the mid-1950s, he needed to establish his authority among his comrades, especially after Ho's death in 1969. He assumed the party leadership at a time when the Soviet Union had just gained an upper hand over the PRC in Vietnam. Moscow's cultivation of his leadership in order to safeguard Soviet dominance in Vietnam became an inevitable development of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Thus, his lukewarm comradeship with Beijing, his personal ambition, and his gratitude to Moscow for help in the establishment of his leadership have all led Duan to formulate a policy of allying with the Soviet Union in opposition to China. He lacks the qualities of patience, accommodation, and compromise of Ho, and perceives almost no value in Ho's equidistance policy toward the two powerful big brothers.

Influenced mainly by Max Weber's theory on leadership and authority, scholars of communist and revolutionary affairs have developed a sophisticated viewpoint on two-generation leadership in communist countries. The first-generation leadership grows out of a crisis environment and is often characterized by revolutionary skills, fervency, and charisma. Its central task is to destroy the enemy by violent means and to set the stage for the arrival of a new society. The second-generation leadership is characterized by managerial and modernizing skills, and is responsible for nation-building and modernization. The Soviet Union offers the best example of leadership development from the first to second generations, while the PRC is trying hard to move from the first to the second. In Vietnam, the first-generation leadership, under Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, Truong Chinh, and others, is still running the country; but they are in the second-generation environment. Their training, experience, and mentality have helped to develop a discrepancy between the ability of their leadership and the urgent needs of the current generation. As a result, the recovery and modernization programs have failed, the economy, unemployment, and corruption have worsened, but the military power has been growing. In addition, the septuagenarian leadership is almost frozen in immobility, unable to cope with the increasing problems of the nation. Although these problems led to the change in the party leadership at the Sixth Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party in December 1986, the problems remain. Since social conflict or Hungarian-style revolt can hardly be brought to the open, the conceivable consequence is the continuation of socio-economic stagnation. If the situation continues for some time, it will create a lost era.

COMPLEXITY OF SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS

In the 1969 book on Vietnam and China, the author established, from an historical perspective, a pattern of the development of their relationship: when China is powerful, magnanimous, and cooperative, Vietnam is grateful to and learns from China; when China is weak and disintegrated, Vietnam enjoys being more independent; and when China is aggressive, Vietnam resists. In the past four decades, the durability of the pattern has been tested by three Vietnamese wars and one Chinese disorder—the Independence War (1946–1954), the Vietnam War (1964–1975), the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1965–1976), and China's war with Vietnam (1979). The pattern has been upheld. Emperor Le Loi's proclamation in 1418 for Vietnam's independence war against China should be emphasized: Vietnam has sometimes been weak, sometimes powerful, but at no time has Vietnam lacked heroes. In the long history of Sino-Vietnamese relations, this statement can well serve as a valuable note to the pattern.

Although the historical pattern remains unchanged, it does not naturally endorse China's use of military force to settle problems with Vietnam today. For peace and law, China's attacks on Vietnam can hardly be justified despite Vietnam's indifference to Chinese aid, the emotional outburst over the exodus of Overseas Chinese, and other important issues. China has criticized the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as an act of social-imperialism, but the Soviets had the excuse of the approval of the Warsaw Pact Organization for doing so. What treaty or legal right could China employ as an excuse to attack Vietnam? While China could impose severe economic sanctions and strong diplomatic pressures upon Hanoi, it could hardly justify its military move. It was an action of power politics—an act of chauvinistic power in a traditional Chinese sense. It has tarnished China's reputation in the international community to some extent.

Recently, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship has been complicated by at least three international actors—the ASEAN, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Their interests sometimes run parallel to China's, sometimes against. The complexity of the situation has altered China's relationship with Vietnam from bilateralism to multilateralism.

Traditionally, Southeast Asian nations had almost no influence on China's relations with Vietnam. Since the communist regimes came to power in the two countries, there has been a mixture of fear and expectancy at the prospect of Chinese influence and communist expansion in the area. Shortly after the conclusion of the Vietnam War, several ASEAN nations hastened to accommodate themselves to Beijing and Hanoi by establishing diplomatic ties. Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea and China's attacks on Vietnam complicated the attitude of the ASEAN, however.

While most ASEAN nations quietly endorsed China's military lesson to Vietnam, no one advocated a massive Chinese military campaign to force the Vietnamese out of Kampuchea. Their demand for a peaceful solution to the Kampuchean issue, including Vietnam's withdrawal and general elections, has nevertheless partially run against the interests of both Vietnam and China. China wants an unconditional Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea and a national coalition government under Sihanouk, whereas Vietnam wants China to remove its military presence on the border and to stop its aid to Pol Pot. Meanwhile, some Southeast Asian nations tacitly welcome China's military pressure on the border so as to prevent Vietnam from expanding into the region; other nations believe that Vietnam's successful resistance to China can serve as a deterrence to its potential threat to the area. As the struggle goes on, Asian nations have shown their conflicting and converging interests to each other as well as to China and Vietnam. Their leaders have also conducted shuttle diplomacy between China and Southeast Asia in the pursuit of a compromise. In spite of the fact that there is no solution in sight, it is clear that the Sino-Vietnamese dispute is closely related to the entire Indochina conflict. For the improvement of China's relations with Vietnam and the settlement of the Indochina issue, ASEAN's role has become an essential element.

The United States has a cooperative and competitive relationship with the PRC in this area. This relationship is one in which their common interests promote cooperation on some issues and their different interests engender competition on others. During the Vietnam War, China and the United States maintained opposing interests that drew them into conflict; both heavily assisted their respective allies. China's sixteen-day Punitive War did not really run against U.S. interests. The United States took no action against China except to urge troop withdrawal. After the war, the United States found itself generally in agreement with China on issues such as Sihanouk's coalition, Vietnamese troop withdrawal, and general elections in Kampuchea. Therefore, Washington has offered some cooperation with Beijing. On the problem of containing Vietnam, both countries have expressed their common concerns and offered assistance to Thailand. On the independence and growth of ASEAN, China also agrees with the United States, especially as the Indochina issue remains unsettled. However, the United States seems to have committed itself to the issue for a longer term. Once the Indochina problem is settled, no one can be sure whether China's current interests will remain parallel to those of the United States.

In a broader strategic perspective, the United States is almost in complete accord with China on blocking the expansion of Soviet naval force in Vietnam as well as in Southeast Asia. Beginning in 1983, Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay has become a fully utilized naval base for the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Some twenty ships are using the bay ranging from Minsk to oil tankers. The Soviet fleet's establishment there not only can patrol the South China Sea, watch surface shipping, and search for submarines, but can also monitor U.S. communications to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines and to the base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. To China, this Soviet naval buildup presents a real threat to its much-underdeveloped navy. Of late, both the United States and China have agreed on the seriousness of this Soviet expansion, but there has been no announcement of a joint program to cope with the problem. If the PRC is to deal with the issue effectively, it will have to cooperate with the United States in various ways, including the purchase of sophisticated U.S. naval weapons.

The Soviet element in Sino-Vietnamese relations is the most serious problem to China. There are several factors that should be placed into focus. First of all, the Soviet Union has succeeded in hardening Hanoi's attitude toward Beijing in an attempt to create an irreconcilable split between them. In his speech at the Fifth Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party in March 1982, Le Duan identified China as Vietnam's "direct and dangerous enemy" and hinted at Vietnam's readiness to fight a "large-scale war" with China. Even if the militant rhetoric was for Soviet consumption, the reaction of Beijing would certainly be no help to future Sino-Vietnamese normalization. The consequences will only be Vietnam's heavier dependency on the Soviet Union and East Europe and slimmer chances for a Sino-Vietnamese rapprochement.

Second, Hanoi must have realized that heroic as the Vietnamese fighters are, Vietnam was not the real winner, politically and strategically, of its war with China. The real winner was clearly the Soviet Union. Hanoi's treaty obligation to Moscow, the $3-million daily aid (to be increased significantly in 1987) from the Soviet Union, and Soviet fulltime operations at Cam Ranh Bay have made Vietnam a Soviet client state. Soviet utilization of the bay and Vietnam's economic dependency on the Soviets have qualified Vietnam, by the standards of U.S. neo-imperialism, to be a victim of Soviet neo-imperialist power.

Currently, Vietnam is in a situation in which it has, as a traditional Chinese and Vietnamese saying goes, "rejected the tiger at the front gate but invited in the wolf at the back door." This represents serious erosion of an independent state—far from what Ho Chi Minh had originally fought for.

Third, rivaling Beijing in playing a U.S. card against the Soviet Union, Hanoi is erroneously, in strategy and capability, playing the Soviet card against China. In strategy, the Vietnamese leaders are not completely aware of the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, based on their common ideology and interests, at Hanoi's expense. They also have not fully comprehended the inconsistency and fluctuation of U.S.-Soviet relations because of their different ideologies and interests. In capability, Vietnam, unlike China, does not possess enough political and economic strength to cope with problems ensuing from a possible impasse of Soviet-Vietnamese relations. As events have developed, the U.S.-Soviet détente has declined for some time, and the Sino-American relationship has fluctuated from time to time, but Beijing has been able to play the Soviet card against the United States and Vietnam. China has also proposed that a cessation of Soviet aid to Vietnam for its aggression in Kampuchea should be one of the three conditions to improve Sino-Soviet relations. To cope with the temporary impasse of Sino-U.S. relations, China exercises its strength to put its house in order without suffering political fallout or economic setback. The Sino-Soviet relationship has also gradually improved. On the contrary, Vietnam, in its dependent relations with Russia, has almost no power to stop the erosion of its independence, improve its near-collapsing economy, or play the U.S. card against the Soviet Union and China. Hanoi's current leadership has failed to apply Ho Chi Minh's policy of balance to the Soviet Union and China. Its strategy of playing the Soviet card against China is a grave error.

In sum, the complexity of Sino-Vietnamese relations is characterized by its development from bilateralism to multilateralism. An improvement in the relationship and a settlement of the Indochina issue will require the cooperation of all the actors involved. The factors of the issue are so complex and so interlocked, however, that to consider one and to ignore the others is to invite confusion.

VIETNAM'S SPECIAL RELATIONS WITH KAMPUCHEA AND LAOS

The establishment of Vietnam's special relations with Kampuchea and Laos has given the unpopular name Indochina Federation a new appeal. It has provided a new concept and concrete organizations. Vietnam's friendship and cooperation treaties with Kampuchea and Laos, respectively, have been most successful. While formulated under the name of friendship, in reality they come under Hanoi's control. Periodic conference of the foreign ministers of the three states functions well. In addition, there are about 150,000 Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea and 50,000 in Laos. More than 200,000 Vietnamese have emigrated to Kampuchea and 100,000 to Laos. Vietnamese advisers are present in the two countries down to the village level. In part, this network of Vietnamese personnel serves to ensure Hanoi's control of local developments and political opposition. The chief architect of the system of special relations must have been inspired by the design of the Warsaw Pact.

Despite harsh criticism, the three Indochinese countries have emphatically denied Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea and Laos. Although Article 2 of each treaty formalized Vietnam's right to support and assist the two countries "wholeheartedly" in defending their "independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity," Vietnam also obtained specific agreements to justify its troops stationed in their territories. For instance, in July 1979, Laotian premier Kaysone Phomvihan explained that the presence of Vietnam's troops in Laos was requested by Laos and agreed upon by both governments in opposing any external threat and domestic sabotage. "This is a legitimate measure," he defended, and "normal practice" in international relations. Likewise, in February 1982, the Joint Communiqué of the

Conference of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers stated that the presence of Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea was a result of the request by the Kampuchean government and of an agreement between the two countries in dealing with the threat from "China's hegemonistic expansionism." In both statements, the three countries also made it clear that Vietnamese troops would leave Kampuchea and Laos at their request. Will the Vietnamese forces indeed withdraw at Kampuchea's and Laos's request? Perhaps, the treaty obligations and Vietnam's power may keep the forces where they are until at least 1990.

As the situation develops, it can be unmistakably predicted that Vietnamese troops in both Kampuchea and Laos will be used more for internal security than for external war. There are several reasons for such an observation. First, Vietnam's occupation of each country by such a large army definitively overpowers all possible resistant forces. At the same time, the omnipresence of Vietnamese military and civilian personnel in key cities and towns functions as a nationwide intelligence network to monitor any military and political opposition. Any dissenting move can easily be detected and any armed rebellion can be quickly crushed. This capability of Vietnamese troops has been proved by their wiping out of several resistant areas on the Thai-Kampuchean border and of anti-Vietnamese sabotage attempts in Laos and Kampuchea. Thus, Vietnamese troops have already been involved in maintaining Indochinese internal security and will continue to do so.

Second, Vietnam is not a country that desires war beyond the Indochinese border at the present time. China, currently struggling hard for modernization, has no intention of attacking a foreign country unless attacked or threatened with attack. The United States is no longer interested in fighting in Indochina after the Vietnam War. Moreover, the ASEAN nations do not wish to engage in a war against nations in Indochina. Therefore, Hanoi's warnings of war with imperialism or expansionism in Indochina will become merely Vietnam's excuse for keeping its troops on that peninsula.

Third, the experience of the Warsaw Pact Organization shows that the organization has not fought an external war with any potential enemy—NATO or others; but it has effectively smashed the internal uprising and liberalization of two pact nations: Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The system of the special relationship is similar to that of the Warsaw Pact. If the Warsaw Pact's experience is a guide for Vietnam, Hanoi in the future is very likely to use its troops more for internal security in Indochina than for an external war against any expansionist or imperialist.

In addition to the friendship treaty, the periodic conference of the foreign ministers of the three Indochinese states is another institution installed to tighten their special relations. Modeling the conferences of foreign ministers of NATO and ASEAN, the conference of the foreign ministers of Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos was organized in January 1980. It holds its gatherings on a biannual basis:

DATE	*CITY*
January 1980	Phnom Penh
July 1980	Vientiane
January 1981	Ho Chi Minh City
June 1981	Phnom Penh
February 1982	Vientiane
July 1982	Ho Chi Minh City
(February 1983, Vientiane, summit meeting)	
July 1983	Phnom Penh
January 1984	Vientiane
July 1984	Vientiane
January 1985	Ho Chi Minh City
August 1985	Phnom Penh
January 1986	Vientiane
August 1986	Hanoi

Several points should be elaborated upon here. To begin with, the conference was established "to strengthen the militant solidarity" of the three states. Moreover, the meetings have been regularly attended by the three foreign ministers on problems of foreign affairs, but they can be upgraded to a summit meeting of government and party leaders to deal with important issues. The February 1983 meeting is a case in point. It was attended by Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and others on Kampuchea before the Conference of the 101 Nonalignment Nations in India in March 1983. Furthermore, the conference has functioned as one voice for the three Indochinese states on foreign policy. It has made several important proposals, such as agreements on nonaggression between the ASEAN and the Indochinese countries, a demilitarized zone along the Thai-Kampuchean border, the prompt resumption of Sino-Vietnamese negotiations, conditions for a significant withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, and a dialogue between the three Indochinese states and ASEAN. These proposals indicate the growth of the institution as well as an impasse in Sino-Vietnamese and Kampuchean problems.

To summarize, the special relationship is vitalized by the three states' treaties and the conferences of foreign ministers. It is of great political and military significance to Vietnam. First, it provides a formal framework for binding the three states together politically, militarily, and even economically. Second, it offers Vietnam an almost warranted apparatus and legitimacy to control the security of the two other states by force. Third, it establishes bilateral military cooperation, which could be extended into trilateral against external adversaries. Fourth, it serves as a useful forum to transmit Vietnamese foreign policy initiatives into unanimous foreign policies of the three states—a united front strategy. Fifth, and finally, it furnishes Vietnam with a semi-legal basis to limit Kampuchea's and Laos's exercise of sovereignty. Therefore, it is clear that as long as this special relationship remains in force, Vietnam will be able to maintain Brezhnev's doctrine of limited sovereignty over the two other Indochinese states.

Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has emphatically stated that since 1951, the Vietnamese "have never set up the idea of a federation of Indochina." Yet, the development of the special relationship system has demonstrated that Indochina is running virtually under federalism without the name of federation. Its implications to the Sino-Vietnamese relationship are clear and simple: the stronger the special relationship, the weaker Sino-Vietnamese ties.

As of this writing, the postwar Sino-Vietnamese relationship has made little progress. Border clashes flare up from time to time, the Kampuchean issue remains unresolved, and the growth of Soviet influence in Indochina runs unchecked. However, the international situation in the past few years, particularly that between China and the Soviet Union, suggests a gradual, conciliatory trend. Take Sino-Soviet relations, for example. After Brezhnev's three appeals to China in 1982 (March, September, and October) for gradual normalization of their relationship, China responded favorably. Sino-Soviet negotiations have been held semi-annually at the deputy-minister level since October 1982 between Beijing and Moscow. Moreover, both nations' Deputy Premiers Li Peng and Arkhipov have exchanged visits and have concluded several agreements on trade, science, and technology. Further, the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in July 1985 in Geneva signaled the concurrent tendency of change in U.S.-Soviet relations from tensions to gradual relaxation. As a result, Deng Xiaoping stated that the "three obstacles" to Sino-Soviet normalization (4.5 million Soviet troops on the Chinese border, Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea, and the Soviet occupation of Afganistan) could be removed one by one, not all at once as demanded previously. The Soviets also expressed the possibility of withdrawing their troops from the Chinese border in order to reduce tensions. Although the development of such a conciliatory trend has many causes, one common denominator is the need for peaceful economic development within both countries. This trend seems to have had some effects on Vietnam.

In his February 1985 speech marking the 55th anniversary of the Vietnam Communist Party, Le Duan expressed Vietnam's desire to normalize relations with China and other non-communist countries in Asia. He also stated his preference for a "dynamic and flexible" economic program. Soon after, Vietnam proposed several times the resumption of Sino-Vietnamese talks and repeated its decision to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea by 1990. In October 1985, China and Vietnam reportedly held a secret dialogue on trade, cultural, and technological exchanges. In November, China accepted Vietnam as a member of the Beijing trade exhibit in which 26 Asian-Pacific nations participated. Phan Hien, who led the Vietnamese exhibition delegation to Beijing, urged the resumption of Sino-Vietnamese trade. He also foresaw the possibility of normalizing Sino-Vietnamese political ties. Since the death of Le Duan in July 1986, Hanoi's new leadership has continued to express its willingness to improve relations with China and has stopped its annual dry season offensive against Pol Pot's forces. Beijing has not altered its original stand on Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea before negotiations. Nevertheless, Beijing has left the door ajar for limited trade and cultural exchanges with Vietnam.

In 1980, I observed that it would take at least one decade after the border war (1979–1989) to restore Sino-Vietnamese friendship unless there was a drastic change in both leaderships. I am still of that opinion. If the current trend of slowly progressive international conciliation develops into a gradual normalization movement between China and Vietnam, the Sino-Vietnamese friendship may be indeed recovered in that decade. If not, Vietnam will suffer much more than China from the continuing hostility and confrontation.

APPENDIXES

A

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

(July 18, 1977)

The Lao People's Democratic Republic and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,

fully aware that the Laos-Vietnam special relationship, the unshakable militant solidarity and friendship between the people of Laos and Vietnam and the great comradeship between the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and the Communist Party of Vietnam, forged over decades of common struggle waged in sharing joys and sorrows to win victory together over the aggressors, and of cooperation and mutual assistance for the purpose of national construction, constitute a precious tradition, an invincible force of the two peoples and parties, a vivid reality and a law of development of the Lao and Vietnamese revolutions;

considering that to strengthen the indefectible solidarity and long-term cooperation in all fields between Laos and Vietnam responds to the cherished aspiration and vital interests of the people of each country in the defense of national independence and socialist construction and conforms to the interests of real national independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality of the other peoples in Southeast Asia, to the interests of the world's peoples struggling against imperialism and colonialism old and new, for peace, national independence, democracy, and social progress;

reaffirming their loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and their will to continue to uphold the banner of national independence and socialism, closely combine genuine patriotism with proletarian internationalism and do their best to defend and develop the Laos-Vietnam special relationship so that the two countries, already bound together in their national liberation struggle, will be forever bound in their national construction and national defence;

sharing the view that the independent and sovereign line and the correct leadership of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and the Communist Party of

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From *Vientiane Radio*, July 19, 1977, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (also *Daily Report*), July 19, 1977, pp. I8–I11.

Vietnam, the tradition of close solidarity between the two nations, the complete victories of the two countries in their struggle against the imperialist aggressors and their goal of achieving socialism are the bases for developing the Laos-Vietnam special relationship, in the spirit of the Laos-Vietnam joint statement of February 11, 1976;

with a view to strengthening the solidarity, long-term cooperation, and mutual assistance in the cause of national construction and national defence, for the independence and prosperity of each country, thus contributing to defending and strengthening peace in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world;

have decided to sign this treaty and have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1

The two sides undertake to do their best to defend and develop the Laos-Vietnam special relationship, to constantly strengthen solidarity and mutual trust, long-term cooperation, and mutual assistance in all fields in a spirit of proletarian internationalism and on the principles of complete equality, respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity as well as each other's legitimate interests, and of noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

Each side will do its best to carry out its educational work so that all party members and the entire people of its country always treasure, preserve, and foster the Laos-Vietnam special relationship and make it evergreen and everlasting.

ARTICLE 2

Proceeding from the principle that the defence of national independence and the maintenance of national security are the work of the people of each country, the two sides pledge themselves to wholeheartedly support and assist each other and carry out a close cooperation aimed at reinforcing the defence capacity, preserving independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and defending the people's peaceful labor, against all schemes and acts of sabotage by imperialism and foreign reactionary forces.

ARTICLE 3

In order to create mutual advantages, assist each other to overcome difficulties, make the most efficacious use of the material potential of each country to build it into a prosperous country and to build a plentiful and happy life, the two sides will strengthen their relations of socialist cooperation of mutual benefit in agriculture, forestry, industry, communications, and transport, the exploitation of natural resources and other economic fields; wholeheartedly assist each other economically and technically; help each other to train cadres; exchange economic, cultural, scientific, and technical specialists; and broaden the trade relations according to a regime of special privileges.

The two sides will widen scientific and technical exchanges and cooperation in the domains of culture, arts, education, public health, information, press, radio-broadcasting, cinematography, physical culture and sports, and other cultural fields.

The two sides will multiply contacts between the branches concerned of the two countries to discuss the realization of the programs of cooperation and exchange experiences in building the economy and developing culture.

ARTICLE 4

The two sides affirm their determination to see to it that the Laos-Vietnam borders will be frontiers of lasting brotherly friendship between the two countries on the basis of the treaty on delimitating the national borders signed on July 18, 1977, between the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

ARTICLE 5

The two sides strictly respect and fully support each other's independent international policies.

The two sides endeavor to strengthen the militant solidarity and the relations of cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries; together with the socialist countries and the international communist movement, positively contribute to strengthening solidarity and mutual support and assistance on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism; unceasingly strengthen the militant solidarity and long-term cooperation and mutual assistance with fraternal Cambodia on the principle of complete equality, respect of each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and legitimate interests, and of noninterference in each other's internal affairs; support the struggle of the peoples in Southeast Asia for real national independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality, and establish and develop relations of friendship and cooperation with the other countries in this region on the basis of mutual respect of independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, nonaggression and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence; support the struggle of the peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America against imperialism and colonialism, old and new, and racism, for national independence, democracy, and social progress; support the struggle of the working class and other work people in capitalist countries for the right to well-being, democracy, and social progress; they undertake to do their utmost to contribute to the common struggle of the world's peoples for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism.

ARTICLE 6

The two sides will have regular exchanges of views on the questions concerning the relations between the two countries and international problems of common interest through contacts between the party and state leaders and visits of official delegations and special representatives or through the diplomatic channel.

The two sides will encourage the widening of the relations between mass organizations of the two countries. All questions concerning the relations between the two countries will be settled by negotiations in a spirit of mutual understanding and respect and in a fair and reasonable manner.

ARTICLE 7

The present treaty will be ratified and will come into effect at the date of the exchange of the ratification documents which will take place at the earliest time in Hanoi, capital of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

This treaty is valid for 25 years and will be tacitly prolonged every ten years, if neither side notifies the other by writ about its intention to annul it, at least one year before its expiration.

Done in Vietiane, capital of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, on the 18th of July, 1977, in two copies in the Vietnamese and Lao languages, both the Vietnamese and Lao copies being equally valid.

For the Lao People's
Democratic Republic,
Kaysone Phomvihan,
prime minister
(Signed)

For the Socialist Republic
Republic of Vietnam,
Pham Van Dong,
prime minister
(Signed)

B

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (November 3, 1978)

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

proceeding from the close cooperation in all fields in a fraternal spirit, from the unshakable friendship and solidarity between the two countries on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism;

firmly convinced that the endeavor to consolidate the solidarity and friendship between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is in conformity with the basic interests of the two peoples and in the interests of the consolidation of the fraternal friendship and one-mindedness among the countries in the socialist community;

in keeping with the principles and objectives of the socialist foreign policy and the desire to ensure the most favorable international conditions for the building of socialism and communism;

confirming that the signatories to the treaty acknowledge their international obligation to assist each other in the consolidation and preservation of the socialist achievements recorded by the two peoples through their heroic efforts and selfless labor;

determined to work for the unity of all forces struggling for peace, national independence, democracy, and social progress;

expressing their iron-like determination to contribute to the consolidation of peace in Asia and throughout the world, and to the development of good relations and mutually beneficial cooperation among countries with different social systems;

hoping to further develop and perfect the all-round cooperation between the two countries;

From *Radio Hanoi*, VNA, November 3, 1978, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (also *Daily Report*), November 6, 1978, pp. L6–L9.

attaching importance to the continued development and consolidation of the juridical basis of the bilateral relations;

in keeping with the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter;

have resolved to sign this Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

In keeping with the principles of socialist internationalism, the two parties signatory to the present treaty shall continue to consolidate the unshakable friendship and solidarity and assist each other in a fraternal spirit. The two parties shall unceasingly develop political relations and cooperation in all fields and endeavor to assist each other on the basis of respect for each other's national independence and sovereignty, equality and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

ARTICLE 2

The two parties signatory to the present treaty shall join efforts to consolidate and broaden the mutually beneficial cooperation in the economic and scientific-technological fields in order to push forward the building of socialism and communism and to constantly raise the material and cultural standards of the two peoples. The two parties shall continue to coordinate their long-term national economic plans, agree upon long-term measures aimed at developing the most important sectors of the economy, science and technology, and exchange knowledge and experience accumulated in the building of socialism and communism.

ARTICLE 3

The two parties signatory to the treaty shall promote cooperation between their state bodies and mass organizations, and develop broad relations in the fields of science and culture, education, literature and art, press, broadcasting and television, health service, environmental protection, tourism, sports and physical training, and others. The two parties shall encourage the development of contacts between the working people of the two countries.

ARTICLE 4

The two parties signatory to the treaty consistently strive to further consolidate their fraternal relations, and to strengthen the solidarity and one-mindedness among the socialist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism.

The two parties shall do their utmost to consolidate the world socialist system and actively contribute to the development and defence of the socialist gains.

ARTICLE 5

The two parties signatory to the treaty shall continue doing their utmost to contribute to defending world peace and the security of all nations; they shall actively oppose all schemes and maneuvers of imperialism and reactionary forces, support the just struggle for the complete eradication of all forms and colors of colonialism and racism, support the struggle waged by nonaligned countries and the peoples of Asian, African, and Latin American countries against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism, for the consolidation of independence and the defence of sovereignty, for mastery over their natural resources and for the establishment of a new world economic relationship with no inequality, oppression, and exploitation, and support the aspirations of the Southeast Asian peoples for peace, independence, and cooperation among countries in this region.

The two parties shall strive to develop the relations between countries with different social systems on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, for the purpose of broadening and consolidating the process of easing tension in international relations and radically eliminating aggressions and wars of aggression from the life of all nations, for the sake of peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism.

ARTICLE 6

The two parties signatory to the treaty shall exchange views on all important international questions relating to the interests of the two countries.

In case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the two parties signatory to the treaty shall immediately consult each other with a view to eliminating that threat, and shall take appropriate and effective measures to safeguard peace and the security of the two countries.

ARTICLE 7

The present treaty does not concern the two parties rights and obligations stemming from the bilateral or multilateral agreements to which they are signatories and is not intended to oppose any third country.

ARTICLE 8

The present treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall take place in Hanoi as early as possible.

ARTICLE 9

The present treaty shall remain in force for 25 years and thereafter shall automatically extend for periods of ten years if neither signatory party declares its desire to terminate the present treaty by informing the other twelve months before the treaty expires.

Done in duplicate in the Vietnamese and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic, in Moscow, this third day of November 1978.

For the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam:
Le Duan
Pham Van Dong
(Signed)

For the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:
L. I. Brezhnev
A. N. Kosygin
(Signed)

C

Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea (February 18, 1979)

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea,

proceeding from the traditions of Vietnam-Kampuchea militant solidarity and fraternal friendship, which have overcome many trials and become an unbreakable force ensuring the success of each country's national defence and construction;

deeply conscious that the independence, freedom, peace, and security of the two countries are closely interrelated and that the two sides are duty-bound to help each other wholeheartedly and with all their might to defend and consolidate the great revolutionary gains they have recorded through almost 30 years' struggle full of hardships and sacrifices;

affirming that the militant solidarity and the long-term and all-round cooperation and friendship between Vietnam and Kampuchea meet the vital interests of the two peoples and, at the same time, are a factor ensuring a durable peace and stability in Southeast Asia, and are in keeping with the basic interests of the peoples in this region and contribute to the maintenance of world peace;

confident that the Kampuchean people's complete victory under the glorious banner of the National United Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea, the correct line for independence, sovereignty and international solidarity of each country, and respect for each other's legitimate interests constitute a firm basis for the constant development of friendship and cooperation between the two countries;

desirous to strengthen the militant solidarity, the long-term cooperation and friendship and mutual assistance in all fields to consolidate independence, build a prosperous country and a happy life for each people, thus contributing to the maintenance of peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the world, in keeping with

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From *Radio Hanoi*, VNA, February 18, 1979, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, February 22, 1979, pp. K13–K15.

the objectives of the nonaligned countries' movement and the United Nations Charter;

have decided to sign this treaty and have agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE 1

The two sides undertake to do all they can to defend and constantly develop the traditional militant solidarity, friendship and fraternal cooperation between Vietnam and Kampuchea, and mutual trust and assistance in all fields on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and legitimate interests, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality, and mutual benefit.

The two sides shall do all they can to educate the cadre, fighters, and people of their respective countries to preserve the traditional Vietnam-Kampuchea militant solidarity and loyal friendship and make them pure and clear forever.

ARTICLE 2

On the principle that national defence and construction are the cause of each people, the two sides undertake to wholeheartedly support and assist each other in all domains and in all necessary forms in order to strengthen the capacity to defend the independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and peaceful labor of the people in each country against all schemes and acts of sabotage by the imperialist and international reactionary forces. The two sides will take effective measures to implement this commitment whenever one of them requires it.

ARTICLE 3

In order to help each other build a prosperous and powerful country and a happy life free from cold and hunger, the two sides shall strengthen mutually beneficial fraternal exchanges and cooperation and assist each other in the fields of economy, culture, education, public health, science and technology, and in training cadres and exchanging specialists and experience in all fields of national construction.

To attain this objective the two sides will sign necessary agreements and, at the same time, increase contacts and cooperation between the state offices concerned and between mass organizations of both countries.

ARTICLE 4

The two sides undertake to solve through peaceful negotiations all the differences which may arise in the relations between the two countries. The two sides will enter into negotiations to sign a treaty on the delineation of the national frontier between the two countries on the basis of the present borderline with the determination to turn the present border into a border of lasting peace and friendship between the two countries.

ARTICLE 5

The two sides fully respect each other's independent and sovereign line.

They persistently pursue a foreign policy of independence, peace, friendship, cooperation, and nonalignment, on the principle of noninterference in whatever forms in other countries' internal affairs, nonacceptance of any interference in their respective countries' internal affairs, and do not allow any country to use their respective countries' territory to interfere in other countries.

The two sides attach great importance to the longstanding tradition of militant solidarity and fraternal friendship between the Kampuchean, Lao, and Vietnamese peoples, and pledge to do their best to strengthen this traditional relationship on the basis of respect for each country's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. They will strengthen their relations in all fields with the socialist countries. Being countries in Southeast Asia, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea persistently pursue a policy of friendship and good neighborliness with Thailand and the other countries in Southeast Asia, and actively contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity of the Southeast Asian region. The two sides will develop the relations of cooperation with the independent nationalist countries, the national liberation movements, and democratic movements, and resolutely support the struggle of nations for peace, national independence, democracy, and social progress. They will make positive contributions to the solidarity and growth of the nonaligned movement against imperialism and other international reactionary forces, to regain and defend national independence and to advance toward the establishment of a new world eoconmic order.

ARTICLE 6

The two sides will frequently exchange views on the questions concerning the relations between their two countries and other international matters of mutual interest. All problems in the relations between their two countries will be solved through negotiation in the spirit of mutual understanding and respect and with fairness and reason.

ARTICLE 7

This treaty is not aimed at opposing any third country and is not related to the right and obligation of each party to abide by the bilateral and multilateral agreements it engages in.

ARTICLE 8

This treaty shall take effect from the day of the exchange of the ratification letters; the ratification shall be done according to the procedures of each party.

ARTICLE 9

This treaty is valid for 25 years and will be automatically prolonged every ten years if neither of the two signatory parties informs the other by writ one year before the expiration of the treaty about its intention to cancel the treaty. This treaty is done in Phnom Penh, capital of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, on the 18th of February 1979, in the Vietnamese and Khmer languages, which are equally valid.

For the Government of
the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam,
Pham Van Dong,
premier of the government
(Signed)

For the People's
Revolutionary Council of
the People's Republic of
Kampuchea,
Heng Samrin,
president of the People's
Revolutionary Council
(Signed)

APPENDIX D

DATA ON THE POLITBURO MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, (DECEMBER 1978)

Members	*Party Position*	*Government Position*	*Birth Year*	*Education*	*Foreign Training*
Hua Guofeng	Chairman	Premier	1920	Middle school	none
Ye Jianying	Vice-chairman	Chairman, People's Congress	1897	Yunnan Military Academy	none
Deng Xiaoping	Vice-chairman	Deputy premier	1904	College in France, Moscow Sun Yat-sen University	France, USSR
Li Xiannian	Vice-chairman	Deputy premier	1905	Anti-Japanese Military & Political Academy	none
Chen Yun	Vice-chairman	Vice-chairman, People's Congress	1905	Primary school	none
Wang Dongxing	Vice-chairman	Commander, Central Security Regiment	1916	Primary school	none
Wang Zhen		Deputy premier	1908	Primary school	none
Wei Guoqing		Director, General Political Department, PLA	1906	Middle school	none
Ulanhu	United Front Minister	Vice-chairman, People's Congress	1904	Moscow Sun Yat-sen University, Infantry Academy	USSR
Fang Yi		Deputy premier	1916	Whampoa Military Academy	none

APPENDIX D (*continued*)

Members	*Party Position*	*Government Position*	*Birth Year*	*Education*	*Foreign Training*
Deng Yingchao		Vice-chairman People's Congress	1904	Tianjin Normal School	none
Liu Bocheng		Vice-chairman, People's Congress	1893	Soviet Red Army University	USSR
Li Desheng		Commander, Shenyang Military Region	1916	Nanjing Military Academy	none
Xu Shiyou		Commander, Guangzhou Military Region	1906	Anti-Japanese Military & Political Academy	none
Ji Dengkui		Deputy premier	1920	Middle school	none
Su Zhenhua		First political commissar, Navy	1911	Anti-Japanese Military & Political Academy	none
Wu De		Vice-chairman, People's Congress	1909	China University	none
Yu Qiuli		Deputy premier	1914	North Shaanxi Public (middle) School	none
Zhang Tingfa		Commander, Air Force	1916	Air Force Academy	none
Chen Yonggui		Deputy premier	1913	(Little formal education)	none
Chen Xilian		Commander, Beijing Military Region	1913	Red Army Academy	none

Hu Yaobang	Secretary-general		1915	Anti-Japanese Military & Political Academy	none
Geng Biao	External liaison minister	Deputy premier	1909	Whampoa Military Academy, Red Army Academy	none
Nie Rongzhen	Vice-chairman, Military Council		1899	Université du Travail, Belgium Soviet Red Army University	France, Belgium, USSR
Ni Zhifu	Second secretary, Beijing Party Committee		1932	Adult vocational school	none
Xu Xiangqian	Vice-chairman, Military Council	Defense minister	1902	Whampoa Military Academy	none
Peng Chong	Third secretary, Shanghai Party Committee		1915	Middle school	none
Chen Muhua (alternate)		Deputy premier	1921	Jiaotong University	none
Zhao Ziyang (alternate)	First secretary, Sichuan Party Committee		1918	Middle school	none
Seypidin (alternate)		Vice-chairman, People's Congress	1916	Central Asian University, Moscow	USSR

Sources: Renmin Ribao, December 1, 1978 to February 17, 1979, May 5, 1982; *Beijing Review*, nos. 51–52, 1978, and 1–7, 1979; Institute of International Relations, ed., *Chung-kung jen-min lu* [Who's Who in Communist China], (Taipei, 1967); *Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly* (Taipei), 1972–79; *China News Analysis*, 1978–79; *Ming Pao* monthly, 1977–1978; *The Seventies* monthly, 1977–78; Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism*, two vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); Wolfgang Bartke, *Who's Who in the People's Republic of China* (Hamburg: Institute of Asian Affairs, and Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1981); and this author's accumulated data, 1957–1982.

Notes

CHAPTER 1

1. John K. Fairbank and Ssu-yu Teng, *Ch'ing Administration: Three Studies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 107–210. For a case study of traditional China's tributary system with Vietnam, see Truong Buu Lam, "Intervention Versus Tribute in Sino-Vietnamese Relations, 1788–1790," in John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968) pp. 165–79.

2. "Asian Peoples' Wishes Absolutely Cannot Be Ignored," *World Culture*, no. 11 (June 5, 1954): 3.

3. *Nhan Dan*, "Important Voice of the People's Republic of China at the Geneva Conference," in *Vietnam News Agency* (*VNA*), April 29, 1954; *Voice of Vietnam*, "The People's Republic of China," in Tonkinese, April 26, 1954; and Cuu Quoc, "The Vietnamese People Support the Geneva Conference," in *VNA*, May 1, 1954.

4. Mao Zedong, "On Contradiction," *Selected Works*, vol. 1 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 318, 330; Mao Zedong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," *Selected Works*, vol. 4 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), pp. 415, 417; and "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism," *Peking Review* (after 1979, *Beijing Review*), (November 4, 1977).

5. To cite a few: "Soviet-Vietnamese Hegemonism Goes Against the People's Will," *Renmin Ribao*, March 19, 1979; "What Led Up to Sino-Vietnamese Border Conflict?" *Xin-hua*, March 18, 1979; "Facts About Sino-Vietnamese Relations, 1, 2, and 3," *Beijing Review*, nos. 41, 42, 44 (October 12, 19, November 2, 1981); "Greeting Kampuchea's New Coalition Government," *Renmin Ribao*, June 25, 1982.

6. See Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), chap. 9.

7. Consult Charles F. Hermann, *International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research* (New York: The Free Press, 1972).

8. Although these six components and ratings are constructed for Chinese crisis analysis, they can also be employed to analyze U.S. involvement in military-diplomatic crises. Take the Vietnam War, for example: (1) manpower in forces: 543,400, H_3; (2) kinds of force: ground, air force, and navy, H_2; (3) weaponry: advanced conventional, H_2; (4) duration: 1964–1973, H_3; (5) casualties: 57,000, H_3; (6) mobilization: national, H_3. The average level is H_3. This analysis is acceptable and similar to that in Table 1.1. For the discussion on some components, see Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), chap. 7. For some numbers on the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, see George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975* (New York: John Wiley, 1979), chaps. 6–8.

9. The sources are arranged under each crisis heading:

(1) The Korean War: Alexander L. George, "Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea," in Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, chaps. 7 and 9; *New York Times* (*NYT*), January 8, 23, 28, 1954.

(2) The Indochina War: Allan B. Cole, ed., *Conflict in Indochina and International Repercussions: A Documentary History, 1945–1955* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956); King C. Chen, *Vietnam and China, 1938–1954* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), chap. 5; *NYT*, March 27, 1952; *Le Monde*, November 10, 1952.

(3 and 4) Quemoy and Matsu (1954, 1958): Tang Tsou, "Mao's Limited War in the Taiwan Strait," *Orbis* 3, no. 3 (Fall 1959); Harold C. Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), chap. 10; *NYT*, September 8, 1954; August 24, September 14, 19, 1958; February 25, 1959; *Washington Post*, September 3, October 14, 1958.

(5 and 6) Indian Border Wars (1959, 1962): Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (New York: Doubleday, 1972), chaps. 4–5; John E. Coon, "The PLA and the Chinese Power Abroad," in William W. Whitson, ed., *The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970's* (New York: Praeger, 1972); *NYT*, August 29, October 24, November 15, 1959; October 27, November 13, 1962.

(7) The Vietnam War: Donald S. Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi* (New York: Pegasus, 1967), chaps. 3, 4, 5; King C. Chen, "Hanoi vs. Peking: Policies and Relations," *Asian Survey* (September 1972); Hoang Van Hoan, "Distortion of Facts About Militant Friendship Between Viet Nam and China Is Impermissible," *Beijing Review*, no. 49 December 7, 1979; *NYT*, July 31, 1979.

(8) Soviet Border War: Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute," *American Political Science Review* 66, no. 4 (December 1972); *Renmin Ribao* and *Jiefangjun Bao*, March 4, 1969; *The Economist* (March 22, 1969); *Le Monde*, April 14, 1969; *NYT*, March 8, 17, 1969.

10. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign*

Policy, p. 185; Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, pp. 122, 164. The Chinese casualties were high because their troops adopted "human waves" tactics against U.S. firepower. Apart from 14,207 prisoners of war who chose to go to Taiwan, the figure of the casualties is an estimate (*NYT*, January 23, 28, 1954).

11. The number of Chinese communist troops facing the offshore islands varies from source to source. The Nationalists on Taiwan estimated 200,000 troops at the height of the crisis and 300,000 in early 1959. Washington estimated 128,000 troops deployed in the same area in 1958. Approximately 300–500 guns were used for intensified shellings. The Nationalists never returned the fire. Limited air force activities were involved, but after the Nationalist planes shot down ten PRC planes on September 24 in addition to the previous six, the air force conflict subsided. Casualities on the Nationalist side were heavy, including a couple of generals and hundreds of civilians. The number of the PRC casualties was never announced (*Washington Post*, September 3, 1958; *NYT*, August 24, 29, September 14, 19, 25, October 24, November 9, 1958; February 25, 1959).

12. The 1959 conflict was a clash between the border guards for only two days, whereas the 1962 war was a Chinese invasion into the disputed area on the Indian side. The Indian Army estimated six Chinese divisions (approximately 72,000 men) actually fighting in India. U.S. sources reported about 100,000. India suffered 1,383 men killed, 1,696 missing, and 3,968 captured. The number of Chinese casualties was estimated to be 300–400 killed and possibly 1,000–1,500 wounded. However, no Chinese soldier was captured. Sources include Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, pp. 455–56; *NYT*, October 24, December 16, 1959; October 27–28, November 13, 1962; *Christian Science Monitor* (*CSM*), June 17, 1963; Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1975), p. 149.

13. The first conflict (March 2) lasted about thirty minutes, the second (March 15) lasted about nine hours. In the two conflicts, the Soviets lost about 80 men, including the border commander, Colonel D. I. Leonov. The Chinese lost about 900. But Beijing, as well as Moscow, exploited the incidents through propaganda and mobilization for at least one month. In China's case, the military did it probably for Lin Biao's political ambition. In the April Party Congress, Lin was "elected" the successor to Mao, as written in the party constitution. Consult Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute;" *Peking Review*, nos. 10–12 (March 7, 14, 21, 1969); *NYT*, March 9, 14, 17, 21, 1969.

14. Hoang Van Hoan, "Distortion of Facts," p. 17; *NYT*, July 31, 1979, p. 9. The 320,000 Chinese army personnel in Vietnam from 1965 to 1971 included anti-aircraft artillerymen, engineers, road builders, railway and bridge workers, and logistics personnel. They were mainly "engineers-soldiers," in Chinese terms. The number could well have been the total personnel for six years. This author's interviews in Saigon in July and August 1972 with military personnel of South Vietnam and from Taiwan, together with other reports, indicate that the Chinese army personnel could have been on a one-year rotation duty in Vietnam and maintained at an average number of 50,000.

15. A. Doak Barnett, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979), p. 18.

16. Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics*, p. 225.

CHAPTER 2

1. Although the origin of the cold war has been a subject of controversy and debate, the date of its inception has been generally agreed upon as late 1946—a few months before the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 and the statement of Bernard Baruch in April 1947 that "we are in the midst of a cold war." See Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).

2. The term, "Viet-Minh," will be used here throughout the period of the Indochina War.

3. Marcel Ner, "Le Viet-Nam et la Chine de 1945 à 1953," *Les Temps Moderns* (Paris) 9, no. 93/94 (August–September 1953): 382.

4. *New China News Agency* (*NCNA*), November 19, 1949.

5. As of 1986, among all the documents and materials available from China and Vietnam, Hoang Van Hoan's long article on Sino-Vietnamese relations carries more inside information. It also clears up several controversial points. Hoan, the first Vietnamese ambassador to Beijing and a former Politburo member of the Vietnamese Workers' (Communist) Party, defected to China in July 1979 in disagreement with Le Duan's policy. He lives in Beijing. On June 26, 1980, the Vietnamese authorities staged an absentee trial of Hoan and sentenced him to death. For Hoan's article, see "Distortion of Facts About Militant Friendship Between Viet Nam and China Is Impermissible," *Beijing Review*, no. 49 (December 7, 1979): 11–23. See also "More on Hanoi's White Book," *Beijing Review*, no. 48 (November 30, 1979): 11. During the period of 1950–1954, Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong and the *New York Times* (*NYT*) also carried useful but less dependable reports. Earlier works on Sino-Vietnamese relations include, among others, Philippe Devillers, *Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 à 1952* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952); Joseph Buttinger, *The Small Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958); Ellen J. Hammer, *The Struggle for Indochina* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954); Bernard B. Fall, *The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964); Hoang Van Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964); P. J. Honey, *Communism in North Vietnam: Its Role in the Sino-Soviet Dispute* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963); Donald Lancaster, *The Emancipation of French Indochina* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961); and King C. Chen, *Vietnam and China, 1938–1954* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969).

6. For details, see Chen, *Vietnam and China*, pp. 260–63.

7. *NCNA*, August 20, 1950.

8. *Vietnam News Agency* (*VNA*), North Vietnam, in English, November 27, 1950; Hoang Van Hoan, "Distortion of Facts," p. 12.

9. Xiao Yang, *Vietnam in Liberation* (Shanghai: Chung Lien, 1951), p. 71.

10. Hanson W. Baldwin in *NYT*, March 27, 1952.

11. *Le Monde*, November 10, 1952.

12. Commentators of *Renmin Ribao* and *Xinhua*, "Sino-Vietnamese Relations During Viet Nam's Anti-French, Anti-American Struggle," in *Beijing Review*, "More on Hanoi's White Book," p. 11.

13. Hoang Van Hoan, "Distortion of Facts," p. 12.

14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, *The Truth About Viet Nam–China Relations Over the Last 30 Years* (Hanoi, 1979), p. 11 (hereafter, *White Book*—a title used by Vietnam itself).

15. For a meticulous discussion on the Geneva Conference, see Robert F. Randle, *Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). The conference had two issues on the agenda: Korea and Indochina. The discussion on Korea began on April 26 and discontinued on June 15 because of a deadlock. The discussion on Indochina began on May 8 and ended on July 20. See also Henri-Eugène Navarre, *Agonie de l'Indochine (1953–1954)*, (Paris: Plon, 1956), p. 210f.

16. Hoang Van Hoan, "Distortion of Facts," p. 14.

17. Anthony Eden, *Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 145.

18. *Times* (London), *Le Monde*, and *Manchester Guardian*, June 17, 1954.

19. *NYT*, June 24, 1954.

20. These five principles are: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) nonaggression; (3) nonintervention in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence.

21. Eden, *Full Circle*, p. 158.

22. *Radio Beijing*, in English, July 7, 1954, *Renmin Ribao* and *Radio Beijing*, July 19, 1954.

23. Ho Chi Minh, *Selected Works*, vol. 4 (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), p. 17.

24. *NCNA*, Beijing, August 3, 1954. Dong's speech was delivered at a reception at the Vietnamese embassy in Beijing in his honor on his way home from Geneva.

25. Hoang Van Hoan, "Distortion of Facts," p. 12. Hoang Van Chi, who joined the Viet-Minh resistance war, is one of the few writers who mentioned Lo Kwei-po (Luo Guibo). He mistook Lo's political mission for a military group. See his book, *From Colonialism to Communism*, pp. 63–65. Hoang Van Hoan's version is the accurate account.

26. *White Book*, Part 2.

27. Hoang Van Hoan, "Distortion of Facts," pp. 13–14.

28. Consult King C. Chen, *Vietnam and China*, pp. 279–95.

29. I was pleased to learn that many findings in my previous study on Hanoi's major decisions to escalate the Vietnam War were confirmed by Hoang Van Hoan's

1979 article. See King C. Chen, "Hanoi's Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam War," *Political Science Quarterly* 90, no. 2 (Summer 1975): 239–59.

30. William E. Griffith, *Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964–1965* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967), pp. 66–67.

31. These five items are summarized from the following sources: "Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on 'United Action,'" *Peking Review* (November 12, 1965); Edward Crankshaw's report in *The Observer* (London), November 14, 1965; *Radio Moscow*, Domestic Service, February 12, 1967.

32. *Peking Review* (November 12, 1965). Liao Chengzhi, Director of the Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs and Chairman of the Chinese-Japanese Friendship Association, revealed in mid-July that the Soviet proposal to build an air base in Yunnan had been rejected. See Liao's interview, Tokyo Domestic Television, July 15, 1965. Hoang Van Hoan reported that before Beijing's rejection, Zhou Enlai flew to Hanoi for consultation. See Hoan, "Distortion of Facts," p. 18.

33. *Radio Paris*, December 6, 1975.

34. *Radio Moscow*, November 27, 1965; Aledsandr N. Shelepin's speech in Hanoi, *VNA*, January 9, 1966. For the Japanese communist delegation's argument, see Kikuzo Ito and Minoru Shibata, "The Dilemma of Mao Tse-tung," *China Quarterly* (July–September 1968): 59–60.

35. Lin Biao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" *Peking Review* (September 3, 1965); Zhou Enlai's statement on the Vietnam War, *Peking Review*, no. 20, (May 13, 1966): p. 5; *Peking Review* (November 12, 1965); Beverly Deepe, "How Hanoi Looks at Negotiating," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 9, 1968, p. 14; Anna Louise Strong, *Letters from China*, nos. 21–30. (Peking: New World Press, 1965), p. 165; "More on Hanoi's White Book," *Beijing Review*, p. 13; Hoang Van Hoan, "Distortion of Facts," pp. 16–19, and *NYT*, July 31, 1979, p. 9.

36. *Radio Hanoi*, *VNA*, June 19, 1966.

37. "New Instruction on the Guangxi Problem," issued by the Central Committee of the CCP, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Committee, June 13, 1968; and Zhou Enlai's telephone instruction of June 19, 1968 in *Liuzhou Gung Zhun* [Headquarters of Liuzhou Labor Federation; Liuzhou Revolutionary Rebellious Forces, Guangxi], July 12, 1968, p. 1. "Instruction," July 3, 1968, issued by the same central government, in *Zhong Xieh Hong Wei* [High School Red Guards; Revolutionary Alliance of High School Red Guards, Canton], late July, 1968, p. 1.

38. *Chung-yang, Chung-yang Wen-ke Shou-chang Chieh-chien Guangxi Lai-ching Hsüeh-hsi te Liang-pai Ch'un-chung-tzu-chih Pu-feng Tung-chih ho Chün-tui Pu-feng Kan-pu Shih te Chung-yao Chih-shih* [Important instructions given by the leaders of the Central Government and the Central Cultural Revolution at the meeting with some of the comrades of two Guangxi mass organizations and some cadres of the military who came to Beijing for learning], (Guangxi: Office of the Guangxi Learning Class of Mao Zedong's Thought, August 3, 1968), pp. 1–16. The meeting was held on July 25, 1968 in People's Hall, Beijing. The leaders

at the meeting included Zhou Enlai, Chen Bota, Kang Sheng, Yao Wenyuan (one of the Gang of Four), and others.

39. From 1965 to 1971, a comparison of Soviet and Chinese aid is shown in the following table (in million U.S. dollars):

	1965	*1966*	*1967*	*1968*	*1969*	*1970*	*1971*
Soviet aid	295	510	705	530	370	420	415
Military	(210)	(360)	(505)	(290)	(120)	(75)	(100)
Economic	(85)	(150)	(200)	(240)	(250)	(345)	(315)
Chinese Aid	110	170	225	200	195	150	175
Military	(60)	(95)	(145)	(100)	(105)	(90)	(75)
Economic	(50)	(75)	(80)	(100)	(90)	(60)	(100)

Sources: Estimates of the State Department, April 1972.

40. "Joint Communiqué of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and the Central Committe of the Viet Nam Workers' Party and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," *Jenmin Jih-pao*, March 11, 1971; *Peking Review* (March 12, 1971).

41. *Nhan Dan*, March 3, 1972.

42. *United States Foreign Policy, 1971: A Report of the Secretary of State*, Publication 8634 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, March 1972), p. 71.

43. Editorial of *Renmin Ribao*, January 28, 1973.

44. Hoang Van Hoan, "Distortion of Facts," p. 19.

45. Van Tien Dung, *Our Great Spring Victory* (New York: Monthly Review, 1977), pp. 17, 19–20; *NYT*, March 25, and July 11, 1975.

46. *White Book*, part 3, the 1965–1969, 1969–1973, 1973–1975 periods.

47. "More on Hanoi's White Book," *Beijing Review*, pp. 13–15; Hoang Van Hoan, "Distortion of Facts," pp. 14–19. Also consult Prince Norodom Sihanouk, *War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 24.

48. Leonid Brezhnev, "The Decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress Are a Militant Program of Activity for the Trade Unions," *Pravda*, March 21, 1972, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (*CDSP*), April 19, 1972, pp. 1–9.

49. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Moscow's Afghan Gamble," *The New Leader*, January 28, 1980, p. 7; and "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," *Problems of Communism*, May–June 1980, p. 18.

50. For the development of American-Soviet cooperation and competition, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, "How the Cold War Was Played," *Foreign Affairs* (October 1972).

51. See Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, "For Strengthening the Solidarity of Communists for a New Upswing in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," *Pravda*, March 28,

1972, in *CDSP*, April 26, 1972, pp. 22–23; O. Borisov, "For Peace and Security in Asia," *New Times* (September 1971); V. Kudryavtsev, "Problems of Collective Security in Asia," *International Affairs* (Moscow), (December 1973); Pavlovskiy, "Collective Security in Asia," *Radio Moscow*, May 13, 1972, August 7, 1973, and December 17, 1974; and TASS Commentary, "Asian Collective Security System," July 21, 1975. For Western observations, see Howard M. Hensel, "Asian Collective Security: The Soviet View," *Orbis* (Winter, 1976): 1564–80; and Avigdor Haselkorn, "Impact of Sino-Japanese Treaty on the Soviet Security Strategy," *Asian Survey* (June 1979): 558–73.

52. *Peking Review*, no. 40 (October 3, 1975): p. 11.

53. For Soviet interests in Southeast Asia, see Donald S. Zagoria and Sheldon W. Simon, "Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia," in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., *Soviet Policy in East Asia* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 153–73. Also Douglas Pike, "The USSR and Vietnam," in Robert H. Donaldson, ed., *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1981), pp. 251–66.

54. *NYT*, May 22, 1975, p. 5.

55. On February 24, 1977, Vice-Premier Li Xiannian told Vietnamese vice-minister Nguyen Tranh that the interference and sabotage by the Gang of Four and the natural calamities in 1976 had caused many difficulties to the Chinese National economy. China therefore was "in no position to provide new aid to the Vietnamese comrades." In March of the same year, Pham Van Dong replied to Li of Dong's "understanding of the matter." See "Memorandum on Vice-Premier Li Xiannian's Talks With Premier Pham Van Dong," *Beijing Review* (March 30, 1979), p. 22 (hereafter, "Memorandum on Li Xiannian's Talks").

56. *NYT*, February 1, 1976, p. 9.

57. The formal name for Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, was changed to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in July 1976.

58. Le Duan, "Outline of the Draft Political Report of the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Workers' Party to the Fourth Party Congress" (hereafter, Political Report), *Viet Nam Courier*, no. 55 Special Issue, (December 1976): 1–28.

59. André Gelinas, "Life in the New Vietnam," *New York Review of Books*, March 17, 1977, p. 25.

60. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (*FEER*), August 24, 1979, p. 22, and January 4, 1980, p. 9; *Southeast Asia Record*, December 12–20, 1979.

61. Huang Hua's speech on foreign policy dated July 30, 1977, in King C. Chen, ed., *China and the Three Worlds* (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1979), p. 270.

62. The author's interview with Chinese refugee, Mr. Lo, in Hong Kong, March 27, 1979. Mr. Lo left Guangxi in 1978.

63. *Viet Nam Courier* (December 1977): 22. In its November 25, 1977 issue, *Peking Review* carried some materials of Duan's welcome, meetings, and speeches, but no departure information.

64. *Wen Wei* (Hui) *Pao* (Hong Kong), May 30, 1978.

65. *NYT*, June 9, 1978, p. A6. Deng explained that this was China's first move against Vietnam after Vietnam had made the eleventh move against China.

66. *VNA*, July 15, 1978.

67. On July 7, 1978, Albania's *Zeri I Populit* criticized China for its rapprochement with the United States and its three-world theory. Six days later, China ended its aid to Albania and withdrew its aid personnel in mid-July. For China's position on the Albanian issue, see Huang Hua's speech of July 1977, in Chen, *China and the Three Worlds*, pp. 274–79.

68. *NYT*, July 11, 1978, p. A6; August 8, 1978, p. A3.

69. Agence Français de Presse (*AFP*), Bangkok, August 16, 1978.

70. "To View the Soviet Strategy from Vietnam's Anti-Chinese Campaign," *Hongqi* (Red Flag), no. 8, (1978): 102–03.

71. *Radio Hanoi*, November 3, 1978, Appendix B.

72. *Nhan Dan*, November 4 and 21, 1978; *Tap Chi Cong San*, no. 11 (November 1978); *Radio Hanoi*, November 7 and 22, 1978.

73. *Renmin Ribao*, November 9, 13–16, 1978; *Peking Review*, no. 46 (November 17, 1978): 24; no. 47 (November 24, 1978): 22–24.

74. *AFP*, Hanoi, March 29, 1979. Informed SRV sources confirmed Soviet warships in Cam Ranh Bay and said, "Between friendly countries, it is normal."

75. John F. Cady, *Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), pp. 103–06; Mark Mancall, "The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay," in John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 68.

76. Norodom Sihanouk, *My War with the CIA* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), pp. 202–03.

77. King C. Chen, "Relations with Third World and 'Intermediate Zone' Countries," in Yuan-li Wu, ed., *China: A Handbook* (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 373–90.

78. *Remin Ribao*, November 22, 1963, p. 1.

79. Michael Leifer, *Cambodia: The Search for Security* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 155.

80. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Democratic Kampuchea, *Black Paper*; reprinted (New York: 1978), pp. 20–51.

81. John F. Cady, *Southeast Asia*, pp. 105–06; Michael Leifer, *Cambodia: The Search for Security*, pp. 21–23. Melvin Gurtov, *China and Southeast Asia—The Politics of Survival* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1971), pp. 49–54.

82. Milton E. Osborne, *The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia: Rule and Response* (1859–1905), (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp. 9–12.

83. Stephen P. Heder, "The Kampuchean-Vietnamese Conflict," in David W.

P. Elliot, ed., *The Third Indochina Conflict* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), p. 23.

84. "The Birth of the Viet Nam Labor Party Is a Great Political Victory," *Voice of South Vietnam*, March 13 and 14, 1951.

85. *FEER*, August 19, 1977, p. 12.

86. Norodom Sihanouk, *War and Hope*, p. 17.

87. Ibid.

88. Sydney H. Schanberg, "Evacuation Convoy to Thailand—Arduous Trip Through the Secret Cambodia," *NYT*, May 9, 1975, p. 14.

89. Sihanouk, *War and Hope*, p. 96.

90. Joseph Zasloff and Paul Langer, *North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970); and Joseph Zasloff, *The Pathet Lao Leadership and Organization* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973).

91. "Joint Communiqué" between China and Kampuchea, in *Peking Review*, no. 34 (August 22, 1975): pp. 6–8.

92. Sihanouk, *War and Hope*, p. 21.

93. John Barron and Anthony Paul, *Murder of a Gentle Land* (New York: Reader's Digest, distributed by Thomas Y. Crowell, 1977). For an accusation of U.S. crime in the destruction of Kampuchea, see William Shawcross, *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979). In an interview with Ieng Sary, then deputy premier and foreign minister of Democratic Kampuchea, on September 27, 1980 in New York (hereafter, Ieng Sary's interview), I asked Ieng Sary how many people had died under the Pol Pot regime during 1975–1978. He replied, "little more than 100,000." The figure he gave is, of course, well below the publicly reported one.

94. Ieng Sary's interview.

95. Sihanouk, *War and Hope*, p. 86.

96. Ibid., p. 80.

97. Ieng Sary's interview. A similar account is also given by Henry Kamm, "Cambodian Communist Concedes Ousted Regime Committed Errors," *NYT*, February 29, 1980, p. A1. For a general review of the Cambodian situation, see Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, "The Passion of Kampuchea," *Problems of Communism*, January–February 1979, pp. 28–44.

98. Sihanouk, *War and Hope*, p. 18.

99. As disclosed by Hoang Tung, Central Committee member of the Vietnam Communist Party and director of *Nhan Dan*. *AFP* (Paris), September 7, 1978, in *FBIS*, Asian-Pacific, September 8, 1978, pp. K2–K3.

100. Huang Hua's speech, in Chen, ed., *China and the Three Worlds*, pp. 269–70. Geng Biao's secret report of January 16, 1979 on Indochina, in *Chung-kung yen-chiu* [Studies on Chinese Communism], (Taipei), October 15, 1980, p. 146. Stephen P. Heder, "The Kampuchean-Vietnamese Conflict" in David W. P. Elliot, ed., *The Third Indochina Conflict*, p. 41.

101. Le Duan, "Political Report," pp. 23–24.

102. *Viet Nam Courier* (August 1977): 1–4.

103. *NYT*, September 30, 1977, p. A5.

104. *Black Paper*, p. 75.

105. Ibid., pp. 77–79; *White Book*, p. 47; *NYT*, December 25, 31, 1977; January 2–6, 9, 10, and 17, 1978.

106. William S. Turley and Jeffrey Race, "The Third Indochina War," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1980): 98.

107. Quyet Tien, "The Chinese Powerholders Are Supporting the Genocidal Fascist Clique in Kampuchea," *Tap Chi Cong San*, no. 8 of 1978, in *FBIS*, September 13, 1978, p. K10. For other Hanoi accusations, *Radio Hanoi*, May 25, October 3, 14, 19, November 1, 12, 1978; and *Nhan Dan*, July 15, November 12, 1978.

108. Ho Yen-sheng, *Kung-tang chih-hsia ssu-nien ti Yuehnan* [South Vietnam: four years under Communism], (Taipei: Time Cultural Publishing, 1979), p. 67. Ho, a Chinese journalist, worked and lived in northern and southern Vietnam from 1945 to 1979.

109. *Nhan Dan*, December 3, 1978. *Radio Hanoi*, October 9, 18, 19, 23–25, 31; November 12; and December 3, 1978.

110. Ieng Sary said: "Without the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty, Vietnam wouldn't dare" to invade Phnom Penh and overthrow the Pol Pot regime (Ieng Sary's interview).

111. *Washington Post*, September 2, 1978; *Beijing Review* (November 24, 1978): 23.

112. *Radio Hanoi*, November 12, 1978.

113. *Radio Phnom Penh*, November 12, 1978.

114. Geng Biao's report, in *Studies on Chinese Communism*, pp. 150–52.

115. *AFP* (Beijing), January 6, 1979, in *FBIS* (PRC), January 8, 1979, p. A5.

116. *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, January 13, 1979, in *FBIS*, Asian-Pacific, January 16, 1979, p. K1.

117. *Bangkok Post*, "All Eyes on Us to See How We Cope," January 23, 1979, p. 6.

118. *NYT*, January 10, 1979, p. A8; January 12, 1979, p. A1; January 13, 1979, p. 1.

119. "Text of the Vietnamese-Kampuchean Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation," *Hanoi Radio*, February 18, 1979, in *FBIS*, February 22, 1979, p. K14, Appendix C.

CHAPTER 3

1. "How Did the Sino-Vietnamese Border Dispute Come About?" *Beijing Review*, no. 21 (May 25, 1979): 19. The Vietnamese put the number of border markers (border stones) at "over 310." See "Memorandum of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Chinese Provocations and Territorial Encroachments," *Hanoi Radio*, March 16, 1979, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (*FBIS*), March 19, 1979, p. K14 (hereafter, "SRV Memorandum").

2. For the French text of "Convention relative à la délimitation de la frontière entre la Chine et le Tonkin, signée à Pékin le 26 juin 1887," see Clive Parry, ed., *The Consolidated Treaty Series*, vol. 169, 1887 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1978), pp. 345–47. Also consult "The Truth About the Sino-Vietnamese Boundary Question," *Beijing Review*, no. 21 (May 25, 1979): 16. "SRV Memorandum" does not specifically mention the division of the red line. Related materials can also be found in *Chung-Fa Yueh-nan chiao-she tang* [Archives on the Sino-French negotiations on Vietnam], vol. 7 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1962).

3. *Beijing Review* (May 25, 1979): 16, 22; "SRV Memorandum," pp. K14, K20–K21.

4. The dispute over Tiao-yu T'ai (the Senkaku Islands) between China and Japan broke out in the early 1970s. At that time, thousands of Chinese in the United States, Hong Kong, and other countries demonstrated enthusiastically against Japan's claims to ownership of the islands; they argued for China's ownership historically. Both Beijing and Taipei governments strongly supported the Chinese move. Before the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1978 was signed, Beijing softened its stand against Japan, including putting off the Tiao-yu T'ai issue in order to attract Japan to conclude the anti-hegemonic treaty. In August 1980, China was reported to have agreed with Japan to a joint project of exploration of oil and gas around the islands. A compromise on the issue, whether favorable or unfavorable to China, eventually may be worked out.

5. The major findings were made by K. O. Emery and officials of CCOP, UN ECAFE (Committee for the Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas, UN Economic Commission of Asia and Far East) in 1968–1970 with the cooperation of the U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office and geologists sent by the Japanese, South Korean, and Chinese Nationalist governments. Emery and others made a series of reports, including K. O. Emery et al., "Geological Structure and Some Water Characteristics of the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea," CCOP *Technical Bulletin*, UN ECAFE (Bangkok, May 1969); Maurice Mainguy, "Regional Geology and Petroleum Prospects of the Marine Shelves of Eastern Asia," ibid. (May 1970); M. L. Parke, K. O. Emery et al., "Structural Framework of the Continental Margin in the South China Sea," ibid. (June 1971); and K. O. Emery and Zvi ben-Avraham, "Structure and Stratigraphy of the China Basin," ibid. (July 1972). Also Jan-Olaf Willums, "China's Offshore Oil: Application of a Framework for Evaluating Oil and Gas Potentials Under Uncertainty" (Ph.D. diss., M.I.T., September 1975); and Selig S. Harrison, *China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead?* (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1977), chap. 3. For China's policy on petroleum production and trade, see King C. Chen, "China's Oil Policy," *The Yale Review*, Autumn 1976, pp. 1–13.

6. Jan-Olaf Willums, "China's Offshore Oil," pp. 273, 279, 281, and Table 8-2.

7. Harrison, *China, Oil, and Asia*, pp. 193–94.

8. *Wall Street Journal*, April 28, 1981, p. 35.

9. *Washington Post*, October 27, 1974, p. A17; and the *Christian Science Monitor*, February 20, 1975, p. 6.

10. Shih Ti-tsu, "South China Sea Islands, Chinese Territory Since Ancient Times," *Peking Review*, no. 50 (December 12, 1976): 10.

11. Harrison, *China, Oil, and Asia*, p. 192.

12. For a legal study of the islands, see Hungdah Chiu and Choon-Ho Park, "Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands," *Ocean Development and International Law Journal* 3, no. 1 (1975): 1–28. For a more detailed discussion of the dispute, see Chang Pao-min, "The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute," *Asia Pacific Community*, no. 8 (Spring 1980): 130–65.

13. Friederick Hirth and W. W. Rockhill (translated from the Chinese and annotated), *Chau Ju-kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, entitled Chu-fan-chi* (St. Petersburg: Printing Office of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1911), p. 176. Chau Ju-kua (Zhou Ergua) was inspector of foreign trade in Fukien Province during the Southern Sung Dynasty (1127–1274).

14. Ibid., p. 185.

15. Chen Pang-chan (Ming dynasty), *Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo* [The chronicles of the Sung Dynasty], Book 3 (Beijing: reprinted by Chung-hua shu-chü, 1977), pp. 1176–77. The Kingdom of Cham was on the east coast of today's Vietnam. It reached its peak in the seventh and eighth centuries but was absorbed by Annam in 1471. The Mongols invaded Champa in 1282.

16. "Shih Pi chuan" [Biography of Shih Pi] in *Yuan shih* (Shanghai: Kai-ming shu-tien, 1934), pp. 382–83/6508–09. In the interpretation of Hirth and Rockhill, "Chien-li Ch'ang-sha," "Ch'i-li Yang," and "Ch'i-chou Yang" are only different names for the Paracel Islands. Hirth and Rockhill, *Chau Ju-kua*, pp. 176, 185.

17. "Cheng Ho chuan" [Biography of Cheng Ho], *Ming shih* (Shanghai: Kai-ming shu-tien, 1934), pp. 755/7841. Two of Cheng Ho's staff, Fei Hsin and Ma Huan, also wrote books about their expeditions. See Fei Hsin, *Hsing-cha sheng-lan* [An overall review of foreign land in the sea] annotated by Feng Ch'eng-chün (Shanghai: reprinted by Shang-wu, 1938); and Ma Huan, *Ying-yai sheng-lan* [An overall review of the ocean shores], annotated by Feng Ch'eng-chün (Shanghai: reprinted by Shang-wu, 1935).

For the reports on Ming coins, see Cheng Tzu-yüeh, *Nan-hai chu-tao ti-li chih-lüeh* [A brief description of the islands in the South Sea], (Shanghai: Shang-wu ying-shu kuan, 1947), pp. 74–75. Also "Statement" by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, February 1974, in *Lien-ho pao* [United Daily News], February 25, 1974, p. 3. According to this statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the coins were found by Professor Wang Kuang from Kwangtung who accompanied the Chinese warships in April 1947 to survey the Paracels. Wang found several kinds of Chinese coins on Rocky Island: Kai-yuan t'ung-pao (Tang dynasty:

618–906), Hung-wu t'ung-pao, and Yung-lo t'ung-pao (both Ming dynasty). The statement also said that previously Japanese fishermen had also found Chinese coins on the Paracels. Wang Mang coins (Hsin dynasty: 8–23 A.D.) were the oldest, and Yung-lo t'ung-pao coins were the largest in quantity.

18. Mao Yuan-yi, *Wu-pei chi* [Records of military affairs], vol. 240 (1621), p. 11, reprinted in Xiang Ta, *Cheng Ho hang-hai t'u* [Map of Cheng Ho's navigation], (Beijing: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1961), pp. 40–41.

19. See the identification by Hirth and Rockhill, *Chau Ju-kua*, p. 185, note 4. Also Cheng Tzu-yüeh, *A Brief Description*, p. 75.

20. Ly Quy Don (1726–1784), *Phu Bien Tap Luc*, cited in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Vietnam's Sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes* (hereafter, *Hoang Sa and Truong Sa*), (Hanoi: 1979), pp. 14–15. Hanoi's translation of this historical evidence (from its original text to English) avoided using such words as swords, coins, ivory, and china. These words are translated by the author.

21. *Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien*, chap. 52, cited in *Hoang Sa and Truong Sa*, pp. 16–17.

22. Ibid., pp. 20–21, 24–25.

23. Chiu and Park, "Legal Status," p. 11.

24. In 1938, after the Sino-French dispute over the archipelagoes occurred, China asserted that according to the 1887 convention the Paracels and the Spratlies belonged to China. See ibid., pp. 12–13.

25. The Japanese merchants, more than 100 in a group, occupied the Pratas Islands for two years collecting guano and engaging in fishing industry. The Chinese government finally was able to demand them to leave through diplomatic negotiations.

26. Cheng Tzu-yüeh, *A Brief Description*, pp. 70–73.

27. Shen Peng-fei, *Tiao-chia Hsisha ch'ün-tao pao-cao shu* [A report of the investigation of the Paracels], (Canton: n.p., 1928), pp. 1–113. This report also contains 38 photographs of the team members and of the Paracels, and four very detailed maps. The team was composed of 25 members. It took them 16 days (May 22 to June 6, 1928) to complete the investigation. When they were on the Paracels, they found no other people there, except a few Hainan fishermen and their boats.

28. Vietnamese historical records were discussed earlier in this chapter.

29. Hsu Kung-su, "The Incident of French Occupation of Nine Small Islands," *Wai-chiao p'ing-lun* [Diplomatic Review], (September 1933): 13–14, 21.

30. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, "China's Indisputable Sovereignty Over the Xisha and Nansha Islands," *Beijing Review* (February 18, 1980): 18.

31. *France-Asie*, November–December 1951, cited in *Hoang Sa and Truong Sa*, p. 42. As of 1951, Vietnam had not yet used the names "Hoang Sa" and "Truong Sa" for the Paracels and the Spratlies. It began to use them in 1976.

32. *Beijing Review* (February 18, 1980): 21.

33. Ibid.

34. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (March 16, 1979): 11.

35. Beijing used approximately 750 soldiers against 200 from Saigon. Patrol crafts and missile ships were used by both sides. Several MIGs were also employed to cover Chinese landing. One American observer with the Vietnamese troops was captured for ten days by the Chinese (*NYT*, January 17, p. 5; 19, p. 3; 21, p. 2; 22, p. 3; 23, p. 3; 24, p. 2; and February 1, p. 8; 1974).

36. *Xinhua*, February 4, 1974; *Peking Review* (April 5, 1974): 8.

37. "Statement," the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC, February 25, 1974.

38. *NYT*, February 6, p. 3; March 10, p. 17; 1974. *Christian Science Monitor* (*CSM*), February 6, 1974, p. 1. For the Philippines' assertion, see "Presidential Decree No. 1596" by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, dated June 11, 1978.

39. Vietnam News Agency (*VNA*) (Hanoi), May 6, 1975.

40. In contrast to Vietnam's assertion, Chinese publications around the same time also carried China's territorial map of South China Sea islands, which included the four archipelagoes, and Chinese scientific activities on the Paracels. See *Peking Review*, no. 50 (December 12, 1975): 10–15, and *China Pictorial* (October 1975): 8–13.

41. *NYT*, May 22, 1977, p. 4.

42. For the Chinese Foreign Ministry's statement, see *Renmin Ribao*, December 29, 1978. For the statement of the SRV Foreign Ministry spokesman, see *Hanoi Radio*, December 30, 1978, in *FBIS*, January 2, 1979, p. K4.

43. "Li Xiannian's Talks with Pham Van Dong," *Beijing Review* (March 30, 1979): 20–21. Huang Hua's speech is collected in Chen, *China and the Three Worlds*, pp. 272–74.

44. *Chung-yang jih-pao* [Central Daily News], April 20, 1978.

45. *Hoang Sa and Truong Sa*, p. 8, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SRV, *The Truth About Viet Nam-China Relations Over the Last 30 Years* (hereafter, *White Book*), (Hanoi, 1979), p. 37.

46. Chiu and Park, "Legal Status," pp. 18, 20.

47. *Beijing Review* (May 25, 1979): 16, and *White Book*, p. 37.

48. *Beijing Review* (May 25, 1979): 16.

49. Ibid.

50. "Li Xiannian's Talks with Pham Van Dong," *Beijing Review* (March 30, 1979): 21.

51. *Beijing Review* (May 25, 1979): 17–18.

52. *White Book*, p. 49.

53. *NYT*, June 23, 1978, p. A3.

54. "What Are the Vietnamese Authorities Up To?" *Renmin Ribao*, November 10, 1978.

55. For a scholarly study of the overseas Chinese, see Stephen Fitzgerald, *China and the Overseas Chinese* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972). Appendix D

of the book is about overseas Chinese farms in the PRC. Fujian has 19 such farms out of a total of 51, Guangdong has 18, Guangxi has 6, Yunnan has 6, Guizhou (Kweichou) has 1, and Liaoning has 1.

56. G. William Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 1. Also in the last decade of the thirteenth century, a Yuan Dynasty's expedition to Java was carried out by a fleet of 1,000 ships and 20,000 men with one full year's supplies. See Wang Gungwu, *A Short History of the Nanyang Chinese* (Singapore: Donald More for Eastern Universities Press, 1959), p. 4.

57. This author's interviews with several Chinese community leaders in Saigon, August 3–9, 1972.

58. Ibid. Also see Pao-min Chang, *Beijing, Hanoi, and the Overseas Chinese* (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1982), pp. 9–19.

59. G. William Skinner rightly did not use the British term "tribe" nor the French term "congregation" for the Chinese groups. They are anthropologically neither tribes nor congregations of religious gatherings. Skinner used speech differences for these groups. See his *Chinese Society in Thailand*, pp. 35–40. For the similar situation in South Vietnam, this author prefers to use language-geographical groups to identify the Chinese community.

60. Chang Wen-ho et al., eds., *Overseas Chinese Commerce in South Vietnam: A Yearbook* (Saigon: Chinese Chamber of Commerce in South Vietnam, 1953), chap. 18, "Charter of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in South Vietnam"; Chang Wen-ho, *Yueh-nan Hua-chiao Shih-hua* [A history of Overseas Chinese in Vietnam], (Taipei: Li-min, 1975), chaps. 2 and 4; Ou Ch'ing-ho, *Hsi-kung Lung-wang Chi* [The fall of Saigon], (Taipei: Times Cultural Publishing Co., 1979), pp. 72–99, 116–128; conversations and correspondence with Chen Ch'ing-li, T. H. Lin, Chen Wen-hua, Au Boh, and Chang Wen-ho in Saigon (1972), Taipei, and the United States (1980, 1981). Chang Wen-ho was the Secretary-General of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in South Vietnam prior to April 1975.

61. In March–May 1972, in the critical battle at Anloc, 60 miles north of Saigon, the Fifth Infantry Division and the Paratroop Battalion (palace garrisons), which were composed of a great number of Nung (minority) people and ethnic Chinese, fought heroically against the Viet-Cong. There had never been a Chinese commander in these units.

62. Ho Yen-sheng, *Kung-tang chih-hsia ssu-nien ti Yuehnan* [South Vietnam: four years under communism, (Taipei: Time Cultural Publishing, 1979), p. 170.

63. Tien Man, "Bourgeoisie of Chinese Descent and the Solicitude of Chinese Authorities," *Tap Chi Cong San*, no. 8, 1978, in *FBIS*, September 18, 1978, p. K5.

64. This author's interviews with Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong, Taiwan, New Jersey, and Connecticut in March–August 1979. By agreement, no full names will be given. They are: Au (two interviews), Hoang (two), Chan (two), Chau, Vu, Lam, Chu, Ma, Liu, Dao, Ho, Ii (two), Lou, Lo, Chang (two), and Liao. Also see Ou Ch'ing-ho, *The Fall of Saigon*, pp. 94–99.

65. The PRGRSV Statement of September 10, 1975, *Saigon Radio*, September 10, 1975, in *FBIS*, September 10, 1975, pp. L1–L5.

66. *Saigon Radio*, September 10, 1975, in *FBIS*, September 10, 1975, p. L5.

67. *Giai Phong* [Liberation], "Let Us Engage in Production Labor Emulation and Resolutely Eliminate Comprador Bourgeois Monopolists, Speculators, and Hoarders Who Are Disrupting the Market," in *FBIS*, September 11, 1975, pp. L2–L4.

68. *Giai Phong*, "Attack! Continuously Attack!" September 16, 1975, in *FBIS*, September 18, 1978, p. L1. *Hanoi Radio*, September 17, 18, 1975, in *FBIS*, September 18, 1975, p. L2, September 19, 1975, p. L1.

69. Ou Ch'ing-ho, *The Fall of Saigon*, pp. 96–98, 100–110.

70. This author's interviews in 1979 as previously cited. Also Ou Ch'ing-ho, *The Fall of Saigon*, pp. 163–64.

71. Military Management Committee Communiqué No. 1, in *FBIS*, September 22, 1975, p. L2.

72. Communiqué of the National Bank of Vietnam, September 21, 1975, *Saigon Radio*, September 22, 1975, in *FBIS*, September 22, 1975, pp. L3–L5. Also Communiqué of the Ho Chi Minh City Currency Withdrawal and Exchange Committee, September 22, 1975, in *FBIS*, September 23, 1975, p. L4.

73. This author's inverviews in 1979 (see Note 64).

74. *NYT*, August 26, 1976, p. 13. Also this author's interviews in 1979.

75. This author's interviews in 1979. Also Chu Tsai-sheng, "After the Fall of South Vietnam: People Can Hardly Make a Living," *Chung-yang jih-pao*, December 10, 1976, p. 2.

76. *NYT*, December 16, 1976, p. 10.

77. Ibid., December 17, 1976, p. A14, and February 12, 1977, p. 9.

78. Ibid., December 18, 1976, p. 5.

79. *Viet Nam Courier*, no. 60 (May 1977): 5.

80. The author's interviews in 1979, and André Gelinas, "Life in the New Vietnam," *The New York Review of Books* (March 17, 1977): 21–27.

81. Harriet King, "Hard Times in Saigon," *NYT*, January 30, 1977, p. E30.

82. André Gelinas, "Life in the New Vietnam," p. 24.

83. Fox Butterfield, "Hanoi Toughness in South Is Seen," *NYT*, February 12, and April 13, 1977.

84. *VNA*, April 12, 1977; and Nguyen Van Canh, *Vietnam Under Communism, 1975–1982* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), pp. 217–21.

85. The figure was estimated by the refugees interviewed by the author and by various reports in Hong Kong and the United States.

86. Decree of the Council of Ministers, *Hanoi Radio*, May 3, 1978, in *FBIS*, May 4, 1978, pp. K5–K7.

87. Interview of the Director General of the Vietnam State Bank, *Radio of Ho Chi Minh City*, May 3, 1978, in *FBIS*, May 4, 1978, pp. K7–K9.

88. This author's interviews with Au and Hoang, July 8, 1979; February 10, and August 30, 1980.

89. *NYT*, May 7, 1978, p. 21. Also this author's interviews with Au, Chan, and Lo, in 1979 (see Note 64).

90. *Nhan Dan*, February 24, 1978, "Complete the Socialist Transformation of Private Capitalist Industry and Commerce in the South," in *FBIS*, March 1, 1978, pp. K17–K18.

91. *Nhan Dan*, February 27, 1978, "Socialist Transformation and Construction Is the Masses' Undertaking," in *FBIS*, March 1, 1978, p. K18.

92. Communiqué issued by the Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee, *Ho Chi Minh City Radio*, March 23, 1978, in *FBIS*, March 27, 1978, pp. K5–K7.

93. *Ho Chi Minh City Radio*, March 24, 1978, in *FBIS*, March 27, 1978, p. K9. Also *NYT*, March 26, 1978, p. 8.

94. *Sankei Shimbun* (Japan), May 2, 1978, in *FBIS*, May 3, 1978, p. K11.

95. Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, June 9, 1978, in *On Viet Nam's Expulsion of Chinese Residents*. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1978), pp. 11–12.

96. Some of the unsuccessful escapees were locked up in regular jails. Others were individually put into empty oil barrels, bottoms up and two holes for air and food. Such temporary prisons for attempted escapees were most inhumane, because few could survive a few days inside the barrels in the scorching heat. Some escapees were ordered to stay in the barrels for days as a punishment before they were transferred or released by paying a handsome amount of money. Interviews with refugees Au and Hoang, summer 1979, New Jersey. Au's uncle was one of those "barrel prisoners" (also see Note 64).

97. The author's interviews with refugees in 1979.

98. *NYT*, May 10, 1978, p. A8.

99. *Wenhui Pao* (Hong Kong), May 21, 1978.

100. Voice of the GDR, East Berlin, May 23, 1978, in *FBIS*, May 24, 1978. For an official Vietnamese account, see *Vietnam Courier, Those Who Leave* (Hanoi: 1979): 22–27.

101. Statement by Spokesman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, PRC, May 24, 1978, in *On Viet Nam's Expulsion of Chinese Residents*, p. 6.

102. *NYT*, May 29, 1978, p. A5, and May 30, 1978, p. A4.

103. Ho Yen-sheng, *South Vietnam*, p. 40.

104. *NYT*, June 9, 1978, p. A6.

105. *NYT*, June 20, 1978, p. A8, and June 21, 1978, p. 1.

106. AFP, Nanning, July 7, 1978, in *FBIS*, July 10, 1978, p. K15.

107. *NYT*, June 21, 1978, p. A8.

108. *Beijing Review* (July 21, 1978): 24–25.

109. *NYT*, June 21, 1978, pp. A1 and A9.

110. *NYT*, June 23, 1978, p. A3.

111. *Nhan Dan*, May 29, 1978, Commentator, "Let Us Protect Our Valuable Friendship," in *FBIS*, May 30, 1978, p. K7.

112. SRV, "Memorandum," p. K24.

113. Tien Man, "Bourgeoisie of Chinese Descent," p. K6.

114. Ibid., p. K5.

115. *Xinhua*, June 15, 1978.

116. *Renmin Ribao*, June 17, July 16, August 19, 1978.

117. *NYT*, September 5, 1979, p. A9.

118. *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, September 18, 1978, in *FBIS*, September 19, 1978, p. K1.

119. *Radio Beijing*, October 15, 1978, in *FBIS*, October 16, 1978, pp. A8–A9.

120. Ho Yen-sheng, *South Vietnam*, pp. 172–76. Refugees also confirmed the role played by the Communist officials. See for instance, Henry Kamm, "Vietnamese Refugees Tell How Officials Aid Escapes," *NYT*, November 26, 1978, p. L3.

121. *NYT*, November 8, 1978, p. A2; November 15, 1978, p. A10; November 16, 1978, p. A2; November 17, 1978, p. 1; November 23, 1978, p. 1; November 26, 1978, p. L3; December 7, 1978, p. 1; November 13, 1978, p. A3; December 24, 1978, p. 5; December 28, 1978, p. A5; and *CSM*, November 28, 1978, p. 3.

122. Tran Quoc Vuong, "From the Hung Kings Era to the Ho Chi Minh Era," *Tap Chi Cong San*, no. 9 (September 1978), in *FBIS*, October 20, 1978, pp. K13–K23.

CHAPTER 4

1. See, for instance, James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), p. 504.

2. For example, Wei Jingsheng, a former Red Guard, was sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment on October 16, 1979, in Beijing. He was found guilty of providing a foreigner with military secrets on China's war with Vietnam and engaging in counterrevolutionary activities.

3. Since April 11, 1980, Beijing has re-established its restricted control over state secrets (*Renmin Ribao*, April 11, 1980).

4. Michael Lindsay, *China and the Cold War* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1955), p. 37.

5. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 184.

6. The approach used in this chapter is not based on any single model. It employs several aspects of different models plus a conceptual framework of the author's. During the research, the author found the following publications very

useful: Richard C. Snyder et al., eds., *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1962); Herbert C. Kelman, ed., *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965); Robert Jervis, "The Costs of the Quantitative Study of International Relations," in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Contending Approaches in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969); Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Joseph de Rivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1968); Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean Decision* (New York: The Free Press, 1968); Ole R. Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation, War* (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972); Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1975); George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*; John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (New York: The Free Press, 1977); Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*; and Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crisis* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

7. Using Vietnam as an example, in early 1983 the author wrote an article on the structure, politics, and process of the making of Chinese foreign policy. See King C. Chen, "Politics and Process of Peking's Decision to Attack Vietnam," in Chen Chih-shih et al., *Collection of Articles in Social Sciences* (Taipei, Taiwan: Commercial Press, 1983), pp. 21–101. In mid-1985, a very useful book on this subject was published. See A. Doak Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985). For information on the Politburo members of the CCP in 1978, see Appendix D of this book.

8. One important decision on domestic affairs was the shift of Taiwan policy from liberation of Taiwan to peaceful reunification of Taiwan. See Deng's interview, *Renmin Ribao*, July 30, 1983.

9. Deng Xiaoping's speech on June 2, 1978, at the All-Army Political Work Conference, *Peking Review*, no. 25 (June 23, 1978): 19–21, 29.

10. For Lin Biao's affairs, see "The Vanished Coup of Lin Biao," *Renmin Ribao*, November 24, 1980, and Michael Y. M. Kau, ed., *The Lin Piao Affairs* (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975).

11. The judgment by the Special Court on the "ten principal culprits" is as follows:

Jiang Qing—death with a two-year reprieve
Zhang Chunqiao—death with a two-year reprieve
Yao Wenyuan—twenty years' imprisonment
Wang Hongwen—life imprisonment
Chen Boda—eighteen years' imprisonment

Huang Yongsheng—eighteen years' imprisonment
Wu Faxian—seventeen years' imprisonment
Li Zuopeng—seventeen years' imprisonment
Qiu Huizuo—sixteen years' imprisonment
Jiang Tengjiao—eighteen years' imprisonment

See *Beijing Review*, no. 5 (February 2, 1981): 28. For a comprehensive record of the trial of the Jiang-Lin group, see *A Great Trial in Chinese History* (Beijing: New World Press, 1981).

12. Hua Guofeng, "Report on the Work of the Government" (February 26, 1978), *Peking Review*, no. 10 (March 10, 1978): 7–41. For a general study of the Four Modernizations, see Richard Baum, ed., *China's Four Modernizations: The New Technological Revolution* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980).

13. The "triumvirate" situation was first reported in Hong Kong and then in the United States (*NYT*, August 22, 1977, pp. 1, 8).

14. Yeh Chien-ying (Ye Jianying), "Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution" (August 18, 1977), *Peking Review*, no. 36 (September 2, 1977): 23–37.

15. *NYT*, January 26, 1978, p. A2.

16. The military veterans are Nie Rongzhen, Xu Xiangqian, Liu Bocheng, and Ye Jianying.

17. The Bai-se Uprising took place in Bai-se Hsien, Guangxi, on December 11, 1929, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and Zhang Yuni (Chang Yun-i). Wei Guoqing was one of the members.

18. The Democracy Movement in 1978–1979 was also called the Spring of Beijing, or China's Human Rights Movement. Its most well known demand was the fifth modernization, or democracy, as voiced by Wei Jingsheng, a former Red Guard. For a translation and comments, see James D. Seymour, ed., *The Fifth Modernization: China's Human Rights Movement* (Pine Plains, N.Y.: Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980).

19. Deng Xiaoping, "Speech at Opening Ceremony of National Science Conference," *Peking Review*, no. 12 (March 24, 1978): 9–18.

20. Hua Guofeng, "Raise the Scientific and Cultural Level of the Entire Chinese Nation," *Peking Review*, no. 13 (March 31, 1978): 6–14.

21. Deng Xiaoping, "Speech at the National Educational Work Conference" (April 22, 1978), *Peking Review*, no. 18 (May 5, 1978): 6–12.

22. See, for instance, Fox Butterfield, "Teng, Challenging Mao Ideology, Says Students' Role Is to Study," *NYT*, May 1, 1978, p. A13.

23. *Xinhua* Reporters, "A Marxist Answer," *Renmin Ribao*, May 15, 1978.

24. *Peking Review*, no. 24 (June 16, 1978): 6–12.

25. Ibid., no. 25 (June 23, 1978): 14–21, 29.

26. Vitor Zorza reported from Washington that Deng Xiaoping's challenge to Hua Guofeng implied his criticisms of Mao (*Christian Science Monitor* [*CSM*], April 27, 1978, p. 4).

27. *Renmin Ribao*, June 10, 1978, p. 2; September 22, 1978, p. 2; and September 25, 1978, p. 2. *Jiefangjun Bao*, June 24, 1978. *Guangming Ribao*, September 19, 1978.

28. *Xinhua*, July 10 and 31, 1978.

29. *Peking Review*, no. 40 (October 6, 1978): 6–7.

30. Editorial, "Emancipate Our Minds, Quicken Our Advance—Warmly Celebrating the 29th Anniversary of the Establishment of the PRC," *Hongqi*, no. 10 (1978): 11–16.

31. Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, (adopted on December 22, 1978), *Peking Review*, no. 52 (December 29, 1978): 15.

32. After this author had written in February 1981 his observations on Deng's victory in this debate, his view was supported in December 1981 by a visiting Chinese scholar to the United States. This visiting scholar followed the debate attentively in Beijing. He wrote in late 1981: "In May 1978, they started a great debate . . . It took seven months to get the party officially to endorse Mr. Deng's views, at the party third plenum." See Zhao Jinglun, "China's Reforms," *NYT*, December 20, 1981, p. E17.

33. The Whatever Faction was so named because the faction members asserted that "whatever Chairman Mao said was right." It was led by Hua Guofeng, Wang Dongxing, and others.

34. *NYT*, November 6, 1978, p. 11. When the debate was almost over, *Renmin Ribao* published on October 6, 1978 a lengthy and extremely important article by Hu Qiaomu (Hu Ch'iao-mu), a victim of the Cultural Revolution and rehabilitated President of the Academy of Social Sciences. This article, "Act in Accordance With Economic Laws, Step Up the Four Modernizations," was originally delivered at a cabinet meeting in July 1978 but was not published until early October after Deng Xiaoping had won the ideological debate. In his article, Hu Qiaomu called on the Chinese to study the methods of economic management in capitalist countries, which he publicly commended because they follow objective economic laws. The Chinese had established the PRC for almost 30 years and could no longer explain their own mistakes simply by citing lack of experience. He added that through practice, it has been proved that the Socialist system cannot guarantee an automatic growth of China's economy, and that the Chinese proletariat should "learn selectively from the bourgeoisie" (*Renmin Ribao*, October 6, 1978, pp. 1–3; *FBIS*, October 11, 1978, PRC, pp. E1–22). Such an economic theory in contrast to Mao's doctrine of "politics in command" was unthinkable a year or even a few months earlier. This was a reorientation for the Four Modernizations, flatly silencing the viewpoint of the Whatever Faction. In April 1981, a visiting scholar from the Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing informed this author in New Jersey that the above article was a collective work of the academy with Hu serving as the chief drafter.

35. *NYT*, November 6, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28; December 12, 14, 1978. *CSM*, November 21, 22, 27, 1978.

36. *CSM*, October 11, 1978, p. 5; *NYT*, November 6, 1978, p. 11. Wu De was

accused of suppressing the masses at the Tien An Men incident leading to the death of more than 10,000 people and the purge of Deng Xiaoping. Wu made a speech on April 5, 1976, at Tien An Men Square immediately after the incident and denounced "the unrepentant capitalist-roader Teng Hsiao-ping's revisionist line" (*Peking Review*, no. 15 [April 9, 1976]: p. 4).

37. Frederic A. Moritz, "Chinese See Hints of 'Power Struggle' at the Top," *CSM*, November 1, 1978, p. 4. Fox Butterfield, "Peking Power Fight: Discontent Disclosed," *NYT*, November 27, 1978, p. A3; November 28, 1978, p. A3.

38. The nine Central Committee members were Huang Kecheng, Song Renqiong, Hu Qiaomu, Xi Zhongxun, Wang Renzhong, Huang Huoqing, Chen Zaidao, Han Guang, and Zhou Hui.

39. "Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," *Renmin Ribao*, December 24, 1978.

40. As of 1985, analysts still considered Deng the "ultimate source of authority for making policy decision" in China (Barnett, *The Making of Foreign Policy*, p. 12). For discussions on the psychological factor in foreign policy decisionmaking, see Kelman, *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*; de Rivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy*; Janis and Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict.*

41. This sketch is drawn mainly from Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism,* 2 vols., (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); Wolfgang Bartke, *Who's Who in the People's Republic of China* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1981); Institute of International Relations, *Chung-kung jen-min lu*; *Hongqi*, no. 21 (1981); *Asian Survey*, June 1967, pp. 389–404; and other data collected by the author.

42. A nearly exhaustive discussion on the definition and theory of crisis was held by Charles F. Hermann, Charles A. McClelland, James A. Robinson, Howard H. Lentner, Glenn H. Snyder, David C. Schwartz, Ole R. Holsti, Anthony J. Wiener, and others. See Charles F. Hermann, ed., *International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research* (New York: The Free Press, 1972), especially chapters 1 and 2.

43. Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1968) p. 317.

44. James A. Robinson, "Crisis: An Appraisal of Concepts and Theories," in Hermann, *International Crises,* p. 29.

45. Ho Chi Minh said that Vietnam and China "are both comrades and brothers" (*Vietnam Courier*, no. 349 [November 29, 1971]: 5; *Renmin Ribao*, November 20, 1971).

46. Janis and Mann, *Decision Making*, pp. 172, 190–91.

47. For the Czechoslovakian and Hungarian interventions, see Anatole Shub, "Lessons of Czechoslovakia," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1969; Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1967), pp. 367–88.

48. Deng said at an interview with a Hong Kong editor on July 18, 1981: "In international affairs, China deliberates all the issues on the principle of global strategy and not merely China's interests." This is the first open statement about global strategy ever made by a Chinese leader. See Cha Liang-yun, "A Conversation Record of Deng Xiaoping," *Ming Pao* (monthly), September 1981, p. 5.

49. The model is not specifically based on any single one, as specified in Note 6 of chapter 4. The "psychology-personality factor" is suggested by the author for the previously discussed reason.

50. The seriousness of the leak of secret information in recent past prompted the party newspaper, *Renmin Ribao*, to carry an editorial on April 11, 1980, entitled "Heighten Our Vigilance and Strengthen the Work of Keeping Things Secret." It was published together with the "Provisional Regulations on Keeping State Secrets" promulgated in 1951 by the government. The editorial warned that "a small number of counterrevolutionaries at home" and "hegemonists and other reactionaries abroad are always" seeking China's secrets, and that they are "willing to pay any amount and using various despicable means" to "spy on and collect important information of China's politics, economy, military affairs, and science and technology." It also stated that the work of keeping state secrets was "impaired to such a serious extent that no distinction was made between *insiders* and *outsiders* and thus there were *no secrets to keep*." Finally, it urged every party member to "strictly guard party and state secrets." Such a warning actually confirmed the leaking of several state secrets, including the Lin Biao affair in 1971, the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, the rise of Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang in 1977–1978, and the decision to go to war with Vietnam in 1978. According to the author's informants in Hong Kong (1979), leaking could be made deliberately to create or test public reaction for both domestic and foreign consumption. Hong Kong's publications such as *Cheng Ming* (monthly), *Ming Pao* (daily), *Ch'i-shih Nien-tai* [The Seventies monthly], and *Guang Jiao Jing* [Wide Angle monthly], all have their channels to Beijing. Their channels could be traced to the inner circles of vice-chairmen of the National People's Congress and Politburo members, including that of Hu Yaobang. However, ever since the republication of the 1951 regulations on April 11, 1980, the leaking has been greatly reduced if not completely stopped.

51. James A. Robinson and Richard C. Snyder, "Decision-Making in International Politics," in Kelman, *International Behavior*, pp. 457–58; Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation, War*, pp. 120–21; and Hermann, *International Crises*, pp. 12–15.

52. Lu Keng interview, April 12, 1981 in New York City. Mr. Lu, a well known reporter, stayed in China from 1949–1978.

53. *NYT*, June 6, 1978, p. A6.

54. Agence Française de Presse (*AFP*), Bangkok, August 16, 1978. The U.S. intelligence community also saw at this time a potential for a serious conflict between China and Vietnam. Les Aspin (U.S. representative), "Intelligence Performance on the China-Vietnam Border," unpublished paper, March 1979, p. 2.

55. William S. Turley and Jeffrey Race, "The Third Indochina War," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1980).

56. Among other developments, it should be noted here that in mid-October 1978, the Vietnam News Agency accused Chinese advisers of commanding ten Cambodian divisions along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border (*CSM*, October 19, 1978, p. 2). In late October, Thai military intelligence sources reported that six Vietnamese divisions (60,000) had occupied Cambodian territory along the whole eastern border (*CSM*, October 25, 1978, p. 3).

57. *NYT*, December 18, 1978, p. A12.

58. Geng Biao became defense minister in March 1981. He was then a deputy premier and party external liaison minister. For his speech, see *Studies on Chinese Communism*, no. 166 (October 15, 1980): 142–62.

59. Geng Biao, "Secret Report," p. 150. Deng Xiaoping said at a luncheon-interview with U.S. reporters on January 31, 1979 in Washington, D.C. that "Any [military] action taken by the Chinese [against Vietnam] is through careful consideration" (*NYT*, February 1, 1979, p. A16).

60. Geng Biao, "Secret Report," pp. 150–52.

61. *NYT*, December 18, 1978, p. A12.

62. On December 4, 1978, "Teng revealed that the important top-level political meeting . . . was still in progress" *AFP* (Hong Kong), December 4, 1978, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (*FBIS*), December 4, 1978, p. E1.

63. This author's conversations with Mr. Chen on March 27, Mr. Li on March 28, and Mr. Chang on March 29, 1979 in Hong Kong. In its April 1979 issue, *The Seventies* carried an article, "Deng Xiaoping on Vietnam War," somewhat similar to the account of the author's interviewees. Deng's accounts here were partially and generally confirmed by himself when he was interviewed by Takeji Watanabe, president of the Kyodo news service of Japan, on February 26, 1979 (*Kyodo*, February 26, 1979, in *FBIS*, PRC, February 26, 1979, pp. A5–6).

64. On this particular issue, see also *Ming Pao Daily News* (Hong Kong) March 4, 1979. Chinese careful and sober calculations of the risks of possible Soviet intervention were also made known by Deng Xiaoping when he talked with Roy Jenkins, European Economic Community Commission President, on February 23, 1979 (*AFP*, February 23, 1979, in *FBIS*, PRC, February 26, 1979, p. A1).

65. *CSM*, February 2, 1980, p. 1.

66. *Hanoi Radio*, November 10, 14, and 24, 1978; *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, November 30, 1978, in *FBIS*, December 1, 1978, p. K2.

67. "There Is a Limit to China's Forbearance," *Renmin Ribao*, December 25, 1978.

68. Yang Dezhi was deputy commander of the Chinese forces in the Korean War and headed a military delegation to Hanoi in 1967.

69. For instance, *NYT*, February 18, 19, 1979.

70. *AFP* (Hong Kong), February 20, 1979, in *FBIS*, PRC, February 21, 1979, p. A3.

71. Rep. Les Aspin, "Intelligence Performance," p. 4.

72. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), p. 409.

73. Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 206; also Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 112–22.

74. Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 410.

75. Carter, *Keeping Faith*, pp. 208–09.

76. *Beijing Review*, no. 7 (February 16, 1979): 18.

77. *NYT*, February 9, 1979, p. A12.

78. Commentator, "Anti-Vietnam Agitators Are Doomed to Failure," *Nhan Dan*, February 8, 1979, in *FBIS*, February 8, 1979, p. K2.

79. *NYT*, February 8, 1979, p. A13.

80. Ministry of National Defense, ROC, *Study on the Strategy and Tactics of the Sino-Vietnamese War* (Taipei, 1979), p. 9.

81. Ibid. The account of the February conference, however, is based mostly on the author's interviews in Hong Kong on March 27, 28, 29, and April 10, 1979. As of 1986, these oral accounts remained accurate. There was a problem of political communication in China. For instance, Fox Butterfield of the *New York Times*, having reported from China for a couple of years, stressed the significance of oral communications which often carry important and accurate information ahead of time. As he put it, the oral communications practice "offers an insight into an enormous hidden communications network. It is an information belt that carries news about the inner workings of the Politburo in Peking, the state of the country's economy and international developments that never appear in papers or on the radio and television." See his article, "Chinese Get Their News From a Hidden Network," *NYT*, December 31, 1980, p. A3. The different communications system in China suggests to us that we be more sensitive to its oral information. We must use it selectively, however.

82. *Pravda*, February 11, 1979.

83. *Sankei Shimbun*, February 11, 1979.

84. *Renmin Ribao*, February 12, 1979.

85. *Nhan Dan*, "Don't Touch Vietnam! To Threaten Vietnam Is to Threaten the Whole World!" February 12, 1979.

86. The statement of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC to the Vietnamese Embassy in Beijing (*Renmin Ribao*, February 17, 1979).

87. The author's interviews in Hong Kong, March 27, 28, 29; April 10, 1979. *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), March 4, 1979, in *FBIS*, PRC, March 5, 1979, pp. A8–A9. Also *The Seventies*, April 1979, pp. 25–26.

88. Geng Biao also gave a similar account after the war had broken out. See Tanjug (Beijing), February 21, 1979, in *FBIS*, PRC, February 23, 1979, p. A11; and *AFP* (Beijing), February 23, 1979, in *FBIS*, PRC, February 26, 1979, p. A7.

89. This view was confirmed by an official of the Chinese Foreign Ministry after

the war broke out (*AFP*, February 23, 1979, in *FBIS*, PRC, February 26, 1979, p. A7).

90. *Kyodo*, February 26, 1979, in *FBIS*, PRC, February 26, 1979, p. A5.

CHAPTER 5

1. Lenin wrote "War is simply the continuation of politics by other . . . means." See V. I. Lenin, "The Collapse of the Second International," *Collected Works*, vol. 21 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), p. 219. Lenin's statement was a quotation from Clausewitz. He also praised him writing, "such is the formula of Clausewitz, one of the greatest writers on the history of war." Mao, however, mentioned Lenin but not Clausewitz. Clausewitz's original phrase was "War is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means." See his book, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), Book 1, p. 87 and Book 8, p. 605.

2. Mao Zedong, "On Protracted War," *Selected Military Writings* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 227.

3. Interviews in Hong Kong, with Lo Kau and Chen Wen-chow, March 27–28, 1979, and with Lu Keng, April 12, 1981 in New York.

4. Among numerous studies on Chinese military affairs, the following volumes are often cited as useful references: William W. Whitson (with Chen-hsia Huang), *The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927–71* (N.Y.: Praeger, 1973); Samuel B. Griffith II, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army* (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1967); John Gittings, *The Role of the Chinese Army* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Alexander L. George, *The Chinese Communist Army in Action* (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1967); Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962); Ellis Joffe, *Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949–1964* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); Chester J. Cheng, ed., *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Publications, 1966); Michael Y. M. Kau, ed., *The Lin Piao Affairs* (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975); Harvey W. Nelson, *The Chinese Military System* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977); and Harlan W. Jencks, *From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–1981* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982).

On the subject of people's war, see, among others, Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," *Peking Review* (September 1965); Samuel B. Griffith, *Peking and People's War* (N.Y.: Praeger, 1966); David P. Mozingo and Thomas W. Robinson, *Lin Piao on "People's War": China Takes a Second Look at Vietnam* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1965); and Chalmers Johnson, *Autopsy on People's War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

5. Hsieh Chan, "The Atom Bomb Is a Paper Tiger," *Peking Review*, no. 30 (July 22, 1977): 17.

6. The six components are drawn from an unpublished paper of the author on revolution and people's war.

7. For a more detailed discussion on the PLA's fundamental strategies and tactics, see Whitson, *The Chinese High Command*, chap. 11.

8. See, for instance, Hsinhua correspondent, "Soviet Social-Imperialism: The Most Dangerous Source of World War," *Peking Review*, no. 5 (January 30, 1976): 9–13; and no. 29 (July 15, 1977): 4–10, 21.

9. Chan, "The Atom Bomb," p. 18.

10. For instance, one interpretation suggests that the March 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict was first provoked by Lin Biao who hoped to promote himself in the Chinese hierarchy. See Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute," *American Political Science Review* (December 1972): 1175–202.

11. Mao Zedong, *Selected Military Writings*, p. 347.

12. T'an Cheng, "Questions of Political Work at the New Stage of Army-building," Speech to the Eighth National Congress of the CCP on September 23, 1956, in *Current Background*, no. 422 (October 18, 1956): 13–21.

13. Drew Middleton, "Chinese Military Regards Manpower as No. 1 Asset," *New York Times* (*NYT*), December 2, 1976, pp. 1, 14; also Russell Spur, "China's Defense: Men Against Machine," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (*FEER*) (January 28, 1977): 24–30.

The PRC made its first nuclear test on October 14, 1964, and its twenty-fifth on September 17, 1977. By that date, the USSR had already carried out more than 167 nuclear tests and the United States more than 278.

14. Hu Hsüeh, "Get Rid of the Blind Belief in Nuclear Weapons," *Renmin Ribao*, May 13, 1977, p. 6. Chi Chuan, "Long Live the Spirit of Millet Plus Rifles," *Renmin Ribao*, June 3, 1977, p. 5. *Hsiao-mi chia pu-ch'iang* [Millet plus rifles] was a phrase and a way of life during the guerrilla era of the CCP. It is the spirit of the people's war, with some reservations about the drive for modernization of military technology.

15. *Radio Peking*, January 20, 1978, Theoretical Group of the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission, "Integration of 'Millet Plus Rifles' with Modernization—Criticizing the Crimes of the Gang of Four in Undermining Modernization of National Defense," in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (*FBIS*), January 23, 1978, pp. E1–E6.

16. See Hua's and Deng's speeches at the conference in *Hongqi* [Red Flag], no. 7 (July 1, 1978): 17–22, 30–37.

17. *Renmin Ribao*, "Revolutionization Commands Modernization," June 10, 1978.

18. Xu Xiangqian, "Tigao Jingti, Zhunbei Dazhang" [Be vigilant, prepare for war], *Hongqi*, no. 8 (August 1, 1978): 42–50. Also see William T. Tow, "Chinese Strategic Thought," *Asian Affairs* 7, no. 4 (March–April 1980): 248–69.

19. *Mei-chou Fei-ch'ing T'ung-hsin* [Chinese Communist Affairs Weekly] (hereafter, *Mei-chou T'ung-hsin*), (Taipei), June 1, 1979, pp. 4–6.

20. *Renmin Ribao* and *Jiefangjun Bao* [Liberation Army Daily], "Wan-zheng di Zhun-que di Zhangwo Mao Zedong Jun-shi Si-xiang" [Completely and correctly grasp Mao Zedong's Military Thought], December 18, 1978.

21. *Mei-chou T'ung-hsin*, February 16, 1979, p. 14, and June 1, 1979, pp. 7–8.

22. *Radio Beijing*, January 23, 1979, in *FBIS*, January 26, 1979, p. E24.

23. *Mei-chou T'ung-hsin*, June 1, 1979, p. 8.

24. The figures of the PLA's strength, including weaponry and equipment, are drawn, unless otherwise indicated, mainly from the following sources: *The Military Balance* (London) 1978–1979; R. T. Pretty, ed., *Jane's Weapon Systems, 1979–80*, 10th ed. (New York: Franklin Watts, 1979); *Studies on Chinese Communism* (Taipei), 1978–1980; *NYT*, February 14, 18, 1979.

25. These eleven military regions were: Beijing, Shen-yang, Lanzhou, Xinjiang, Jinan, Nanjing, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu, and Kunming. The Dongjiang (eastern Xinjiang) Military Region, established immediately before the Punitive War, was a second-class region under the Xinjiang Military Region.

26. *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), no. 18 (April 1, 1979): 10–11.

27. *Newsweek* (January 21, 1980): 51; Harlan W. Jencks, "China's 'Punitive' War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment," *Asian Survey* (August 1979): 808. The Atoll air-to-air missile is a U.S. heat-seeking Sidewinder missile of the early 1960s. Since then, the United States has gone through eight different models, each with more sophisticated electronics than the last.

28. *Newsweek* (January 21, 1980): 51.

29. *AFP* (Georges Biannic) February 21, 1979, in *FBIS*, February 22, 1979, p. E3.

30. Figures given here are drawn from the following sources: *Fei Yueh Chan-cheng chih Chan-shu Chan-fa Yen-chiu* [A study on the strategy and methods of the Sino-Vietnamese War], (hereafter, *Chan-shu Chan-fa*, Taipei, 1979), pp. 7–8 and Appendix 1; *Tui Fei-Yueh Chan-cheng chung Fei-chun Chan-shu Chan-fa chi ch'i Wu-ch'i chih Chien-pao* [A brief report on the Chinese strategy, methods, and weaponry during the Sino-Vietnamese War], (hereafter, *A Brief Report*, Taipei, 1979), pp. 21–25; *Da Gong Bao*, March 3, 4, and 7, 1979; *FEER*, March 9, 1979, p. 15; *NYT*, February 14, 18, and 23, and August 15, 1979, p. A3, p. 10, p. A10, and p. A3; *AFP*, February 20, 1979, in *FBIS*, February 21, 1979, p. A3. The 948 aircraft included 28 MIG-21's, 560 MIG-19's, 98 MIG-17's, 120 F9's, and others. The 15 airbases included 5 in Yunnan, 5 in Guangxi, 1 in Guangdong, and 4 on Hainan.

31. The figures of manpower and weaponry of the Vietnamese armed forces are from *The Military Balance*, 1978–1979, pp. 68–69; *Chan-shu Chan-fa*, pp. 11–12; *NYT*, February 14, 18, 23, 1979; *FEER*, March 9, 1979, pp. 14–15.

32. *The Military Balance*, 1978–1979, p. 69; *NYT*, February 14, 1979, p. A3.

33. *Chan-shu Chan-fa*, p. 10.

34. Ibid., pp. 10–11.

35. Nguyen Hu'u Thuy et al., *The Chinese Aggression: Why and How It Failed* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1979), p. 4.

36. A Japanese news agency reports a statement by the Chinese spokesman: "The Chinese air force has not been involved in the war" (*Kyodo*, February 24, 1979).

37. Nguyen Hu'u Thuy et al., *The Chinese Aggression*, p. 10.

38. "Communiqué of the Ministry of National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam," in Van Hien et al., *Chinese Aggression Against Vietnam: Dossier* (Hanoi: Vietnam Courier, 1979), pp. 94–95.

39. *Chan-shu Chan-fa*, pp. 18–21. Laser ("death ray") weapons were reportedly being used by Vietnam as a testing process for the Soviet Union.

40. *Guang Jiao Jing* [Wide Angle], (Hong Kong), March 16, 1979, p. 8.

41. After some losses due to explosions of boobytraps and mines, the Chinese used buffaloes to touch off the explosions to clear the way for the advancing forces.

42. As reported by a Soviet researcher of that institute at a university seminar on communism at Columbia University in New York, September 29, 1981, which the author also attended.

43. *Radio Hanoi*, February 18, and February 19, 1979, in *FBIS*, February 21, 1979, pp. K6–K8. After the war broke out, the West Wing under Yang Dezhi fought more successfully than did the East Wing under Xu Shiyou.

44. *NYT*, February 18, 1979, p. 1.

45. *TASS*, February 18, 1979.

46. *NYT*, February 19 and February 20, 1979, both p. A1.

47. *Xinhua*, February 25, 1979.

48. *Hsinghua*, February 20, 1979, *AFP*, in *FBIS*, PRC, February 21, 1979, p. A2.

49. Nguyen Hu'u Thuy et al., *The Chinese Aggression*, pp. 25–26; *NYT*, February 19, 1979. p. A1, and February 20, 1979, p. A7.

50. *NYT*, February 23, 1979, p. A10.

51. *Kyodo* (Beijing), February 23, 1979, in *FBIS*, PRC, February 23, 1979, p. A13.

52. *NYT*, February 20, 1979, p. A7.

53. *AFP* (Beijing), February 23, 1979, in *FBIS*, February 26, 1979, p. A6.

54. Ibid., p. A7.

55. *Kyodo* (Beijing), February 26, 1979, in *FBIS*, February 26, 1979, pp. 5–6.

56. *NYT*, February 26, 1979, p. A1.

57. The U.S. call for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam and Vietnamese troops from Cambodia was made by the Carter administration in a message to the Beijing leaders carried by Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal (*NYT*, February 23, 1979, p. A10).

58. *NYT*, February 22, 1979, pp. A1 and A6. The 16,000-ton Sverdlovs are the largest surface combatants in Soviet Navy. They have been re-armed with launchers for surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles.

59. *AFP* (Beijing), February 23, 1979, in *FBIS*, February 26, 1979, p. A7; *NYT*, February 23, 1979, p. A1; and *AFP* (New Delhi), February 23, 1979, in *FBIS*, February 26, 1979, p. K2.

60. *Vietnam News Agency* (Hanoi), (*VNA*), February 24, 1979, in *FBIS*, February 26, 1979, p. K2.

61. *VNA* (Hanoi), February 24, 1979, in *FBIS*, February 26, 1979, p. K1.

62. *NYT*, February 23, 1979, p. A11.

63. As stated by Chinese officers at an interview in China; see Jonathan Mirsky, "China's Invasion of Vietnam: A View from the Infantry," *Journal of the Royal United Services for Defence Studies* 126, no. 2 (2 June, 1981): 49.

64. Nguyen Hu'u Thuy et al., *The Chinese Aggression*, pp. 23–24.

65. Ibid., p. 24.

66. *Guang Jiao Jing*, no. 78 (March 16, 1979), p. 7.

67. *Renmin Ribao*, March 3, 1979, p. 4; *NYT*, February 28, 1979, p. A1.

68. *Renmin Ribao*, March 4, 1979, p. 5.

69. Ibid.

70. *FEER*, May 4, 1979, p. 12.

71. Vietnam Courier, *Chinese War Crimes* (Hanoi: 1979), pp. 21–24; *Beijing Review*, no. 10 (March 9, 1979): 15–16.

72. *Fei-Yueh Chan-cheng P'ou-hsi Pao-kao* [An analytical report on the Sino-Vietnamese War], (Taipei), (hereafter, *P'ou-hsi Pao-kao*), 1979, p. 14.

73. *Renmin Ribao*, March 6, 1979, p. 1; *Beijing Review*, no. 10 (March 9, 1979): 12–13.

74. *Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Shengli Jieshu dui Yue Ziwei Fanji Baowei Bianjiang Zhanzheng di Tongzhi* [A notice of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the victorious conclusion of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam and border-protection war], (Beijing) (hereafter, *Tongzhi*), 1979, p. 2. *Tongzhi* was a semi-secret circular; it also instructed all the party offices not to "publish, broadcast, or post it."

75. *NYT*, March 5, 1979, p. A1 and A12.

76. *Nhan Dan*, March 7, 1979.

77. *VNA*, March 2, 1979 and March 3, 1979 in *FBIS*, March 5, 1979, p. K3.

78. Cuban Ambassador Fernando López Muiño's interview with *El Sol*, a Mexico City daily, in *NYT*, March 4, 1979, p. 11.

79. *NYT*, March 11, 1979, p. 3.

80. *U.N. Chronicle* 15, no. 3 (March 1979): 5–17, 42–46; also *U.N. Documents*, Provisional, Security Council, 34th Year-Plenary, (February 23–25, 27–28, 1979).

81. Founded in 1967, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) includes Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei.

82. *U.N. Chronicle* 15, no. 3 (March 1979): p. 5.

83. *Beijing Review* (March 2, 1979): 19–22; *U.N. Chronicle* 15, no. 3 (March 1979): 5.

84. *U.N. Chronicle* 16, no. 4 (April 1979): 46.

85. Ibid., pp. 46–49.

86. A diplomat at the United Nations told the author on February 21, 1979, "We have a saying in the U.N.: When there is a dispute between small countries, the dispute disappears. When there is a dispute between a large country and a small country, the small country disappears. When there is a dispute between big countries (big powers), the United Nations disappears."

87. *AFP*, March 11, 1979, in *FBIS*, March 12, 1979, p. A4.

88. *Mei-chou T'ung-hsin*, July 27, 1979, p. 15.

89. *Tui Fei-Yueh Chan-cheng chih Yen-chiu* [A study on the Sino-Vietnamese War] (Taipei), (hereafter, *Chan-cheng chih Yen-chiu*), 1979, pp. 2–5; *Mei-chou T'ung-hsin*, March 23, July 27, 1979, pp. 9–10, 14–16.

90. *Chung-kung Wen-ti Tzu-liao* [Chinese Communist Data Weekly], (Taipei), (hereafter *Tzu-liao*), February 25, 1980, pp. 1–5; September 22, 1980, pp. 24–25; November 3, 1980, p. 23. Xu, born in 1906, practiced Chinese Kung Fu (Wu Shu) until he joined the communist revolution at age 16. In May 1979, he was invited to attend the National Wu Shu Performance and Exchange Conference in Nanning, Guangxi. He was a member of the Central Advisory Committee of the party before he died in 1985.

Most of Hua's supporters were identified as the Whatever Faction, who believed that whatever Mao said was right. It included Wu De, Wang Dongxing, Ji Dengkui, and others.

91. *Radio Hanoi*, Domestic Service, March 4, 1979, in *FBIS*, March 5, 1979, Vietnam, p. K25.

92. *AFP* (Hong Kong), May 2, 1979, in *FBIS*, May 3, 1979, PRC, p. E1.

93. *Christian Science Monitor* (*CSM*), March 7, 1979, p. 12.

94. *NYT*, March 28, 1979, p. A6.

95. *Cheng Ming*, April 1, 1979, p. 10.

96. Mr. Li's and Mr. Chen's interviews, March 28, 1979, Hong Kong.

97. *Chan-cheng chih Yen-chiu*, pp. 6–7. The PRC was reported to have mobilized more than 50,000 militia men from Guangxi and 30,000 from Yunnan. They were organized in 102 battalions and several hundred companies, including a mortar company, a heavy machine-gun company, an anti-aircraft gun company, a medicare company, a road-repairing company, a transportation company, donkey-horse transportation units, and other logistic units. The militia system improved significantly after the National Militia Work Conference in July–August 1978. Its campaign slogan was "Every man is a soldier." See *Mei-chou T'ung-hsin*, March 30, 1979, p. 11; Chang Tai, "National Militia Work Conference," *Studies on Chinese Communism* 12, no. 9 (September 15, 1978): 20–27.

98. Jean Thoraval of AFP from Hanoi in *NYT*, March 27, 1979, p. A3.

99. Ibid.

100. *Kyodo*, March 29, 1979, in *FBIS*, March 29, 1979, p. E7; *Renmin Ribao*, March 1, 1979, p. 2; 345A and 316A divisions were reinforcements.

101. *Chan-cheng chih Yen-chiu*, pp. 7–9; *P'ou-hsi Pao-kao*, pp. 18-27; *NYT*, March 6, 1979, p. A10.

102. *Mei-chou T'ung-hsin*, February 16, 1979, p. 14.

103. *Chan-cheng chih Yen-chiu*, p. 10; Nguyen Hu'u Thuy, et al., *The Chinese Aggression*, pp. 14–15.

104. Mr. Lu's interview in New York, April 12, 1981.

105. *Tongzhi*, p. 8. The places were apparently Bose, and Gueixien, Guangxi Province.

106. The other two factors were obsolete Chinese logistics and Vietnam's regional forces that contained, isolated, and whittled the Chinese down (*VNA* [Hanoi], April 6, 1979, in *FBIS*, April 9, 1979, pp. K2–K3).

107. China's claims have been repeatedly cited above. The editorial of *Renmin Ribao* on March 7, 1979 repeated such claims. For Vietnamese claims, see *VNA* (Hanoi), April 6, 1979, in *FBIS*, April 9, 1979, pp. K2–K3; and commentator, "The Chinese Aggressors' First Strategic Defeat," *Nhan Dan*, March 10, 1979, in ibid., March 12, 1979, pp. K2–K3. The Soviet Union also claimed a victory for Vietnam (*CSM*, March 6, 1979, p. 3).

108. It was held mostly by Wang Dongxing and other Whatever Faction men.

109. *Jiefangjun Bao,* "Love and Defend Our Motherland," March 26, 1979, p. 1.

110. Xu Xiangqian, "Wei Shi-xian Guo-fang Xian-dai-hua er Nu-li Fen-dou" [Struggle hard to carry out defense modernization], *Hongqi*, no. 10 (October 2, 1979): 28–33.

CHAPTER 6

1. The 320,000 Chinese army personnel in Vietnam served over a period of seven years (1965–1971). See note 15 in chapter 1.

2. *Renmin Ribao*, May 6, 1979; *New York Times* (*NYT*), May 14, and June 12, 1979.

3. Interviews with Boat People in New Jersey, Connecticut and New York on August 14, October 15, 1979, March 10, 1980. *NYT*, June 8, 12, 26, July 21, 25, November 23, 1979; May 7, July 2, 1980; January 11, 1982. Also see Nguyen Van Canh, *Vietnam Under Communism, 1975–1982* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), pp. 128–30.

4. Doan van Toai, "What's Become of Vietnam?" *Wall Street Journal* (*WSJ*), March 24, 1982, p. 26.

5. *NYT*, May 16, 1979, p. A2; May 20, 1979, p. 17.

6. *NYT*, June 30, and July 1, 1979, p. 3 and p. 1.

7. *Beijing Review*, no. 30 (July 27, 1979): 22–25.

8. Barry Wain, "The Indochina Refugee Crisis," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1979): 173.

9. Walter F. Mondale, "Evian and Geneva," *NYT*, July 28, 1979, p. 17.

10. *NYT*, July 22, 1979, p. 1, and July 26, 1979, p. A18.

11. *NYT*, August 18, 1979, p. 3. For a more detailed argument from Hanoi, see *Vietnam Courier, Those Who Leave*, 1979, pp. 19–27.

12. *Hanoi Radio*, July 6, 1979, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (*FBIS*), July 9, 1979, p. K1.

13. *Phnom Penh Radio* (Heng Samrin's), July 6, 1979, in *FBIS*, July 9, 1979, p. H1.

14. *Christian Science Monitor* (*CSM*), May 30, 1979, p. 4.

15. *NYT*, September 5, 1979, p. A9.

16. Ibid., July 17, 1979, p. A3, and August 9, 1979, p. 2; *CSM*, February 2, 1982, p. 12.

17. *United Daily*, July 28, 1979, and August 1, 1979.

18. James P. Sterba, "Thousands of Vietnam Refugees Are Trapped in China," *NYT*, July 10, 1980, p. A3; and ibid., August 10, 1982, p. A2.

19. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey 1982*, (New York: American Council for Nationalities Service, 1982), p. 26.

20. Ibid.; *NYT*, July 10, 1980, p. A3; July 19, 1983, p. A2.

21. Henry Kamm, "Taiwan's Aid to Refugees Goes Unrecognized," *NYT*, August 30, 1981, p. 22; Report by Mao Sung-Nien, chairman of the Overseas Affairs Commission, R.O.C., in *United Daily*, April 8, 1981; *United Daily*, January 31, 1981, February 28, 1981, September 23, 1981, August 7, 1982; *Central Daily News*, September 26, 1980, February 14, 1981, August 21, 1982; Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, R.O.C., *Arrival and Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees in the Republic of China* (Taipei, April 1983), pp. 5–7; and *World Refugee Survey 1982*, p. 27.

22. Conversations with Mrs. Hoang and Mrs. Tran on April 8, May 10, 1982, and Ms. Au on August 17, 1984 in New Jersey.

23. *NYT*, June 12, 1979, pp. A1, and A6; June 15, 1979, p. A11; June 23, 1979, p. 2; July 1, 1979, p. 3.

24. Sydney H. Schanberg, "Cambodian Reporter Who Fled 'True Hell' Tells of 4-Year Ordeal," *NYT*, October 12, 1979, pp. A1, A10.

25. *NYT*, August 31, 1979.

26. *CSM*, March 12, 1980, p. 12, May 5, 1980, p. 6.

27. Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, *Press Release*, no. 21, September 29, 1982, pp. 8–9.

28. Lau Teik Soon, "ASEAN and the Cambodian Problem," *Asian Survey* (June 1982): 549.

29. The nonalignment movement has come a long way. Originated at the Bandung Conference in April 1955 and founded in Belgrade in 1961, it aims at the

development of an independent political power of the Third World. Many of its member nations were victims of colonialism. In two decades, it grew into a 101-nation movement, and its stand has tilted toward the leftist, pro-communist side. As the only survivor of the five founding fathers of the movement, U Nu of Burma (the others were Jawaharlal Nehru, Sukarno, Josip Tito, and Gamal Abdel Nasser) rightly criticized it in 1980: "I cannot honestly call it a nonaligned movement . . . As far as I am concerned, I do not see any bright future for it . . . The world opinion has ceased to respect it as a nonaligned movement." See Henry Kamm, "U Nu, a Founder of Third-World Bloc, Is Now Critical of It," *NYT*, August 5, 1980, p. A3. As of 1986, its eight conferences were held as follows: (1) Belgrade, 1961, 25 nations attended; (2) Cairo, 1964, 57 nations attended; (3) Lusaka, Zambia, 1970, 54 nations attended; (4) Algiers, 1973, 76 nations attended; (5) Lima, Peru, 1975, 80 nations and political units attended; (6) Havana, 1979, 89 nations and units attended; (7) New Delhi, 1983, 101 nations and organizations attended; (8) Harare, Zimbabwe, 1986, 101 nations and organizations attended.

30. For a general assessment, see Fouad Ajami, "The Fate of Nonalignment," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1980/81): 366–85.

31. *NYT*, September 5, 1979, p. A1.

32. *Nhan Dan*, "Great Success of the Havana Conference," September 10, 1979, in *FBIS*, September 11, 1979, pp. K1–K3.

33. *NYT*, September 8, 9, and 10, 1979, pp. 6, 1, and A1. The conference also decided neither to oust nor to condemn Egypt.

34. *U.N. Chronicle* (January 1980): 39–41; *NYT*, September 20, 22, 1979, pp. A7 and 1-2.

35. Ibid., September 23, 1979, p. 7.

36. *U.N. Chronicle* (January 1980): 39.

37. *Asia Record* (May 1980): 2, 4.

38. David Jenkins, "Second Thoughts on Kuantan," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (*FEER*), (October 10, 1980): 27–28.

39. *CSM*, September 15, 1980, p. 3.

40. *NYT*, June 2, 1981, p. A3.

41. *NYT*, June 19, 1981, p. A5.

42. *U.N. Chronicle* (September–October 1981): 38.

43. *Phnom Penh Radio*, July 19, 1981, in *FBIS*, July 20, 1981, pp. H1–H2.

44. Prince Norodom Sihanouk's interview with the author, October 17, 1982, New York (hereafter, Sihanouk interview). Also Chang Pao-min, *Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985), pp. 1–26, 158–59.

45. *NYT*, September 3, 1979, p. A2.

46. Ibid., October 12, 1979; *CSM*, November 19, 1979.

47. Soon, "ASEAN and the Cambodian Problem," p. 557.

48. Wang Taiping, "Insistence on Struggle is Victory," *Shijie Zhishi* [World Knowledge], March 16, 1980, pp. 6–9.

49. *Asian Record*, vol. 1, no. 11, February 1981, p. 13. Beijing's official publication reported that both Prime Ministers Prem Tinsulanonda and Lee Kuan Yew had discussed with Chinese leaders the situation of Southeast Asia, especially Kampuchea. *Beijing Review*, no. 45 (November 10, 1980): 8, 11–12, and no. 47 (November 24, 1980): 7.

50. *NYT*, December 23, 1979, p. 1.

51. Ieng Sary's interview with the author, September 27, 1980.

52. *NYT*, December 1, 1980, p. A9.

53. *Renmin Ribao*, "We Should See the Kampuchean Issue from the Entire Strategic Situation," December 27, 1980.

54. *Voice of Democratic Kampuchea* (*VODK*), January 9, 1981, in *FBIS*, January 12, 1981, pp. H8–H10, and *VODK*, Khieu Samphan interview, January 16, 1981, in *FBIS*, January 21, 1981, p. H8.

55. *Asian Record* (February 1981): 13.

56. *Time* (March 2, 1981): 53. Prince Sihanouk told the author that the Khmer Rouge had killed 14 members of his family except two sons who were with the prince under house arrest in Phnom Penh in 1975–1978 (Sihanouk interview).

57. Sihanouk interview. Also *Renmin Ribao*, March 13, 1981, p. 1; *Time* (March 2, 1981): 53.

58. *Nhan Dan*, "Our Just Cause and Good Will," January 29, 1981, in *FBIS*, January 29, 1981, pp. K1–K3; *NYT*, January 31, 1981, p. 4.

59. "Joint Statement" of the Kampuchea Tripartite Meeting, *Beijing Review*, no. 37 (September 14, 1981): 10; also see Permanent Mission of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations, "On the National Union Issue," *Press Release*, no. 105/81 (New York: December 7, 1981), p. 2.

60. *Bangkok Post*, November 26, 1981.

61. Permanent Mission of Democratic Kampuchea, *Press Release*, no. 106/81 (New York: December 11, 1981), pp. 1–5.

62. Permanent Mission of Democratic Kampuchea, *Press Release*, no. 49/82 (New York: June 23, 1982), pp. 1–4.

63. *Renmin Ribao*, "Jiaqiang Tuanjie Gongtong Duidi," [Strengthen unity, jointly fight against the common enemy], June 25, 1982, p. 6.

64. *NYT*, June 23, 1982, p. A6.

65. *Hanoi Radio*, June 21, 1982, in *FBIS*, June 22, 1982, pp. K1–K2.

66. *Asia Record* (September 1982): 14, and (November 1982): 8.

67. *Hanoi Radio*, July 7, 8, 1982, in *FBIS*, July 8, 9, 1982, pp. K1–K2.

68. *CSM*, July 22, 1982, p. 13.

69. Ren Zhong, "Hanoi's 'Partial Troop Withdrawal' Fraud," *Beijing Review* (July 19, 1982): 11–13.

70. Daniel Southerland, "Vietnam: Struggling to Win the Peace," *CSM*, February 2, 1982, p. 12; Henry Kamm, "Life in 'Liberated Cambodia,' " *New York Times Magazine* (May 18, 1980): 78; *NYT*, September 22, 1982, p. A2.

71. Ieng Sary stated definitely that such a doctrine had already been established (Ieng Sary interview).

72. Sihanouk interview. Son Sann declared that "the Vietnamese only want to exterminate and colonize our country." *China Daily* (Beijing), April 23, 1984, p. 1.

73. Colin Campbell, "Defectors Detail Hanoi Role in Running Cambodia," *NYT*, October 9, 1982, p. 5.

74. Sihanouk interview. Sihanouk also said that Beijing offered military aid to almost the entire opposition force. Some 3,000 of his 5,000 men were equipped by Chinese arms; the other 2,000 men were formerly Lon Nol's followers.

75. Sihanouk interview. Barry Wain, "A Cambodian Patriot Explains His Khmer Rouge Alliance," *WSJ*, August 23, 1982, p. 15.

76. Sihanouk interview. In October 1982, Son Sann, prime minister of Sihanouk's coalition, said that if his countrymen were forced to choose between the Heng Samrin regime and the Khmer Rouge, "the people will choose the Heng Samrin regime." *The Asia Record* (November 1982): 6.

77. Sihanouk interview.

78. *Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea's Proposal for a Political Settlement to the Problem of Kampuchea* (Beijing, March 1986). *People's Daily* (Overseas Edition), March 22, 1986. *VNA*, March 19, 1986.

79. *NYT*, February 20, 1979; December 26, 1979.

80. *The Bangkok Post*, January 19, 1981.

81. Editorial, "Restraint for Peace," *The Korea Herald*, February 27, 1979, in *FBIS*, February 27, p. E1.

82. Letter from Kong-ja Chang of the Research Institute for International Affairs in Seoul to the author, June 11, 1982.

83. The author's conversations with three Thai, Singaporean, and Indonesian U.N. diplomats (names unrevealed) on February 19, 20, 1979 in New York.

84. *Xinhua* (Beijing), February 22, 1979, in *FBIS*, February 23, 1979, p. A12.

85. James P. Sterba, "Neighbors Relish Hanoi's Discomfort," *NYT*, March 11, 1979, p. E3; Henry Kamm, "Asians to Side With Peking Against Hanoi," *NYT*, March 14, 1979, p. A3.

86. *Nhan Dan*, March 27, 1979; *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), March 28, 1979.

87. Zhang Weilie interview, *The Bangkok Post*, April 1, 1979.

88. *Hanoi Radio*, September 16, 1979, September 29, 1979, in *FBIS*, September 17, 1979, p. K4 and October 10, 1979, p. K4.

89. *Hanoi Radio*, October 17, 1979, in *FBIS*, October 17, 1979, p. K1.

90. *Southeast Asia Record*, week of December 27, 1979–January 3, 1980, p. 10. Hanoi also hardened its position against the United Nations on March 15, 1980, by rejecting a U.N. Human Rights Commission resolution that accused Hanoi of violating human rights in Kampuchea.

91. *NYT*, March 8, 1980, p. 4.

92. ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statement, *Bangkok Radio*, June 26, 1980, in *FBIS*, June 26, 1980, p. A2.

93. Cited in Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia in 1980: Regime Fatigue?" *Asian Survey* (February 1981): 244.

94. *Bangkok Post*, July 20, 1980.

95. *Beijing Review*, no. 45 (November 10, 1980): 12. Also the conference of 16 Asian-Pacific Commonwealth nations issued a joint communiqué in India, expressing grave concern over the persistence of "foreign intervention" in Kampuchea and urging "the withdrawal of foreign forces" from that country (*NYT*, September 9, 1980, p. A5).

96. Les Buszynski, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia Since the Fall of Saigon," *Asian Survey* (May 1981): 545–46.

97. *The Straits Times* (Singapore), June 17, 1982, pp. 1, 8, 9.

98. Ibid., June 18, 1982, p. 14.

99. Sihanouk interview.

100. There were more details about the proposals: (1) no number was given for troop withdrawal; (2) the safety zone could be supervised by a United Nations force if the U.N. withdrew its recognition of the Khmer Rouge as the legitimate government of Kampuchea; (3) the international conference would include the five original ASEAN countries, Burma, India, and five permanent U.N. Security Council members (*Asia Record* [August 1982]: 1, 7).

101. A joint press conference of the five ASEAN foreign ministers, *Bangkok Radio*, August 7, 1982, in *FBIS*, August 9, 1982, p. A2.

102. Speech by Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Sitthi Savetsila to the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand, *Bangkok Radio*, August 12, 1982, in *FBIS*, August 12, 1982, pp. J1–J3.

103. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, *Malaysia's Refugee Policy*, Appendix K (Kuala Lumpur, August 1983), p. K5.

104. *Beijing Review* (February 9, 1981): 15. Also consult William R. Heaton, "China and Southeast Asian Communist Movements: The Decline of Dual Track Diplomacy," *Asian Survey* (August 1982): 779–800.

105. Scholars may differ slightly on the date of change but not on the change itself. Consult Donald S. Zagoria, ed., *Soviet Policy in East Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 1 and 153.

106. Douglas Pike, "The USSR and Vietnam: Into the Swamp," *Asian Survey* (December 1979): 1169; also Edmund F. McWilliams, Jr., "Hanoi's Course in Southeast Asia," *Asian Survey* (August 1984): 881–83.

107. *NYT*, May 22, September 7, 1980; January 25, April 21, 22, October 12, 1981; December 30, 1982; *WSJ*, February 12, June 1, 1981; *CSM*, March 3, September 20, 1982.

108. *NYT*, February 16, 1982, p. A7.

109. *NYT*, April 25, 1982, December 30, 1982.

110. Chinese Foreign Ministry's memorandum, "Cause of Deteriorated Sino-Vietnamese Relations and of Turbulence in Southeast Asia," *Beijing Review*, no. 29 (July 20, 1981): 16–20; Guo Yan and Dong Nan, "The Kampuchean Issue," *Beijing Review*, no. 37 (September 12, 1983): III–XXIV.

111. *The Asia Record* (July 1982): 9.

112. S. Rajaratnam, "Now Vietnam Fights for a Soviet Indochina," *WSJ*, June 1, 1981, p. 27.

113. *NYT*, July 10, 1984, p. A10.

114. Barry Kramer, "China Warms Up to Wary Neighbors," *WSJ*, February 3, 1981, p. 37; also Sheldon W. Simon, "The Two Southeast Asias and China: Security Perspectives," *Asian Survey* (May 1984): 526–30.

115. *The Asia Record* (December 1982): 15.

116. Ibid., September 1981, p. 9.

117. *CSM*, September 20, 1982, p. 7.

118. *The Asia Record* (October 1982): 2.

119. Speech of former Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge at a meeting in Washington D.C., November 23, 1982.

120. Vo Nguyen Giap, "People's War for National Defense in the New Era," *Tap Chi Cong San*, no. 5, 1979, in *FBIS*, May 24, 1979, pp. K11–K32. Similar views were also held by *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, *Nhan Dan*, *Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, in *FBIS*, April 27, May 3 and 30, 1979.

121. *Remin Ribao*, March 25, 1980, p. 6.

122. *Beijing Review* (July 21, 1980): 11–12.

123. Hoang Van Hoan had served as a vice-chairman of the National Assembly for years under Truong Chinh.

124. Le Duan, "Condensed Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fifth Vietnamese Communist Party Congress," *Hanoi Radio*, March 27, 1982, in *FBIS*, March 29, 1982, pp. K6–K18; Pham Van Dong's report, *Hanoi Radio*, March 27, 1982, in *FBIS*, March 30, 1982, pp. K1–K7; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Background Brief* (London: January 1986), p. 5; *CSM*, April 19, 1982, p. 1; *WSJ*, April 24, 1981, p. 32; *NYT*, December 28, 1981, p. A1; April 4, 1982, p. A9; June 10, 1982, p. A5; June 13, 1982, p. E3; *VNA*, February 2, 1985; *Time* (July 7, 1986): 41.

125. *NYT*, June 15, 1982, p. A3.

126. Ibid., May 1, 1982, p. 5.

127. International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, April 29, 1982; *Background Brief* (London), June 1984, p. 5.

128. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Background Brief*, October 1982, p. 4; *CSM*, April 19, 1982, p. 14; August 3, 1982, p. 5.

129. *NYT*, January 28, 1985, p. A2.

130. *AFP* (Beijing), May 2, 1979, in *FBIS*, May 3, 1979, p. E1. *NYT*, March 27, 1979, p. A3; June 7, 1979, p. 12; October 14, 1979, p. 19; January 5, 1980, p. 2. *Newsweek* (July 16, 1979): 59. *Mei chou T'ung-hsin*, September 7, 1979, p. 7. *CSM*,

February 22, 1980, p. 1; July 8, 1980, p. 4. Sihanouk interview with the author, October 17, 1982.

131. *AFP* (Beijing), February 5, 1985, in *Centre Daily News* (New York), February 6, 1985.

132. Foreign Minister Huang Hua's interview, *NYT*, May 1, 1981, p. A11.

133. "On Questions of Party History" (adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on June 27, 1981). *Beijing Review*, no. 27 (July 6, 1981): 10–39.

134. Song Shilun, "Mao Zedong Military Thought Is the Guidance of the Victory of Our Army," *Hongqi*, no. 16 (1981): 5–15.

135. Cited in *Jiefangjun Bao*, "Build Up a Strong, Modernized and Regularized Revolutionary Army," October 1, 1981. For an assessment of Chinese military modernization, see Thomas W. Robinson, "Chinese Military Modernization in the 1980s" and Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, "Chinese Military Modernization: The Western Arms Connection," both in *China Quarterly* (June 1982). Also Michael Y. M. Kau, "Deng's Quest for Military Modernization and National Security," a paper delivered at Sino-American Conference on Mainland China, June 17, 1981, at the University of California at Berkeley.

136. Yang Dezhi, "Several Problems of the Building of Regularization," *Jiefangjun Bao*, January 22, 1982.

137. Associated Press, July 13, 1982.

138. *NYT*, May 19, 1980, p. A4; and October 17, 1982, p. A15.

139. Zhang Aiping, "Several Problems About National Defense Modernization," *Hongqi*, no. 5 (March 1, 1983): 21–24.

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Mr. Liao and Ms. Au, July 8, August 14, October 15, 1979; and February 10, 1980, Connecticut and New Jersey
Mrs. Hoang, August 3, 14, 1979; March 10, August 30, 1980; April 8, 1982, New Jersey
Mr. Chau, August 8, 1979, New Jersey
Mr. Tran, March 10, 1980, New York
Mr. Ieng Sary, September 27, 1980, New York
Mr. Chang Wen-ho (letters), December 22, 1980, and May 15, 1981, California
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Mr. Lee, December 27, 1981, New Jersey
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King C. Chen, a professor of political science at Rutgers University, is also author of the definitive study *Vietnam and China, 1938–1954* (Princeton University Press, 1969), as well as several books on the foreign policy of the PRC.

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